Skagit Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 304, Dba United Gen. Hosp. v. Skagit Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 11 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 86796–8.,86796–8.
• Citation: 177 Wash.2d 718,305 P.3d 1079
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 304, dba United General Hospital, Respondent, v. SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 1 and The Board of Commissioners Thereof, dba Skagit Valley Hospital, Appellant.

177 Wash.2d 718

305 P.3d 1079

SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 304, dba United General Hospital, Respondent,

v.SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 1 and The Board of Commissioners Thereof, dba Skagit Valley Hospital, Appellant.

No. 86796–8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

July 11, 2013.

Philip James Buri, Buri Funston Mumford PLLC, Bellingham, WA, Roger L. Hillman, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, Bradford Edward Furlong, Furlong–Butler Attorneys, Mount Vernon, WA, for Appellant.

Christopher J. Knapp, The Everett Clinic, G. Douglas Ferguson, Anderson Hunter Law Firm, Everett, WA, Michael Craig Subit, Frank Freed Subit & Thomas LLP, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

James Scott Fitzgerald, John James White Jr., Kevin Blair Hansen, Livengood Fitzgerald & Alskog PLLC, Kirkland, WA, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of King County Public Hospital Dist.

GONZÁLEZ, J.

[177 Wash.2d 720]¶ 1 This case concerns the authority of a rural public hospital district (PHD) to provide health care services outside its own boundaries and within those of another rural PHD. Skagit Valley Hospital acquired a medical group that operated multiple clinics, including one located within United General Hospital's territory. United General challenged Skagit Valley in Snohomish County Superior Court, which granted a writ of prohibition ordering Skagit Valley to stop providing health care services within United General's boundaries.

¶ 2 The trial court properly granted a writ of prohibition. A rural PHD may not invade the territory of another rural PHD without that PHD's permission. Further, Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 304 v. Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, No. 86796–8 the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in legal procedure.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 This is an action between two rural PHDs, which are municipal corporations organized under chapter 70.44 RCW. Skagit County PHD No. 1, doing business as Skagit Valley Hospital, encompasses the majority of the city of Mount Vernon and areas southwest of the city of Burlington. Skagit County PHD No. 304, doing business as United General Hospital, includes the cities of Sedro–Woolley, Burlington, and other areas and towns. Both entities are rural PHDs because their respective territories do not contain a city with a population greater than 50,000. RCW 70.44.460.

¶ 4 This dispute arose when Skagit Valley acquired Skagit Valley Medical Center's (SVMC) medical practice. SVMC operated a number of offices, including a practice in Unit 2 of the Pavilion, a commercial office building located within United General's boundaries. Skagit Valley notified United General of its intent to purchase SVMC and assured it that referrals from Unit 2 would not be affected by the change in ownership. SVMC also offered United General the option to purchase Unit 2. United General did not purchase Unit 2, but instead formally opposed the merger through a board resolution, asserting that Skagit Valley needed United General's approval to operate within its boundaries. Nevertheless, Skagit Valley purchased SVMC's assets and began operating its former facilities, including Unit 2 of the Pavilion.

¶ 5 United General filed a complaint against Skagit Valley in Snohomish County Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment, a writ of prohibition, and injunctive relief. United General also filed a motion for an order to show cause why the trial court should not immediately issue a writ of prohibition, stopping Skagit Valley from providing medical services within its boundaries. Visiting Judge Ronald Castleberry issued the writ of prohibition and stayed the effective date of the writ, pending the decision and mandate of an appellate court. Skagit Valley appealed directly to this court.

II. Issues

¶ 6 1. May a rural PHD provide medical services within the boundaries of another rural PHD without that district's permission?

¶ 7 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available in the course of legal procedure?

III. Analysis

¶ 8 This case asks us to decide whether the trial court appropriately issued a writ of prohibition ordering Skagit Valley to refrain from operating a health care facility within United General's boundaries. A writ of prohibition “arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.” RCW 7.16.290. A writ of prohibition is a drastic measure, which is to be issued only when two conditions are met: “(1) [a]bsence or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of legal procedure. The absence of either one precludes the issuance of the writ.” Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wash.2d 828, 838, 766 P.2d 438 (1989) (quoting State ex rel. Ernst v. Superior Court, 198 Wash. 133, 137, 87 P.2d 294 (1939)). Although the common law writ of prohibition restrains the unauthorized exercise of only judicial or quasi-judicial power, the statutory writ of prohibition applies to executive, administrative, and legislative acts as well. Winsor v. Bridges, 24 Wash. 540, 542–543, 64 P. 780 (1901).

¶ 9 Skagit Valley discusses both prongs required to obtain a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court erred because (1) Skagit Valley did not act in excess of its jurisdiction by taking over SVMC's practice in Unit 2 and (2) an adequate remedy in the course of legal procedure was potentially available to United General.

1. May a rural PHD provide medical services within the boundaries of another rural PHD without that district's permission ?

¶ 10 Turning to the first prong required to obtain a writ of prohibition, we consider Skagit Valley's argument that it did not act in excess of its jurisdiction because PHDs may freely compete against all health care providers, even in other districts. Skagit Valley refers to its statutory authority “to provide hospital and other health care services for residents of said district by facilities located outside the boundaries of said district, by contract or in any other manner said commissioners may deem expedient or necessary under the existing conditions....” RCW 70.44.060(3). The meaning of this statute is a question of law, which we review de novo, considering the statutory scheme as a whole. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

¶ 11 The trial court determined that a PHD cannot provide services in another PHD's territory without that PHD's permission, relying on Alderwood Water District v. Pope & Talbot, 62 Wash.2d 319, 382 P.2d 639 (1963), and a 1988 attorney general opinion (1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 15). In Alderwood, we considered the analogous issue of whether a municipal water district could furnish water outside its own boundaries and within those of another water district. 62 Wash.2d at 320, 382 P.2d 639. A statute stated that “ ‘a water district may provide water services to property owners outside the limits of the water district,’ ” id. (quoting former RCW 57.08.045 (1959)), but we refused to mechanically conclude from this provision that a water district could supply water within the boundaries of other water districts. We relied on “a general rule that there cannot be two municipal corporations exercising the same functions in the same territory at the same time.” Id. at 321, 382 P.2d 639;see also2 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 7:8 (3d rev. ed. 2006). We noted that case law had eroded the rule but that “it continues to serve as a touchstone in the sense that it expresses a public policy against duplication of public functions, and that such duplication is normally not permissible unless it is provided for in some manner by statute.” 62 Wash.2d at 321, 382 P.2d 639. The general rule serves to “alert courts ... to the necessity of closely examining in toto statutory provisions conferring authority upon the potentially competing municipal corporations.” Id.

¶ 12 Construing the relevant statutory framework as a whole, we concluded that the legislature intended to allow water districts to supply water to individuals outside of their districts only if those individuals were not within the boundaries of another water district. Id. at 323, 382 P.2d 639. In particular, we relied on a statute prohibiting the territory of water districts from overlapping, a statute requiring water district commissioners to prepare a comprehensive plan sufficient to fulfill the foreseeable needs of their districts, and on various statutes establishing the financial dependence of water districts on the sale of water. Id. at 322, 382 P.2d 639. Because these purposes would be impeded if one water district were allowed to supply water within the boundaries of another, and because a substantial portion of state land was not within any water district, we concluded that a statute “permitting water districts to supply water to individuals outside of their districts was meant to extend water services only to those individuals who were not within the boundaries of any other water district.” Id. at 323, 382 P.2d 639 (citations omitted).

¶ 13 In 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 15, the attorney general concluded that the Alderwood rule extended to PHDs organized under chapter 70.44 RCW. The parties dispute the weight we grant to opinions of the attorney general. Opinions of the attorney general are entitled to considerable weight, but they are not binding on this court and we give them less deference when they involve issues of statutory construction. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. Office of Fin. Mgmt., 121 Wash.2d 152, 164–65, 849 P.2d 1201 (1993); ATU Legislative Council of Wash. State v. State, 145 Wash.2d 544, 554, 40 P.3d 656 (2002).¹

¶ 14 The question before the attorney general was whether a PHD could construct and...