Cook v. Hannah
| Decision Date | 08 April 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45401. |
| Citation | 297 N.W. 262,230 Iowa 249 |
| Parties | COOK v. HANNAH et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Crawford County; M. E. Hutchison, Judge.
Mandamus to compel the refund of certain taxes for 1934, 1935, and 1936. Defendant board of supervisors pleaded that the taxes had been legalized and validated by Ch. 250, Acts 48th G.A. The trial court held the legalizing act unconstitutional and granted plaintiff the relief sought. Defendant board appeals.
Reversed.
John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., John E. Mulroney, Asst. Atty. Gen and Robert K. Brannon, Co. Atty., of Denison, for defendants-appellants.
Powers & Gilchrist, of Denison, and Kern & Faville, of Des Moines for plaintiff-appellee.
The taxes for which refunds are sought were paid by plaintiff-appellee's assignors for the years 1934-5-6. These taxes were excessive because of the failure of the county auditor of Crawford county, in computing the tax rate, to deduct from the total budget requirements the tax to be derived from moneys and credits in compliance with section 7164, Code 1935. See Charles Hewitt & Sons Co. v. Keller, 223 Iowa 1372, 275 N.W. 94. In 1934, section 7164 was amended to read as follows:
The record before us shows that in only 13 counties did the auditor, in computing the tax rate for 1934-5-6, deduct the tax to be derived from moneys and credits as required by the above section. In the remainder of the 99 counties, including Crawford, the auditor failed to make this deduction for one or more of the three years in question. Because of this failure taxes were collected in excessive amounts in more than 80 counties. In some of the counties where there was no compliance with section 7164, some refunds of the excesses were made. The record indicates, however, that in most of such counties no refunds were made.
The 48th G. A., after the decision of this court in Charles Hewitt & Sons Co. v. Keller, supra, attempted to legalize the taxes collected in all counties where the auditor did not comply with section 7164, by the passage of Ch. 250, Acts 48th G. A., reading as follows: " All taxes levied, assessed, or collected wherein the county auditor in computing the tax rate failed to deduct from the total budget requirements the tax to be derived from moneys and credits and other moneyed capital during the years 1934, 1935, 1936, and 1937, as defined by section seventy-one hundred sixty-four (7164) of the Code, are hereby declared legal and valid."
This legalizing act went into effect during the pendency of the present suit and was pleaded by appellant board as a complete defense. By reply, appellee challenged the constitutionality of the act. The trial court held the legalizing act was not of uniform operation in violation of the constitutional provisions hereinafter mentioned, that it therefore constituted no defense to appellee's suit and ordered the refunds. The board of supervisors has appealed. There is presented to us the single question of the constitutionality of the legalizing act.
The power to declare legislation unconstitutional is one which courts exercise with great caution, and only when such conclusion is unavoidable. State v. Darling, 216 Iowa 553, 556, 246 N.W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 47, 126 N.W. 914, Ann.Cas.1912B, 822. And the presumption in favor of constitutionality is especially strong where the statute, like the one before us, was enacted to promote a public purpose, such, for example, as statutes relating to taxation. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 275, § 99.
Appellee claims the act (Ch. 250, 48th G.A.) is unconstitutional in four respects. The principal contention is that it is not of uniform operation throughout the state, in violation of Section 6, Article I, and Section 30, Article III of the State Constitution. The trial court so held. Section 6, Article I, provides: " All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." Section 30, Article III, provides:
We do not understand appellee to contend that the act in question is a local or special law. Is it of uniform operation? That is the vital question. It may at once be conceded that the act does not operate alike upon all citizens of the state. This court has repeatedly held, however, that uniformity, in the constitutional sense, does not depend upon the number of citizens affected or within the scope of operation of the law in question. A large amount of legislation is not uniform in the extent of its application. Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 910, 258 N.W. 190; State v. Darling, supra, at page 559 of 216 Iowa 246 N.W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 20 Iowa 338, 343. If the law operates upon every person within the relation or circumstances provided for in the act, the requirement of uniformity is met.
It has been held more than once that a law is of uniform operation throughout the state even though at the time of its adoption its practical application is limited, for example, to a single municipality. See State v. Darling, supra, and cases cited at page 559 of 216 Iowa, at page 393 of 246 N.W. 88 A.L.R. 218. Compare State v. Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 65 N.W. 818, 31 L.R.A. 186, 59 Am.St.Rep. 381, where a law was held nonuniform because by no possibility could it ever apply to more than one city. In the Des Moines case, page 526 of 96 Iowa, page 820 of 65 N.W., however, this court observed that (Italics supplied.) Laws which are public in their objects may be confined to a particular class of persons if they are general in their application to the cases to which they apply, provided the distinction is not arbitrary but rests upon some reason of public policy . Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 39, 40, 126 N.W. 914, Ann.Cas.1912B, 822. It is apparent that in passing the act before us the legislature was confronted with important questions of public policy, such, for example, as the raising by taxation of sufficient funds with which to make refunds and pay the considerable expense of computing the amounts to be refunded, and also the extensive litigation that would be apt to result if no curative act were adopted.
It is also well recognized that the legislature exercises a wide discretion in determining classifications to which its enactments shall be made applicable. State v. Darling, supra, at page 556 of 216 Iowa 246 N.W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; Tolerton & W. Co. v. Board, 222 Iowa 908, 912, 270 N.W. 427, 429.
Appellee does not argue that the law is not uniform because of any language in the act itself. His entire argument is based on the facts (1) that in 13 of the 99 counties the auditor for the three years in question observed the requirement of section 7164 by deducting the moneys and credits tax while in the remaining counties this requirement was ignored for one or more of the three years, and (2) that in some few counties where excessive amounts were collected, refunds were made to some taxpayers. If every county auditor in the state had failed to make the deduction for the years in question, and if no refunds had been granted by any of the counties, then there would be no basis whatever for appellee's claim of nonuniformity. His contention, in substance, is that a general curative act can not be passed after advantages have accrued to some citizens before the passage of the act. Carrying appellee's argument to its logical conclusion would mean that if but one of the 99 county auditors had observed the requirement of section 7164 while the remaining 98 ignored it, or if in a single county where the excessive amounts were collected refunds had been made to some taxpayers, the legislature would be divested of its power by a general curative act to remedy the situation. We can not agree that the power of the lawmakers to legislate in the public interest can be made to depend upon the action of a single county auditor in computing a tax rate, or a single board of supervisors in ordering a refund. To accept the argument of appellee would mean that the power of the legislature to enact laws of this kind would depend, not upon the terms of the constitution, but upon some action of county officials in observing a legal requirement as to the computation of a tax or in making a refund. This is not the measure of uniformity intended by the constitution.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial