Cook v. Pitter Patter Learning Ctr.
| Decision Date | 25 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 29260 |
| Parties | LINDA K. COOK Plaintiff/Appellant v. PITTER PATTER LEARNING CENTER, LLC, et al. Defendants/Appellees |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
2022-Ohio-961
LINDA K. COOK Plaintiff/Appellant
v.
PITTER PATTER LEARNING CENTER, LLC, et al. Defendants/Appellees
No. 29260
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery
March 25, 2022
Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court Trial Court Case No. 2020-CV-1628
JASON P. MATTHEWS, Atty. Reg. No. 0073144 and MATTHEW C. SCHULTZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0080142, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
MATTHEW D. STOKELY, Atty. Reg. No. 0062611 and KRISTINA ELIZABETH CURRY, Atty. Reg. No. 0084084, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
OPINION
WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Linda Cook, appeals from a judgment dismissing her complaint against Defendants-Appellees, Pitter Patter Learning Center, LLC, and Zandra Phillips (collectively, "Appellees"). According to Cook, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because it failed to apply the proper standard of review. Cook also argues that the court failed to properly consider evidence about judicial estoppel.
{¶ 2} We conclude that dismissal of the complaint was partly based on incorrect factual conclusions related to the application of judicial estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Cook's complaint. Furthermore, an alleged lacked of standing due to Cook's Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing does not provide an alternate reason to affirm the dismissal. Cook had standing when the complaint was filed because she asserted that Appellees had caused her injury and damages by unlawfully terminating her employment, by failing to pay wages, by failing to pay minimum wages, and by illegally accessing her electronically-stored information. At that point, Cook had not yet filed for bankruptcy, and standing existed.
{¶ 3} Whether the bankruptcy trustee subsequently became a real party in interest, depriving Cook of standing, or whether Cook had a concurrent interest for purposes of standing due to differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings is for the trial court to decide on remand, along with the issue of judicial estoppel. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 4} On April 3, 2020, Cook filed a complaint against Appellees, alleging that her employment had been terminated in violation of R.C. 5113.52, Ohio's "whistleblower" statute, and R.C. 5104.10, which precludes childcare employers from taking retaliatory actions against employees who have made good faith oral or written complaints to the director of job and family services. Cook also alleged that Appellees had failed to pay wages, had failed to pay minimum wages, and had illegally accessed her electronically-stored communications in violation of state and federal law.
{¶ 5} The claims arose from Cook's employment with Pitter Patter, which is a licensed daycare facility. According to the complaint, Cook was employed at Pitter Patter as an administrator from July 8, 2019 through October 9, 2019, and reported to Zandra Phillips. Complaint, ¶ 5 and 7. Cook's job performance and conduct were satisfactory during her employment. Id. at ¶ 6. During her employment, Cook reported unsafe conditions to Phillips, including children's access to prescription medication and sharp objects and improper staff-to-child ratios. However, Phillips failed to correct the conditions. Id. at ¶ 7. As a result, Cook sent an email on October 8, 2019, to a Day Care Licensing Specialist for the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS"), asking to speak with him about unsafe conditions at the daycare center. Id.
{¶ 6} Cook sent the email using her private mobile phone and personal email account. Id. at ¶ 8. However, on October 9, 2019, Phillips handed Cook a printed copy of email communications between ODJFS and Cook and terminated Cook's employment. Id. at ¶ 9. Cook then filed the current action against Appellees, Phillips and Pitter Patter.
{¶ 7} After receiving an extension of time to plead, Appellees filed an answer to
the complaint on June 3, 2020. Following a pretrial conference, the court set various litigation dates, including a January 21, 2021 discovery cutoff and a February 8, 2021 jury trial.
{¶ 8} On December 3, 2021, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and, alternatively, Civ.R. 12(C), based on Cook's failure to disclose the existence of her action against Appellees when she filed for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. By agreement of the parties, the court vacated the trial date and granted Cook an extension of time to reply to the motion to dismiss. Cook then filed a response to the motion on December 29, 2020, arguing that her failure to list the claim against Appellees was inadvertent. As support, Cook attached her trial attorney's affidavit and several other documents.
{¶ 9} On the same day, Cook also filed a motion in the trial court seeking to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as a real party in interest under Civ.R. 17(A). Again, Cook attached several documents, including the docket sheet for her bankruptcy case and her trial attorney's affidavit.
{¶ 10} Another pretrial order was filed on January 7, 2021, setting trial for October 25, 2021. On February 9, 2021, Appellees responded to the motion to add the bankruptcy trustee and to Cook's memorandum concerning the motion to dismiss.
{¶ 11} Along with a subsequent memorandum, Cook included her own affidavit, in which she said she had informed her bankruptcy attorney of the pending litigation. She further stated that this attorney and his staff had prepared the bankruptcy filings and had not given her an opportunity to review them before filing. Cook therefore claimed she
had no knowledge that the common pleas court litigation had been omitted until Appellees' motion to dismiss was filed. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Her Motion to Substitute Bankruptcy Trustee as Real Party in Interest (Feb. 16. 2021) ("Substitution Motion"), Cook Affidavit, p. 1-2. Appellees filed a surrreply to this memorandum on February 23, 2021.
{¶ 12} On September 9, 2021, the trial court filed an order and entry sustaining Appellees' motion to dismiss and dismissing Cook's complaint. This timely appeal followed.
II. Alleged Error in Dismissal of the Complaint
{¶ 13} Cook's sole assignment of error states that:
The Trial Court Erred by Granting the Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendants-Appellees.
{¶ 14} Cook first contends that the trial court failed to apply the correct standard of review under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) or Civ.R.12(C). Specifically, Cook argues that the court made judgments on facts outside the pleadings, which is appropriate for summary judgment situations but not for motions to dismiss or motions for judgment on the pleadings. Cook further contends that because her intent was in question, this matter was not suitable for disposition by summary judgment. Following that discussion, Cook addresses the merits of dismissing the case. Before we consider these issues, we will outline the relevant standards.
A. Applicable Standards
{¶ 15} As noted, Appellees' motion to dismiss was based on Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and, alternatively, on Civ.R. 12(C). Civ.R. 12(B)(1) concerns dismissal based on "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter," and Civ.R. 12(C) pertains to motions for judgment on the pleadings.
{¶ 16} "The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has been raised in the complaint." State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 537 N.E.2d 641 (1989), citing Avco Fin. Servs. Loan, Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 67, 520 N.E.2d 1378 (10th Dist.1987). "In determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a cause of action sufficient to withstand a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint, and it may consider evidentiary material pertinent to such inquiry without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment." Tibbs v. Kendrick, 93 Ohio App.3d 35, 39-40, 637 N.E.2d 397 (8th Dist.1994), citing Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526 (1976).
{¶ 17} Appellate review of dismissals under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is de novo. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State of Ohio, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 12. This means we apply the same standards as the trial court. Carter v. Trotwood-Madison City Bd. of Edn., 181 Ohio App.3d 764, 2009-Ohio-1769, 910 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 18} Unlike Civ.R. 12(B)(1), a decision on "a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and any writings attached to the complaint." Dearth v. Stanley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22180, 2008-Ohio-487, ¶ 24, citing Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973).
{¶ 19} "Under Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal is appropriate where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. * * * Thus, Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996).
{¶ 20} Appellate review of decisions made under Civ.R. 12(C) is also de novo. Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 18. This is because the motion presents only questions of law. Id.
{¶ 21} With these standards in mind, we return to consideration of Cook's arguments.
B. Trial Court...
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