Commonwealth v. Trippi

• Citation: 167 N.E. 354,268 Mass. 227
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. TRIPPI.
• Decision Date: 01 July 1929
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

268 Mass. 227

167 N.E. 354

COMMONWEALTH

v.TRIPPI.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

July 1, 1929.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County.

Charles Trippi was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.M. H. Shanly, of Boston, and M. L. Glazer, of Roxbury, for appellant.

F. T. Doyle and J. A. Sullivan, both of Boston, for the Commonwealth.

CROSBY, J.

On November 11, 1928, the defendant, twenty-two years of age, was serving a sentence of fifteen to eighteen years in the Massachusetts State Prison. Armed with a loaded revolver and thirty or forty extra cartridges, in an attempt to escape from the prison he shot and killed Frederick Pfluger, a guard of the institution. The defendant was indicted and convicted of murder in the first degree.

The first assignment of error relates to the ruling of the trial judge respecting certain questions propounded to an expert in psychiatry. Counsel for the defendant asked the following question: ‘Will you tell us, Doctor, what you found, what conclusions or opinion you arrived at inregard to the mental age of this defendant as a result of your psychometric tests?’ The question was excluded in that form, the defendant excepted and the judge said, ‘I am not precluding you from asking the Doctor his opinion as to the sanity or criminal capacity of this defendant in any form that you may have, but on nothing so far introduced are you entitled to the question in the form in which you put it.’ Counsel for the defendant then asked the witness, ‘Now, did you arrive at any conclusion, or did you form an opinion as to the mental age of this defendant?’ The judge then said, ‘I will exclude your question, unless accompanied by some offer of proof from a qualified expert that the answer to the question would throw some light on his sanity or criminal capacity, his capacity to commit a crime.’ ‘When you put the question, Mr. Shanly, do you mean the mental age as determined by the so-called psychometric tests referred to in your previous question?’ Counsel for the defendant replied, ‘Exactly.’ The judge then excluded the question and the defendant made the following offer of proof: ‘The defendant expects to prove by this witness, and in answer to this question, that the defendant Trippi, in his opinion, has a mental age of about thirteen years * * * as determined by the psychometric tests. That is offered on the ground of the defendant's mental capacity to premeditate, deliberate, and on his capacity to form and carry along an intent for an appreciable time. It is offered on the further ground as entitling the defendant to an instruction from the court if the jury find that the defendant has a mental age of about thirteen years old * * * as determined by this same test, the psychometric test, he is entitled to an instruction that he is presumed to be incapable of forming a criminal intent.’ The judge then made the following ruling: ‘So far as the second part is concerned, I now rule that the showing, if it can be shown, that the defendant was mentally thirteen years of age, as established by the psychometric test, does not entitle him to the benefit of the presumption claimed by counsel. Having made that ruling, I exclude this evidence on that ground. * * * So far as the first ground of the admission of this evidence is concerned, I will permit you to inquire of the Doctor generally and particularly as to the mental condition of this defendant in so far as his capacity to commit crime is concerned, in so far as his power to premeditate is concerned, and will permit the Doctor to give his reasons for the opinion if the opinion is in any way favorable to the defendant, or, if it is unfavorable, if Counsel desires it. In the absence of any evidence that a mental age of thirteen, which is the offer of proof, in any degree, or in any way, interferes with this defendant's criminal responsibility, insanity, or power to premeditate, I rule that the precise question is not competent and therefore I exclude it.’ At the end of the conference at the bench the judge added: ‘Do you understand my ruling? That it is not to interfere in any way with your asking the Doctor a professional and expert opinion as to the sanity of the defendant or as to his mental condition determined by all of his examinations?’ Counsel for the defendant replied: ‘Yes. That is all, Doctor.’

[1] It is the contention of the defendant that since an infant between the ages of seven and fourteen is prima facie presumed to be incapable of forming a criminal intent, Commonwealth v. Mead, 10 Allen, 398;State v. Learnard, 41 Vt. 585, 589;Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209, 210-213,36 Am. Rep. 132, evidence that the defendant's mental age was about thirteen years should have been admitted, and that, if admitted, this presumption would be applicable. This rebuttable presumption, however, refers to the physical age of the child and does not extend to one beyond the age of fourteen years. State v. Schilling, 95 N. J. Law, 145, 146-148, 112 A. 400;People v. Day, 199 Cal. 78, 87, 248 P. 250;State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 452,108 A. 391. If the decision in State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, is not in accord with the view herein expressed, we cannot follow it.

[2][3] ‘Criminal responsibility does not depend upon the mental age of the defendant nor upon the question whether the mind of the prisoner is above or below that of the ideal or of the average or of the normal man, but upon the question, whether the defendant knows the difference between right and wrong, can understand the relation which he bears to others and which others bear to him, and has knowledge of the nature of his act so as to be able to perceive its true character and consequences to himself and to others.’ Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 13, 151 N. E. 74 (44 A. L. R. 579);Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500,41 Am. Dec. 458;Commonwealth v. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382, 387, 388, 74 N. E. 939;Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 5, 106 N. E. 545. It was said...