Cook v. Shoshone First Bank

• Decision Date: 20 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-105.,05-105.
• Citation: 126 P.3d 886,2006 WY 13
• Parties: Jeannie COOK, Administrator of the Estate of Christina Proefrock, Deceased; and Randy Proefrock, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. SHOSHONE FIRST BANK, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

126 P.3d 886

2006 WY 13

Jeannie COOK, Administrator of the Estate of Christina Proefrock, Deceased; and Randy Proefrock, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. SHOSHONE FIRST BANK, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 05-105.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

January 20, 2006.

Representing Appellants: Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Scott E. Kolpitcke and Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Copenhaver.

Before HILL, C.J., and KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ., and SKAVDAHL, DJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Christina Proefrock was employed as a teller at Shoshone First Bank (SFB). While she was away on vacation, SFB discovered $1,200 was missing from the bank. When Ms. Proefrock returned from vacation, SFB questioned her about the missing money. Ms. Proefrock denied any knowledge of the missing funds and SFB placed her on paid administrative leave while the matter was investigated. A few hours later, Ms. Proefrock committed suicide.

[¶ 2] Ms. Proefrock's mother, Jeannie Cook, as administrator of her daughter's estate, and Randy Proefrock, Ms. Proefrock's husband, filed a complaint against SFB alleging claims for "liability in tort for [Ms.] Proefrock's suicide," negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. In essence, they claimed SFB knew Ms. Proefrock did not take the money but falsely accused her and set her up to take the blame for it, which caused Ms. Proefrock such severe emotional distress that she took her own life.

[¶ 3] SFB filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming there were no genuine issues of material fact and judgment was warranted as a matter of law. The district court granted SFB's motion. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 4] The estate and Mr. Proefrock present the following issue:

Did the district court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of [a]ppellee, holding that the record is devoid of reasonable inferences to support [a]ppellants' legal theories?

SFB phrases the issue as:

Should the decision of the [d]istrict [c]ourt [j]udge granting summary judgment to [a]ppellee be affirmed for any of the reasons asserted by [a]ppellee in its Motion for Summary Judgment and [b]rief in support thereof?

FACTS

[¶ 5] Viewed in the light most favorable to the estate and Mr. Proefrock, the evidence presented was as follows: In July 2001, Ms. Proefrock had been employed by SFB in Cody, Wyoming for less than a year and had worked at the Albertson's branch for only a few months. She was an at-will employee.

[¶ 6] On July 12, 2001, Ms. Proefrock completed her shift at 7:00 p.m. and left the bank to begin a ten-day vacation. She did not obtain written verification of the cash balance in her teller drawer from another SFB employee before leaving as was required by bank policy. While she was on vacation, another employee had the keys to her drawer and other employees used her password to sign into her teller drawer. Also while she was on vacation, SFB discovered that $900 in cash was missing from the vault and $300 was missing from Ms. Proefrock's cash drawer.

[¶ 7] On July 23, 2001, Ms. Proefrock returned to work following her vacation. She was confronted immediately by Graham Jackson, SFB vice president and cashier at the downtown bank, and Eric Wright, the assistant branch manager. Ms. Jackson accused her of stealing the money. She denied any knowledge of the missing funds. Ms. Jackson told Ms. Proefrock the bank would get the police involved and there would be lie detector tests. She also said there were hidden cameras in the bank about which the employees had no knowledge, a statement that was not true. Despite Ms. Proefrock's denial, Ms. Jackson placed her on paid administrative leave. Ms. Jackson did not tell Ms. Proefrock other employees were suspects in the theft.

[¶ 8] Ms. Proefrock left the bank and went to her apartment. She spoke with her husband, who came by the apartment, and her mother, brother and best friend. She told them SFB accused her of stealing money, she had not done it, but no one believed her. She received a telephone call from Ms. Jackson, asking her to prepare a written statement. Ms. Jackson went to Ms. Proefrock's home and retrieved the statement from her.

[¶ 9] Shortly thereafter, Ms. Proefrock ingested rubbing alcohol and shot herself in the head with her husband's .22 caliber pistol. Mr. Proefrock found her body a short time later. At the time of Ms. Proefrock's death, she had two children, ages 2½ and 1½.

[¶ 10] On June 2, 2003, the estate and Mr. Proefrock filed a complaint against SFB alleging that it knew or reasonably should have known at the time it accused Ms. Proefrock of taking the money that she did not commit the theft.¹ The complaint further alleged that SFB knew the false accusation would cause Ms. Proefrock severe emotional distress and that SFB acted intentionally, recklessly and outrageously in falsely accusing her and inflicting severe emotional distress upon her, causing her to take her own life. The estate sought damages for unidentified potential claimants in the amount of Ms. Proefrock's future lost earnings, companionship, society and comfort. Mr. Proefrock sought damages for the emotional distress he suffered from finding his wife shortly after her suicide. The estate and Mr. Proefrock also sought punitive damages.

[¶ 11] Six months later, SFB filed a motion for summary judgment claiming it owed no duty to Ms. Proefrock, there was no evidence showing SFB's conduct caused Ms. Proefrock's suicide, there was no evidence SFB acted outrageously, intentionally or recklessly to cause Ms. Proefrock severe emotional distress and the claim was barred by worker's compensation. The estate and Mr. Proefrock filed a response in which they asserted genuine issues of material fact existed for trial concerning whether:

(1) SFB's false accusation of [Ms. Proefrock] was outrageous, and a willful departure from acceptable banking practices, and (2) SFB's false accusation induced in [Ms. Proefrock] a mental state that made it impossible for her to resist the impulse to end her own life, and was a substantial factor in [Ms. Proefrock]'s suicide.

The district court heard argument on the motion and, by order dated March 14, 2005, granted summary judgment in favor of SFB. In its order, the district court concluded:

[T]here are no genuine issues as to any material facts in this case and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment should be granted to Defendant.

While the Plaintiffs have made numerous inferences and raised theories of conspiracy and cover-up, the Court finds that such inferences are not reasonable inferences that can be fairly drawn from the evidence or are otherwise supported by unwarranted and inadmissible speculation.

The estate and Mr. Proefrock appealed the order to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that a party has asserted.

We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by examining the same material as the district court. We examine de novo the record, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record. If upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that doubt must be resolved against the party seeking summary judgment. We accord no deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law.

Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 WY 63, ¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo.2005) (citations omitted).

[¶ 12] The standard of review is refined somewhat when applied to summary judgment in a negligence case.

"Summary judgment is not favored in a negligence action and is, therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny. We have, however, affirmed summary judgment in negligence cases where the record failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405 (Wyo.1997) (failure to establish duty); Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545 (Wyo.1991) (failure of proof of underlying claim of a joint venture); MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776 (Wyo.1990) (failure of proof of defendant's duty); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986) (cause element was pure speculation); and Fiedler v. Steger, 713 P.2d 773 (Wyo.1986) (failure to establish cause in a medical malpractice action).

After a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of material fact. The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings ..., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden."

The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful speculation." Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.

Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo.2005) (some citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

1. Worker's Compensation Immunity

[¶ 13] As a preliminary...