Cook v. Exxon Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 06-03-00131-CV.,06-03-00131-CV.
• Parties: Allen COOK, Appellant, v. EXXON CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

145 S.W.3d 776

Allen COOK, Appellant, v. EXXON CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 06-03-00131-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted August 25, 2004.

Decided September 10, 2004.

Appeal from the 4th Judicial District Court, Rusk County, J. Clay Gossett, J Ron Adkison, Wellborn, Houston, et al, Henderson, for appellant.

M. Keith Dollahite, Tyler, for appellee.

Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice CARTER.

Allen Cook sued Exxon Corporation for trespass and nuisance due to oilfield equipment that had been left on the property before he purchased that property. Exxon filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Cook lacked standing, that Exxon had no contractual or tort duty to remove the disputed items, that Cook failed to present any evidence of damages, and that the statute of limitations barred Cook's suit. Cook appeals the granting of the summary judgment motion. We affirm.

In his first point of error, Cook contends the trial court erred in concluding he lacked standing. Cook argues, in his remaining points of error, that the question of whether the lease imposes a duty on Exxon is irrelevant to his nuisance claim, that his tort claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, that Exxon is committing a continuing tort, and that there is evidence he suffered damages.

This opinion follows the precedent established by this Court in Denman, as well as the precedent of our sister courts in Pluff and Senn.¹ We further explain why the characterization of an injury as temporary or permanent is not relevant under these circumstances. The first section of our opinion examines why Cook lacks standing to pursue this cause of action regardless of whether the injury was permanent or temporary. We first examine the holdings in Denman, Pluff, and Senn. Second, we explain Cook's argument that a subsequent landowner may have standing to pursue a claim for a temporary injury. Next, we examine the differences between temporary and permanent injuries. Even if Cook's injury is temporary, Cook still does not have standing because he has not sustained any new injuries since he has owned the property. A landowner lacks standing to sue if the injury occurs before he owned the property, his or her deed contains no assignment of the cause of action, and there is no evidence of a new injury since the current landowner has owned the property. The second section of our opinion addresses whether there is any evidence of a continuing tort. We determine Cook has failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence this injury is a continuing tort. Because these issues are dispositive, we decline to examine the remaining points of error.

Factual Background

In 1930, H.A. and Callie Piercy executed an oil and gas lease on the land in question. Humble Oil and Refining Company (predecessor of Exxon) developed the lease in the 1930s and drilled a number of oil wells on the land. On or about April 17, 1990, Exxon ceased operations on the property and assigned the lease to 4-Sight Operating Company. Cook stated that to his knowledge Exxon had not conducted activities related to oil and gas production on the land in question after December 1, 1991.

In May 1994, Cook contracted to buy from the Piercy family the surface estate of the property in dispute. Before closing the purchase, Cook received the commitment for a title policy, which disclosed the oil and gas lease entered into by the Piercys in 1930. On May 23, 1994, the Piercys executed and delivered a general warranty deed to Cook conveying the surface estate of the property in question.

In March 2000, Cook filed suit against Exxon, alleging breach of contract, negligence, excessive use, nuisance, and trespass in connection with abandoned oilfield equipment left on his property. In his suit, Cook complained about concrete derrick corners, concrete equipment pads, and other miscellaneous debris at the sites of plugged and abandoned oil wells. Cook stated these materials were probably installed before 1950. Cook also complained the ground was not level where some old pits had been located. The trial court granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment. Cook appeals.

Standard of Review

When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995); Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 54 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Exxon's motion for summary judgment alleged (1) that there was no evidence Cook had standing to sue, (2) that Exxon had no tort or contract duty to Cook, (3) that Cook suffered no damages, (4) that the two-year statute of limitations barred any possible tort claim, and (5) that the four-year statute of limitations barred any possible contract claim.

A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial motion for a directed verdict. We therefore apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex.2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex.2002). We must determine whether the nonmovant produced any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on the material questions presented. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d at 506; Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).

A no evidence point will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.

King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 751. We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary judgment was rendered, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997). A no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the nonmovant presents more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 751; Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 953 S.W.2d at 711.

Cook Lacks Standing

The circumstances of this case are nearly identical to those this Court examined in Denman, 123 S.W.3d 728. In Denman, this Court held that a landowner lacks standing to sue for injury to real property when any injury occurred before the landowner acquired the property, his or her deed contains no assignment of any cause of action, and there is no evidence of a new injury since the current landowner has owned the property. Id. at 734-35. Similar to Denman, Cook lacks standing to bring this cause of action.

Standing is a necessary component of subject-matter jurisdiction, which is essential to the authority of the court to decide a dispute. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex.1993). The determination of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). Accordingly, we review de novo the trial court's determination of standing. See id.

Only the person whose primary legal right has been breached has standing to seek redress for an injury. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976). Stated differently, a person has standing to sue only when he or she is personally aggrieved by an alleged wrong. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996). "Without a breach of a legal right belonging to a plaintiff, that plaintiff has no standing to litigate." Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 732; Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

Cook must have a cause of action for injury to the property in order to have standing. Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 732; see Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 927. The cause of action for an injury to property belongs to the person owning the property at the time of the injury. Abbott v. City of Princeton, 721 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Without express provision, the cause of action does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property. Abbott, 721 S.W.2d at 875; Lay, 599 S.W.2d at 686. Without such an express provision, a subsequent purchaser cannot recover for an injury committed before his or her purchase. Lay, 599 S.W.2d at 686.

Exxon relies on Denman, Pluff, and Senn. All three of these cases held that the cause of action for injuries to property belongs to the owner of the property at the time of the alleged injuries and that subsequent purchasers lack standing to sue, absent an express provision in the deed granting them that power. Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 734; Pluff, 94 S.W.3d at 28; Senn, 55 S.W.3d at 226. In Senn, the Eastland Court of Appeals regarded the distinction between temporary and permanent injuries as meaningless with respect to the issue of standing. Senn, 55 S.W.3d at 226. The court found that "[a]ny injury to the land that the defendants might have caused, whether temporary or permanent, occurred prior to the Senns' purchase of the land" and the Senns, therefore, did not own any causes of action for either type of injury that may have been caused by the defendants. Id. The Tyler Court of Appeals and this Court followed the reasoning of the ...