State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling

• Decision Date: 17 January 1933
• Docket Number: No. 41876.,41876.
• Citation: 246 N.W. 390,216 Iowa 553
• Parties: STATE EX REL. WELSH, SUPERINTENDENT OF DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND PUBLIC PROPERTY OF DES MOINES, ET AL. v. DARLING ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

216 Iowa 553

246 N.W. 390

STATE EX REL. WELSH, SUPERINTENDENT OF DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND PUBLIC PROPERTY OF DES MOINES, ET AL.

v.DARLING ET AL.

No. 41876.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 17, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Frank S. Shankland, Judge.

Action in quo warranto to test the right of the defendants constituting the Park Board of the City of Des Moines to hold the office of members of said board. Decree and judgment in favor of the defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus and Dwight Brooke, all of Des Moines, for appellant.

Chauncey A. Weaver, of Des Moines, for appellees.

STEVENS, J.

This is an action by the State of Iowa on the relation of Pete Welsh, superintendent of the department of parks and public property in the city of Des Moines, and Frank C. Kelly, a resident taxpayer of said city, to test the right of appellees as members of the park board of said city to hold their respective offices and also to test the validity of chapter 293-D1 of the Code of 1931, under the authority of which the said board was appointed and is claiming the right to perform the duties prescribed by the act for such officers. The questions presented and the argument of counsel cover a much wider range than we deem it necessary to consider or pass upon. The right of relators to maintain an action in quo warranto, under the facts of this case, is earnestly challenged by appellees. The ultimate vital question involved and which goes directly to the public interest is the constitutionality of the aforesaid chapter. Each of the litigants and the public at large are directly and deeply interested in this question. We shall therefore, without deciding or expressing any opinion thereon, assume that the constitutionality of the law is properly before the court for adjudication. The propositions presented will be discussed in the order in which they are assigned by the relators and in such detail as is necessary to a full understanding and determination thereof.

Chapter 293-D1 of the Code of 1931 (sections 5813-d1 to 5813-d9) comprises nine sections. We deem it unnecessary to quote the chapter in full. The first ground upon which the validity of the statute is assailed is that it violates section 6, article 1, of the Constitution of the state of Iowa, which is as follows: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

The act, by its express terms, is applicable only to cities now or hereafter having a population of 125,000 or more, to be determined according to the last or subsequent state or federal census.

[1][2] It is the claim of relators that the classification thus adopted is unreasonable, capricious, and that the purpose and object of the enactment bears no reasonable or natural relationship to population, that is to say, that the benefits, if any, to municipalities, of the law, are as directly and appropriately applicable to other cities of much less population as to the class prescribed. It is a matter of which judicial notice will be taken that the city of Des Moines alone has a population of 125,000, and it is probable that no other city of this state is likely to attain a similar population for possibly a generation. Classification, to meet the requirements of the Constitution, must be based upon something substantial--something which distinguishes one class from another in such a way as to suggest the reasonable necessity for legislation based upon such classification. Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 822;State v. McGuire, 183 Iowa, 927, 167 N. W. 592, 593;Lee v. Hoffman, 182 Iowa, 1216, 166 N. W. 565, L. R. A. 1918C, 933;Munn v. Independent School District, 188 Iowa, 757, 176 N. W. 811;Owen v. Sioux City, 91 Iowa, 190, 59 N. W. 3;Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa, 452, 115 N. W. 177;State v. City of Des Moines, 96 Iowa, 521, 65 N. W. 818, 31 L. R. A. 186, 59 Am. St. Rep. 381;Haskel v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa, 236;McAunich v. Miss. & Mo. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338.

[3] Courts are reluctant to declare legislative enactments unconstitutional, and will do so only when the violation is clear, palpable, and practically free from doubt. State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa, 703, 133 N. W. 895, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 821; Lee v. Hoffman, supra; Munn v. Ind. School District, supra; In re Pedersen's Estate, 198 Iowa, 166, 196 N. W. 785;Loftus v. Dept. of Agriculture, 211 Iowa, 566, 232 N. W. 412.

[4] Necessarily, therefore, the Legislature exercises a wide discretion in the determination of classifications as a basis of legislative enactments. A careful reading of the cases cited will disclose that this court will not set aside a statute upon the ground that it is in violation of the article of the Constitutionunder consideration, unless the invalidity is clear and practically beyond doubt. This is a concession due to the co-ordinate branch of the government, and has always been recognized and followed by this court. Therefore, is the classification in the present instance so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate section 6, article 1, of the Constitution of this state? Is the law general and uniform in its operation, or does it grant to some municipalities or classes of citizens privileges and immunities which are denied to others? That population may be a proper basis of classification is not questioned by the relators. Is the act in question so wholly foreign and unrelated to population as to make its adoption by the Legislature as the basis of classification in this instance arbitrary and unreasonable, or does the act bear some reasonable and natural relationship to that subject?

We said in State v. McGuire, supra, that: “The order in which measures for the advancement of public welfare shall be adopted rest primarily with the lawmaking branch of the government, and a very large proportion of all our statutes involve to some greater or less extent an exercise of the legislative power of classification.”

[5] It appears from the record that the park system of the city of Des Moines comprises forty-seven separate and wholly disconnected parks. The estimated value thereof exceeds $3,000,000. The purpose and value of parks in all cities and districts having congested populations are obvious and manifest. They are a boon and comfort to the public, and are conducive to the public health and welfare. The line of demarcation between cities of a designated population and cities of substantially smaller population may be, and no doubt often is, more or less fanciful. In a large measure, as we have already shown, this is a matter largely for legislative discretion. The improvement, equipment, and beautification of a city's parks are matters in which the whole public is keenly interested. A park board of ten members in the smaller cities and towns of the state, no doubt, would be quite unnecessary, and serve little or no purpose, but in a city of 125,000 population, with a large number of parks possessing wide areas, the convenience thereof and use by the public quite naturally presents a very different situation. As stated, the act, by its terms, applies to all cities in this state now or subsequently having a population of 125,000. As will presently appear, the mere fact that but one city, at present, meets the statutory requirements, is not fatal to the validity of the enactment. To hold that the classification in this case is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and without any reasonable relationship to the purposes and objects of the enactment would, it seems to the court, be an encroachment upon the power and authority of the legislative department as fixed by the Constitution. There is, quite obviously, a close relationship between an act which makes provision for the possible equipment, management, and control of an extensive parking system and the population of certain municipalities. Trained minds might differ as to the reasonableness or advisability of a given measure. Possibly a smaller city might be equally benefited, but the Legislature deemed otherwise.

Before concluding this subdivision of our opinion, reference should be made to the authorities relied upon by relators to sustain their contention at this point. State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 960, 56 L. R. A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524, contains an excellent discussion of the subject of classification. In this opinion, the court clearly pointed out the distinction between laws of an arbitrary and capricious character and those of uniform application. The basis of classification in the statute there considered was so clearly arbitrary that but one conclusion was possible. The act required peddlers plying their vocation outside of cities and towns to pay an annual tax to the county. Persons who served in the Union Army or Navy were, however, excepted from the operation of the statute. The court said: “The classification here attempted rests solely on a past and completed transaction, having no relation to the particular legislation enacted.”

Numerous cases which are cited below are reviewed by counsel, but a careful reading thereof will disclose that the respective acts considered clearly and definitely distinguish the cases from those cited above. People ex rel. Board of Education v. Read, 344 Ill. 397, 176 N. E. 284;Street Improvement Dist. v. Hadfield, 184 Ark. 598, 43 S.W.(2d) 62;Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction (Fla.) 136 So. 334;Simpson v. Matthews, 184 Ark. 213, 40 S.W. (2d) 991;Smith v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S.W.(2d) 739;L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 Ill. 418, 72 N. E. 399, 103 Am. St. Rep. 234;Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. 266, 16 A. 356, 2 L. R. A. 577;Ward v. State, 224 Ala. 242, 139 So. 416; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 435.

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