Consolidated Disposal Services, Inc. v. Grant County

• Citation: 51 Wn.App. 652,754 P.2d 1059
• Decision Date: 02 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 8483-3-III,8483-3-III
• Parties: CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC., a Washington corporation, Respondent, v. GRANT COUNTY, Petitioner.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington

Page 652

51 Wn.App. 652

754 P.2d 1059

CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC., a Washington corporation, Respondent, v. GRANT COUNTY, Petitioner.

No. 8483-3-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 3, Panel Three.

June 2, 1988.

Paul Klasen, Pros. Atty., Ephrata, James Cleland, Bellevue, for petitioner.

Paul White, Baird & White, Ephrata, for respondent.

McINTURFF, Chief Judge.

Grant County seeks review of a writ of prohibition entered against it February 20, 1987 restraining the placement of drop boxes for garbage collection at any location other than the county maintained transfer stations and solid waste disposal sites. The order was the result of a complaint filed by Consolidated Disposal Services, Inc. (CDSI) seeking injunctive relief and damages. The complaint alleged Grant County provided garbage collection for the county fairgrounds and for private businesses in the towns of Warden and Quincy in contravention of RCW 36.58.030 and 36.58.040. We granted the County's motion for discretionary review.

CDSI holds a permit from the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission authorizing it to transport solid waste throughout Grant County, with the exception of Moses Lake, Crescent Bar and an area around Mattawa. Mr. Daniel M. Dietrich, president of CDSI, observed a county drop box at Forney Fruit and Produce, Quincy, and the Asgrow Seed Company, Warden, then filed this action to prevent the County from maintaining those drop boxes. At oral argument, the County admitted it no longer provides drop boxes in Warden and Quincy and is not interested in further pursuing that issue. However, the County continues to argue it is entitled to maintain and service a drop box at the county fairgrounds. To the extent that service is affected by the writ of prohibition it will be considered in this opinion.

The single, dispositive issue raised by the County is, did the court err in ordering the writ?

The County has no powers except those conferred on it by state law. State ex rel. Taylor v. Superior Court, 2 Wash.2d 575, 579, 98 P.2d 985 (1940). RCW 36.01.010 ¹ enumerates the corporate powers of the counties. Those powers related to solid waste are found in RCW 36.58, and include provisions for establishment of transfer stations (which do not include detachable containers), RCW 36.58.030; solid waste disposal systems, RCW 36.58.040; districts, RCW 36.58.100; and a solid waste collection district, RCW 36.58A.010 ² and RCW 36.58A.030. ³ Nothing in the record indicates Grant County has established a solid waste collection district; therefore, any garbage collection system ⁴ operated by the County is without authority.

We now focus on the remedy and whether the writ of prohibition is proper. RCW 7.16.290 provides:

The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.

The statutory writ grants superior courts power to control administrative, legislative or executive acts where those acts exceed the jurisdiction of the board or tribunal. Citizens Coun. Against Crime v. Bjork, 84 Wash.2d 891, 894, 529 P.2d 1072 (1975) (citing Winsor v. Bridges, 24 Wash. 540, 64 P. 780 (1901)); Coughlin v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 27 Wash.App. 888, 892, 621 P.2d 183 (1980). This statutory writ is similar to the authority granted the Supreme Court by article 4, section 4, of the state constitution restraining the exercise of unauthorized judicial or quasi-judicial power. Citizens Coun., 84 Wash.2d at 893, 529 P.2d 1072; Seattle v. Rohrer, 69 Wash.2d 852, 853, 420 P.2d 687 (1966).

Cases cited by the County, State ex rel. New York Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wash.2d 834, 199 P.2d 581 (1948); State ex rel. Ernst v. Superior Court, 198 Wash. 133, 87 P.2d 294 (1939); State ex rel. Bennett v. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 P. 1029 (1909); and State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 P. 877 (1905), involve applications filed directly with the Supreme Court; they are distinguishable from the case at bench--they do not involve an application under RCW 7.16.290.

In Barnes v. Thomas, 96 Wash.2d 316, 635 P.2d 135 (1981) petitioner applied for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Department of Social and Health Services from holding a hearing regarding an overpayment. The court, at 318-19, 635 P.2d 135, affirmed the denial of the writ and stated:

First, we state the long established law that a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only where the tribunal is clearly and inarguably acting in a matter where there is an inherent, entire lack of jurisdiction:

the writ of prohibition will only issue where there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. State ex rel. New York Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wn. (2d) 834, 199 P. (2d) 581 [1948]; Rem.Rev.Stat., § 1028 ... But where the court is attempting to proceed entirely without jurisdiction, we have held that the remedy by appeal is inadequate and prohibition will lie. State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines [Ltd.] v. Superior Court, 26 Wn. (2d) 740, 175 P. (2d) 640 [1946].

State ex rel. Munro v. Superior Court, 35 Wn.2d 217, 221, 212 P.2d 493 (1949). See also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Molitor, 43 Wn.2d 657, 263 P.2d 276 (1953); RCW 7.16.300.

Total and inarguable absence of jurisdiction cannot be adequately remedied by appeal. State ex rel. Maurer v. Superior Court, 122 Wash. 555, 211 P. 764 (1922); State ex rel. Waterman v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 37, 220 P. 5 (1923). In the instant case, however, there is no clear absence of jurisdiction, and the appeal remedy is adequate to protect petitioner's interest.... By appearing and requesting a hearing he may have waived that objection. But even had he not waived it, a writ of prohibition should not issue. As we said in State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 101 Wash. 81, 92, 172 P. 257, 4 A.L.R. 572 (1918):

Where, however, the question is whether the court, acting within the scope of its admitted jurisdiction, has acquired jurisdiction over the parties or the particular subject-matter, the writ will not issue.

Under the administrative procedure act, petitioner can appeal the jurisdictional issue following the hearing. Thus, the writ was correctly denied ... Issuance of the writ is a matter of discretion, and we find no abuse in the court's refusal to grant the remedy under these facts.

It is important to note, DSHS in Barnes was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner by attempting to hold a hearing to determine whether an overpayment had been made. The definition of jurisdiction is found in Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Wash.2d 834, 836, 355 P.2d 838 (1960) (quoting State ex rel. New York Cas. Co., 31 Wash.2d at 840, 199 P.2d 581):

[T]he essential elements of jurisdiction are said to be three: (1) the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; (2) the proper parties must be present; and (3) the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issues before the court. [Citations omitted.]

Even though the writ in Adams was not filed under the statute, the definition is applicable. See Floor Decorators, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Ind., 44 Wash.App. 503, 506, 722 P.2d 884, appeal dismissed, 107 Wash.2d 1019 (1986) (application for writ under RCW 7.16 to preclude Department of Labor and Industries from hearing an appeal, citing Adams ). Here, Grant County was not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner but in an administrative capacity, even though without authority.

The second requirement to support the issuance of a writ must be the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the...