O'Connell v. City of Stockton

• Decision Date: 26 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. S135160.,S135160.
• Citation: 41 Cal.4th 1061,63 Cal.Rptr.3d 67,162 P.3d 583
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Kendra O'CONNELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF STOCKTON et al., Defendants and Respondents.

63 Cal.Rptr.3d 67

41 Cal.4th 1061

162 P.3d 583

Kendra O'CONNELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF STOCKTON et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S135160.

Supreme Court of California.

July 26, 2007.

Mark T. Clausen, Santa Rosa, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

O'Melveny & Myers, Meredith N. Landy, Dale M. Edmondson, Joshua D. Baker, Menlo Park, and Michel Amaral for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Joseph M. Quinn, San Francisco; Richard E. Nosky, Jr., City Attorney, and Lori S. Whittaker, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles) and Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, for The League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

KENNARD, J.

Our state Constitution allows cities and counties to enact and enforce local ordinances so long as they are "not in conflict" with the state's "general laws." (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) Any conflicting ordinance is preempted by state law and thus void.

At issue here is a city ordinance allowing forfeiture to the city of any vehicle used to commit certain acts made criminal by state law. The Court of Appeal held that state law preempts the city ordinance. We agree.

I.

Plaintiff Kendra O'Connell filed this taxpayer action (Code Civ. Proc, § 526a) against the City of Stockton and its city attorney (City) challenging the constitutionality of a City ordinance labeled "Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles." Plaintiff sought to enjoin the City's enforcement of the ordinance. The trial court sustained the City's demurrer to plaintiffs complaint, allowing plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. When plaintiff did not do so, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit.

On plaintiffs appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. It held that the forfeiture ordinance violated procedural due process because it failed to provide for a reasonably prompt postseizure probable cause hearing on the City's right to hold a vehicle pending its forfeiture. The Court of Appeal also held that the forfeiture ordinance was preempted by specific state law provisions governing vehicle forfeiture. This conclusion conflicted with Horton v. City of Oakland (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, in which a different Court of Appeal held that a vehicle forfeiture ordinance enacted by the City of Oakland, and similar to the one at issue here, was not preempted by state law. We granted review to resolve the conflict.¹

II.

Part XXV of Chapter 5 of the Stockton Municipal Code is entitled "Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles." The term "forfeiture," as used here, means that the government assumes title to property used to further some illegal purpose. (See United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314; Bennis v. Michigan (1996) 516 U.S. 442, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed.2d 68; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974) 416 U.S. 663, 682, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452.)

The ordinance at issue provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ny vehicle used to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire any controlled substance," with "[a]ll right, title, and interest" thereafter vesting in the City. (Stockton Mun.Code, §§ 5-1000 & 5-1002, italics added.) A vehicle so used may be seized by a peace officer (1) with a court order; (2) incident to an arrest or a search conducted with a search warrant; or (3) with probable cause to believe the vehicle was used in the specified crimes. (Id., § 5-1003.) Within one year of police seizure of a vehicle, either the Stockton City Attorney or the San Joaquin County District Attorney "shall file a petition for forfeiture with the Superior Court of San Joaquin County." (Id., § 5-1006, subds. (a) & (b).) The prosecuting agency must then give notice of the intended forfeiture proceedings to interested parties, advising them of their rights to file claims with the San Joaquin County Superior Court challenging the forfeiture. (Id., § 5-1006, subd. (c).)

A trial of the vehicle forfeiture can be before either a court or a jury. The City has "the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence" that the vehicle was used for one of the prohibited purposes set out in the ordinance. (Stockton Mun.Code, § 5-1006, subd. (f).) Forfeited vehicles are to be sold; the proceeds are used first to pay any "bona fide or innocent purchaser, conditional sales vendor, mortgagee or lien holder" of the vehicle, when such payment is ordered by the prosecuting agency. (Id., § 5-1008, subd. (a).) After paying the costs of publishing the notice of the forfeiture action and of storing, repairing and selling the vehicle (id., § 5-1008, subd. (b)), remaining funds are distributed in proportionate shares to the involved prosecuting and law enforcement agencies. (Id., § 5-1008, subd. (c).)

We now turn to the principles governing state law preemption of local ordinances.

III.

We have in the past articulated the following principles on state law preemption of local ordinances. "Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, '[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general [state] laws.' [¶] `If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.' [Citations.] [¶] `A conflict exists if the local legislation "`duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. [Citations.]'"'" (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534 (Sherwin-Williams), italics added; see also American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239, 1251, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813 (American Financial).) We explain the italicized terms below.

A local ordinance duplicates state law when it is "coextensive" with state law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534, citing In re Fortnoy (1942) 21 Cal.2d 237, 240, 131 P.2d 1 [as "finding `duplication' where local legislation purported to impose the same criminal prohibition that general law imposed"].)

A local ordinance contradicts state law when it is inimical to or cannot be reconciled with state law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534, citing Ex Parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 641-648, 192 P. 442 [as finding "`contradiction'" in a local ordinance that set the maximum speed limit for vehicles below that set by state law].)

A local ordinance enters afield fully occupied by state law in either of two situations—when the Legislature "expressly manifest[s]" its intent to occupy the legal area or when the Legislature "impliedly" occupies the field. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534; see also 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law, § 986, p. 551["[W]here the Legislature has manifested an intention, expressly or by implication, wholly to occupy the field ... municipal power [to regulate in that area] is lost."].)

When the Legislature has not expressly stated its intent to occupy an area of law, we look to whether it has impliedly done so. This occurs in three situations: when "`(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the' locality." (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.)

With respect to the implied occupation of an area of law by the Legislature's full and complete coverage of it, this court recently had this to say: "`Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.'" (American Financial, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1252, 23 Cal. Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813, quoting Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280.) We went on to say: "`State regulation of a subject may be so complete and detailed as to indicate an intent to preclude local regulation.'" (American Financial, supra, at p. 1252, 23 Cal. Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813.) We thereafter observed: "`Whenever the Legislature has seen fit to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, the entire control over whatever phases of the subject are covered by state legislation ceases as far as local legislation is concerned.'" (Id. at p. 1253, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813, quoting In re Lane (1962) 58 Cal.2d 99, 102, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897.) When a local ordinance is identical to a state statute, it is clear that "`the field sought to be covered by the ordinance has already been occupied'" by state law. (American Financial, supra, at p. 1253, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813.)

"[W]hen local government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, such as the location of particular land uses, California courts will presume, absent a clear indication...