Commonwealth v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–P–1111.,14–P–1111.
• Citation: 89 Mass.App.Ct. 383,50 N.E.3d 206
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Antonio WILLIAMS.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

89 Mass.App.Ct. 383

50 N.E.3d 206

COMMONWEALTH

v.Antonio WILLIAMS.

No. 14–P–1111.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

Argued Nov. 17, 2015.

Decided May 12, 2016.

Jason Howard, Brockton, for the defendant.

Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: CYPHER, TRAINOR, & RUBIN, JJ.

CYPHER

, J.

The defendant, Antonio Williams, appeals from the denial of his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b)

, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). The offenses were set forth in two sets of indictments that charged unrelated gun and drug crimes. The defendant argues that because the guilty pleas were based, in part, on drug tests performed by Annie Dookhan at the Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton laboratory), the subsequent discovery of Dookhan's pervasive wrongdoing requires the reversal of the convictions.¹

The first set of indictments (the gun case) arose after the police responded to a report of domestic violence at the home of the defendant's girl friend on April 14, 2010. Upon their arrival, the police were informed by the girl friend that the defendant had threatened her. While there, police also saw loose ammunition and a loaded firearm, both of which the defendant admitted were his. The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm (G.L. c. 269, § 10

[a ] ); unlawful possession of a loaded firearm (G.L. c. 269, § 10 [n ] ); unlawful possession of ammunition without an FID card (G.L. c. 269, § 10 [h ] ); and threat to commit a crime (G.L. c. 275, § 2 ). The first indictment, charging unlawful possession of a firearm, also alleged that the defendant previously had been convicted of three predicate offenses, namely, armed masked robbery as a juvenile, possession with intent to distribute marijuana and “crack” cocaine on June 21, 2006 (No. 0615CR4295) (the 2006 drug charges), and possession with intent to distribute a class B substance on July 29, 2007 (No. 0715CR005623) (the 2007 drug charges),² thus subjecting him to enhanced sentencing as an armed career criminal under G.L. c. 269, § 10G(c ) (the ACC offense).

On March 4, 2011, while the defendant was out on bail on the gun charges, the police executed a search warrant in the third-floor apartment in Brockton where he was living with his mother, her boy friend, and his younger brothers. During the search, police found what they believed to be cocaine residue in an area in the defendant's bedroom that suggested drugs were being prepared for packaging and sale. They also found fifteen bags of suspected marijuana and nineteen bags of suspected crack cocaine, as well as a scale, gloves, bags, scissors, and numerous plastic bags in the bedroom. On a tray in the kitchen, police found nine twisted bags of what are alleged to be Oxycontin pills as well as suspected crack cocaine. According to the police report, the defendant said that if the weight of the purported crack cocaine in combination with the substance found in his bedroom “was less than trafficking weight then he would admit the crack cocaine and the pills in the kitchen were his.” The house was within 1,000 feet of a public school.

As a result of the search, a second set of indictments was returned (the drug case) charging the defendant with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second or subsequent offense, G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(c ) and (d )

; possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute, second or subsequent offense, G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(c ) and (d ) ; and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, second or subsequent offense, G.L. c. 94C, § 32C. Each indictment included a count charging that the defendant had committed that particular offense in a school zone, G.L. c. 94C, § 32J. The second or subsequent offense portion of each indictment identified the defendant's convictions on the 2006 drug charges as the prior offense.

A plea hearing was held on January 26, 2012. At the outset of the hearing, the prosecutor explained that she was willing to reduce the ACC offense from a “level III” (three predicate offenses) to a “level II” (two predicate offenses), thereby reducing the defendant's exposure from a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years and a maximum sentence of twenty years to a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of fifteen years. See G.L. c. 269, § 10G(b ) and (c )

. She further indicated that she would seek a ten– to twelve-year aggregate sentence on the level II ACC offense and the related charges and an additional aggregate sentence of no more than ten years on the drug counts. The prosecutor sought consecutive sentences because the defendant had committed the drug offenses while he was out on bail on the gun charges. See G.L. c. 279, § 8B.³ For his part, the defendant requested concurrent sentences and a reduction in the prosecutor's offer of ten to twelve years on the level II ACC offense to ten years.

Upon inquiry from the judge, the prosecutor confirmed that, in the event the judge intended to impose concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, she would nonetheless maintain her offer to reduce the ACC charge to a level II offense and would not increase the ten- to twelve-year sentence recommendation. Against this backdrop, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charges with the ACC charge reduced to a level II offense.

The prosecutor recited the facts of both cases including that testing had confirmed the nature of the substances underlying the drug case. Certificates of analysis showed that the contraband had been analyzed at the Hinton laboratory by Annie Dookhan, who had signed the certificates of analysis as either the primary analyst or the sole analyst. At the conclusion of the plea hearing, the judge accepted the pleas and sentenced the defendant to an aggregate sentence of not less than ten nor more than twelve years in State prison on the gun charges and a concurrent aggregate term of seven and one-half years in State prison on the drug offenses.

Between June, 2013, and January, 2014, in light of problems that surfaced at the Hinton laboratory and with Annie Dookhan, in particular, the defendant filed a motion in both the gun case and the drug case to withdraw his guilty pleas and for a new trial. See generally Commonwealth v. Torres, 470 Mass. 1020, 1021, 25 N.E.3d 311 (2015)

. Simultaneously, in the Brockton Division of the District Court Department, the defendant challenged his convictions on the 2006 and 2007 drug charges that constituted the enhancement offenses on grounds that Annie Dookhan analyzed the drugs underlying the 2006 charges and another chemist in the same laboratory analyzed the drugs at issue in the 2007 charges.

After a hearing, a special magistrate appointed to preside over criminal proceedings in connection with cases relating to the Hinton laboratory issued proposed rulings and orders denying the defendant's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in the case at bar.⁴ See Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 75–76, 992 N.E.2d 999 (2013)

. The defendant appealed, and a judge of the Superior Court affirmed the orders of the magistrate denying the defendant's motions.

The magistrate found that while the gun case against the defendant was strong, the drug case was not. He reasoned that “if [the defendant] had been facing solely the [drug] case,” “[t]he defendant may reasonably have chosen to go to trial if he had known he had a chance of successfully suppressing the drug tests” and that “he could have used information of Dookhan's misconduct to impeach her testimony and undermine the veracity of the tests that she performed as a primary chemist.” The magistrate concluded, however, that “it would not have been rational for the defendant to forgo the plea bargain to proceed to trial and risk a mandatory from and after sentence” on the drug case. The magistrate acknowledged that “[i]f one or both of [the enhancement] charges is ultimately resolved in his favor, then the defendant has grounds to seek further redress in this court.”

The defendant argues on appeal that because Dookhan's misconduct would have resulted in the likely reversal of the drug charges, the specter of an on-and-after drug sentence did not actually hang over him. After the initial appellate briefs were submitted in this case, the defendant filed a reply brief stating that the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the 2007 enhancement offenses had been affirmed by this court, and that further appellate review had been denied by the Supreme Judicial Court. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2015 WL 711605 (2015)

. After oral argument, defense counsel further informed us in a letter pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 16(l ), as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982), that upon remand from this court, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 Mass.App.Ct. 1114, 2014 WL 4851328 (2014), his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the 2006 drug charges, which had served both as a basis for the armed career criminal enhancement on the firearm possession charge and the second and subsequent offense drug charges in the present matter, had been allowed in the trial court. Anticipating this result, the defendant argued in his brief and at oral argument that reversal of one of the three original predicate offenses underlying the ACC count would render the subsequent plea to the reduced charge no “bargain.” According to the defendant, the plea would have garnered him nothing, demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that he would have refused to plead guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial.

Discussion. “A motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 30(b)

is the proper vehicle by which to seek to vacate a guilty plea.... Under Mass. R.Crim. P. 30(b), a judge may grant a motion for a new trial any time it appears that justice may not have been done. A motion for a new trial is thus committed to the sound discretion of the judge.... Rule 30(b)...