Conklin v. Conklin, 97-2081

• Decision Date: 25 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2081,97-2081
• Citation: 586 N.W.2d 703
• Parties: Angel CONKLIN, Appellant, v. Michael Wayne CONKLIN, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 703

586 N.W.2d 703

Angel CONKLIN, Appellant, v. Michael Wayne CONKLIN, Appellee.

No. 97-2081.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 25, 1998.

James Kringlen of the Legal Services Corporation, Iowa City, for appellant.

J. Michael Metcalf of Metcalf, Conlon & Siering, P.L.C., Muscatine, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

TERNUS, Justice.

Appellant, Angel Conklin, filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (1997). She alleged her husband, appellee Michael Conklin, had burned her with a cigarette on three occasions, and that he had threatened her life and that of their son. A temporary protective order was issued and a hearing was scheduled for consideration of a permanent order. See Iowa Code § 236.4.

The day before the scheduled hearing, Michael filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. He served Angel with a copy of the petition immediately prior to the hearing on Angel's domestic abuse petition. At the domestic abuse hearing, the court heard conflicting evidence from Angel, Michael and other witnesses concerning Michael's alleged abuse of Angel. After the parties rested, Michael's attorney informed the court of the pending dissolution action. Upon learning of the dissolution action, the court stated it would enter a no-contact order in that case.

Later the same day, the court filed an order that bore the caption and case numbers for the domestic abuse action and the dissolution action. The court dismissed Angel's petition for relief from domestic abuse, but assessed costs to Michael. In the same order, the court entered an injunction in the dissolution case. This injunction applied to both parties and prohibited them from having any contact with each other during the pendency of the dissolution action other than for purposes of visitation between Michael and the couple's son.

Angel filed a motion to enlarge the court's findings and conclusions to include a no-contact order in the domestic abuse case. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 179(b). She pointed out that a mutual protective order is specifically prohibited by Iowa Code section 236.20 unless both parties file a petition requesting such relief. (Michael had not sought a protective order.) The court denied Angel's motion, stating that "the merging of the protective order under ... a 236 domestic abuse petition and the dissolution as filed in this matter under [Iowa Code chapter] 598 is reasonable."

In this appeal of the court's rulings, Angel claims the court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning her claim of domestic abuse, as required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(a) (1997). ¹ She also alleges error in the court's dismissal of her domestic abuse petition and the court's entry of a mutual no-contact order in the dissolution action. We review this equity case de novo. See Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994).

I. Error preservation. Michael claims Angel did not preserve error on her claim that the district court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether domestic abuse occurred because she did not request such findings or conclusions in her rule 179(b) motion. We think, however, that the necessity to enlarge the order to include findings with respect to the facts supporting a claim of domestic abuse and a conclusion that there was domestic abuse was inherent in Angel's request that the court enter a protective order in the domestic abuse case. See Iowa Code § 236.5 (requiring a finding that the defendant engaged in domestic abuse before the court may grant a protective order); cf. Suckow v. Boone State Bank & Trust Co., 314 N.W.2d 421, 424 n. 4 (Iowa 1982) (finding plaintiffs adequately challenged trial court's findings of fact by asking, in their rule 179(b) motion, that court reconsider its decision to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss, a request that "necessarily advance[d] a challenge to" the court's finding of fact upon which the dismissal was based). Therefore, we will consider the merits of Angel's claim that the trial court failed to make findings of fact and state conclusions of law on the issue of Michael's alleged domestic abuse.

II. Compliance with rule 179(a). The court made only three references to Angel's claim of domestic abuse in its final order:

(1) "This court finds at this time from the evidence as presented ... that cause number DACV011255 [the domestic abuse case] shall be and the same is hereby dismissed with costs assessed to the respondent."

(2) "At this point, as indicated, the [temporary] injunction and the petition in cause number DACV011255 is dismissed and the Order entered therein is quashed...."

(3) "It is further ORDERED that any costs assessed in cause number DACV011255 are assessed to the respondent therein...."

Angel argues these statements do not satisfy rule 179(a), which requires that the court find the facts in writing, separately state its conclusions of law, and direct an appropriate judgment. We agree.

As we have noted on a prior occasion, "[i]t is difficult at times to differentiate between findings of fact and ... conclusions of law." Pribyl v. Standard Elec. Co., 246 Iowa 333, 337, 67 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1954) (citations omitted). "[W]here the ultimate conclusion can be arrived at only by applying a rule of law, the result so reached embodies a conclusion of law and is not then a finding of fact." Id. In defining the phrase "finding of fact," other courts have focused on whether the determination is "found on the evidence of a fact averred by one party and denied by the other party." California Employment Comm'n v. Malm, 59 Cal.App.2d 322, 138 P.2d 744, 746 (Ct.App.1943) (quoting Maeder Steel Prods. Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562, 220 P. 155, 158 (1923)); accord Miles v. McCallan, 1 Ariz. 491, 3 P. 610, 611 (Ariz.Terr.1884) ( "A finding of fact is a determination of a fact by the court, which fact is averred by one party and denied by the other, and this determination must be founded on the evidence in the case." ); cf. Mikel v. State, 528 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Mo.Ct.App.1975) (a "finding of fact is ... a statement by the court as to what facts the court finds to be true which in turn leads the court to form conclusions of law" ).

Here, a determination of whether Michael committed the acts alleged by Angel would be derived from the evidence, not from applying any rule of law; thus, such a determination would be a finding of fact. Whether the facts found by the court constitute domestic abuse would require the application of law and, thus, would be a conclusion of law. We now examine whether the trial court's ruling contains such findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Michael relies on the court's statement in its order that the court "finds from the evidence ... that [the domestic abuse action] shall be and the same is hereby dismissed...." We think this statement is insufficient to qualify as a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. ² See State v. Kingman, 77 Wash.2d 551, 463 P.2d 638, 639 (1970) (holding trial court order denying state's petition for an order of public use and necessity for "good cause appearing" did not constitute a finding of fact or a conclusion of law); cf. Palmer v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 179 Minn. 381, 230 N.W. 257, 258 (1930) ( "There is what purports to be one finding of fact, that 'the evidence fails to establish the cause of action set out in the complaint herein.' That is no finding of fact, but a mere legal conclusion from the facts." ); Mikel, 528 S.W.2d at 798 (holding trial court failed to make a finding of fact but rather made a finding of the ultimate question of law--that the defendant's plea was not knowingly and intelligently made). The court simply dismissed Angel's petition and assessed costs against Michael without making any factual findings and without stating whether Michael had or had not committed domestic abuse.

To add to the uncertainty, the rulings entered by the trial court implicate irreconcilable factual findings and conclusions of law. A court may order a defendant to pay court costs only upon a finding that the defendant engaged in domestic abuse. See Iowa Code § 236.5(3). But if the court in fact made such a conclusion here, as implied by its assessment of costs, the court should not have dismissed Angel's petition on the merits. Although relief under chapter 236 is not mandated upon a finding of domestic abuse, see id. § 236.5(2) (stating "[t]he court may grant a protective order" (emphasis added)), there are no...