Commw v. Jackson

• Citation: 731 N.E.2d 1066,432 Mass. 82
• Decision Date: 07 April 2000
• Docket Number: SJC-08026
• Parties: (Mass. 2000) COMMONWEALTH vs. CURTIS JACKSON No.: Argued:
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

731 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass. 2000)

COMMONWEALTH vs. CURTIS JACKSON

No.: SJC-08026

Massachusetts Supreme Court

Argued: April 7, 2000.

Decided: July 10, 2000.

Hampshire County.

Summary: Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Required finding, Capital case. Homicide. Burglary. Felony-Murder Rule. Robbery.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 31, 1996.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Daniel A. Ford, J., and the cases were tried before him.

Stanley W. Norkunas for the defendant.

Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Abrams, Ireland, Spina, & Cowin, JJ.

SPINA, J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder.¹ He was also convicted of burglary. On appeal he claims error in the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police, and the denial of his motion for required findings of not guilty. We affirm the convictions and decline to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, 33E.

1. Facts. The jury could have found the following facts. Mary Paviol's body was discovered by police on November 10, 1996, shortly after friends reported that she failed to appear at work for two days. She was lying near a pool of dried blood in the bedroom of her apartment at 103 Spring Street, Springfield. There were signs of a struggle in her living room. A wig and a pair of eyeglasses lay on the floor surrounded by her blood. A wastebasket, a lamp, and a chair had been upended. A blood smear extended from the back door, through the living room, and into the bedroom, as if something had been dragged through blood. A television, a microwave, and jewelry appeared to be missing. The medical examiner opined that the cause of death was strangulation and that Paviol had been dead approximately two days as of November 10. He could not be more precise as to time of death because of decomposition.

At approximately 5 A.M. on November 8, two days before Paviol's body was discovered, Randy Foster was awakened by the sound of a woman screaming. The sound came from the vicinity of the adjoining apartment building at 103 Spring Street. He also heard banging sounds after opening his window. The sound stopped after he telephoned the police. The police arrived within minutes, and Foster met them outside. The police could detect no wrongdoing, so they left. The defendant's brother, Reginald Jackson, who lived in a three-room apartment next to Paviol's, was also awakened by the screams and the banging. He went to the window and saw someone matching Foster's description. He also noticed that the defendant, who had been staying with him for about three weeks, was not in the apartment. The defendant had been in the living room watching television when Reginald Jackson came home from work at 1:30 A.M. on November 8. Reginald went to bed at about 4 A.M. that morning. On November 10, after discovering Paviol's body, the police spoke to Reginald for about fifteen minutes.

The police found the defendant's fingerprints inside Paviol's apartment. They returned to Reginald's apartment on November 13 with a search warrant. Reginald signed a consent form authorizing the search of his apartment. The police seized several items, including a bag with women's jewelry, subsequently identified as Paviol's, found among the defendant's belongings. Detectives asked the defendant if he would talk with them at the police station, and he agreed.

At the police station, the defendant was advised of the Miranda warnings and his right to use a telephone. He acknowledged his rights both verbally and in writing. After reading the Miranda warnings aloud from a waiver form, he initialed each warning on the form and signed the form. He denied being in Paviol's apartment, and said his brother woke him at about 4 or 5 A.M. on Friday (November 8) to say he heard a "boom and a thump and somebody yelling." Police typed his statement and read it to him. The defendant read it as well, then signed it. After the completion of the statement, the detectives went to their sergeant and learned that the bag of jewelry found among the defendant's belongings possibly belonged to Paviol.

They returned to the room where the defendant was waiting and told him he was under arrest for murder. They again advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and to the use of a telephone, and further advised him of his right to a prompt arraignment. The defendant initialed the typed warnings and signed the waiver forms. The detectives told the defendant that they found his fingerprints in Paviol's apartment, as well as a footprint that they believed was his. They also told him about the bag of jewelry found among his belongings. At first the defendant said he purchased the jewelry on the street, but later admitted taking the jewelry from Paviol's apartment. He said he went into her apartment on Saturday afternoon, November 9, after noticing that the back door was unlocked. She was already dead. He walked through her apartment and took her jewelry, some cash, and her automatic teller machine (ATM) bank card. He said he later tried using the card, but the ATM "ate the card" because he did not know her personal code. The defendant signed his second statement. Bank records confirmed that an ATM "captured" Paviol's card at about 9:45 P.M. on November 9 after someone unsuccessfully tried four times to withdraw one hundred dollars.

The defendant's fingerprints were found in Paviol's apartment on a can of cocoa on the kitchen counter, on a living room wall, and on the hot water faucet in the bathroom. The defendant left a bloody "transfer"² footprint on Paviol's living room floor which only could have been made within about five minutes of Paviol's blood being spilled, before it had dried. Further, the "take-away" print was obliterated when something was smeared through the wet blood.

2. Motion to suppress statements. The defendant claims that the motion judge, who was also the trial judge, erred by failing to suppress the statements he gave to the police³ on grounds that they were not made voluntarily and were not made after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.

The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that, in the totality of the circumstances, the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 669-670 (1995). Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 920-921 (1983). The judge's findings are entitled to substantial deference. Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 670. Commonwealth v. Day, supra at 920.

The Commonwealth also bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that, in the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were made voluntarily. Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). A statement is voluntary if it is "the product of a rational intellect and a free will." Commonwealth v. Davis, 403 Mass. 575, 581 (1988), quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). See Commonwealth v. Selby, supra at 662-663. A judge's findings as to the voluntariness of a statement are also granted substantial deference, Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 412 (1986), but they "must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity." Commonwealth v. Tavares, supra at 152, quoting Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967).

The voluntariness of a Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of a statement are separate and distinct inquiries, but the "totality of the circumstances" test under each analysis is the same. Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 670. Relevant factors to consider include, but are not limited to, "promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence, and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings." Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra at 413. See Commonwealth v. Selby, supra at 663. If the police inadvertently fail to advise a defendant of his right to use the telephone, that is a factor to be considered. Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 567 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39 (1980). The defendant focuses our attention on the factor of his intelligence. As to that, we have said "[t]he police, and ultimately judges, must give special attention to whether a person of low intelligence waived Miranda rights and voluntarily and knowingly made a statement to the police." Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 381 (1997). We have also said that "people with low intelligence may waive their rights." Id.

The defendant was thirty-three years old at the time of the interrogation. The judge found that the police treated him "with courtesy and respect," and did not "pressure or coerce the defendant in any way." The defendant demonstrated no difficulty understanding or communicating with police and appeared calm and composed.

The defendant's expert, a neuropsychologist, testified that the defendant had an intelligence quotient (IQ) of sixty-five, was mentally retarded, and as a result was incapable of freely waiving his rights or freely communicating with the police. The judge found her testimony unpersuasive and instead credited the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert, who opined that the defendant most likely had an IQ in the eighties and suffered from a learning disability. In support of his decision, the judge found that "[t]he defendant...