Commonwealth v. Reed
| Decision Date | 03 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1197 WDA 2020,J-A06028-22 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. AARON REED Appellant |
| Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
Aaron Reed appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his guilty plea to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.[1] We affirm.
In 2019, Reed, then fifteen-years-old, committed an armed robbery with another juvenile. Reed and his co-conspirator knocked on the door of the victim's residence and were permitted entry by the victim's stepfather, who indicated that the victim was in the basement. Reed and his co-conspirator proceeded to the basement where they encountered the victim and his girlfriend. Reed pointed a gun at the victim's chest and demanded marijuana. A struggle with the victim ensued during which Reed's firearm discharged, striking the victim in the abdomen. Reed and his companion attempted to flee, but the stepfather locked them in the garage. They escaped by shooting out garage door windows and climbing through them. Police responded to the residence, and the victim identified Reed as the shooter. Police arrested Reed later that evening and he made several incriminating statements. Police also discovered gunshot powder residue on his hands.
Police charged Reed with numerous offenses, including robbery aggravated assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Pursuant to the 1995 amendments ("Act 33") to the Juvenile Act of 1972, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375, the charges for robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon vested in the criminal division of the court of common pleas. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6302 (). Reed filed a petition to decertify the case to juvenile court pursuant to section 6322(a). Therein, he challenged the constitutionality of Act 33 and claimed that the decertification court should have granted his petition to decertify the charges because he was amenable to treatment through the juvenile justice system.
The decertification court conducted a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, Reed presented the testimony of Carol A. Hughes, M.A., a licensed psychologist, who prepared an expert report in this matter and opined that Reed was amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system. Hughes indicated that she had interviewed Reed and his family and reviewed Reed's educational records. Hughes noted that Reed suffers from ADHD, self- medicates with marijuana, and had no criminal record. Hughes further opined that the crimes Reed committed during the armed robbery lacked criminal sophistication. The Commonwealth argued that Reed was not amenable to treatment and presented evidence that, since his release on bail for the armed robbery, Reed engaged in additional violent criminal conduct and was charged with simple assault after he and other juveniles attacked another juvenile. At the conclusion of the hearing, the decertification court denied the petition. Reed filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied. On October 28, 2020, Reed pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement.[2] The trial court sentenced him to six years of probation. Reed thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Reed raises the following issues for our review:
In his first issue, Reed challenges the constitutionality of Act 33. Reed's constitutional challenge presents a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 493 (Pa. 2011). Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 219 (Pa. 2000). Therefore, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion. Id.
The legislature, through the Juvenile Act, placed the adjudication of a "delinquent act" within the jurisdiction of juvenile court when the defendant is a child. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). However, section 6302 of the Juvenile Act excludes robbery and aggravated assault from the definition of a delinquent act when the perpetrator is aged fifteen or older and used a gun during the commission of the crime. See id. § 6302 (providing the definition of "Delinquent act" at (2)(ii)(C), (D)). The prosecution for an offense excluded from the definition of a delinquent act is automatically vested in criminal court rather than in juvenile court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a); see also Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2007) ().
When a criminal court has jurisdiction over a crime committed by a juvenile pursuant to section 6322(a), the juvenile may request that his or her case be decertified, i.e., removed from criminal court and transferred to the jurisdiction of juvenile court. See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003). This process has been upheld as constitutional by this Court and our Supreme Court. See Cotto, 753 A.2d at 222 ( as constitutional the 1995 Amendments to the Juvenile Act which vest original jurisdiction in the criminal courts for specified violent felonies and granting the decertification court discretion in determining whether to transfer a direct file case to juvenile court); see also Commonwealth v. Aziz, 724 A.2d 371, 374 (Pa. Super. 1999) ().
In the instant matter, Reed contends that Act 33 is unconstitutional. While Reed concedes that Cotto and Aziz are binding on this Court, he nevertheless claims that since those cases were decided there have been several decisions by the United States Supreme Court recognizing that juvenile offenders are capable of change and rehabilitation and are not to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system, including: Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ( that juvenile offenders who commit crimes other than murder cannot constitutionally be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (). Reed claims the differences between juveniles and adults should also be recognized in the jurisdictional context (i.e., criminal court versus the juvenile justice system).
Reed claims that Act 33 does not achieve its stated purposes, as set forth in section 6301(b)(2):
Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of the community.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2). Reed asserts that Act 33 does not protect the community because studies have shown that processing juvenile offenders through adult criminal court makes them more likely to reoffend, to reoffend earlier, to commit a higher number of subsequent offenses, and to commit more serious offenses. Reed claims that Act 33 does not hold juveniles accountable for their conduct. He argues that juveniles in adult prisons suffer from higher rates of physical and sexual abuse and suicide than adult inmates, are more likely to be sexually assaulted and beaten by staff, and attacked with a weapon. Reed claims that, apart from physical harm, juveniles in adult prisons also suffer from mental illness. Reed maintains that juveniles in adult prisons are less able to manage their disabilities, anxieties, fears, losses, and trauma, and are more likely to commit suicide. Reed asserts that Act 33 does not rehabilitate juveniles and claims that juveniles processed through adult criminal court are nearly certain to reoffend.
Reed points out that section 6355 of the Juvenile Act permits the Commonwealth to transfer a charge from juvenile court to criminal court when a juvenile offender is extremely violent or such a chronic offender that he or she is deemed no longer amenable to treatment through the juvenile justice system. Reed claims that this statute places the burden on the Commonwealth to prove that the public interest is served by the transfer of the case from juvenile court to criminal court and that a child is not amenable to treatment supervision, or rehabilitation as a juvenile. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(8). Reed maintains that section 6355 was the...
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