Popejoy v. Steinle

• Decision Date: 08 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-255,90-255
• Citation: 820 P.2d 545
• Parties: Ronald L. POPEJOY and Doris J. Popejoy, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Carl STEINLE and the Converse County Bank, Personal Representatives of the Estate of William E. Steinle, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 545

820 P.2d 545

Ronald L. POPEJOY and Doris J. Popejoy, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Carl STEINLE and the Converse County Bank, Personal Representatives of the Estate of William E. Steinle, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 90-255.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Nov. 8, 1991.

Michael D. Zwickl, Casper, for appellants.

David A. Drell of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, P.C., for appellees.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

Appellants Ronald L. and Doris J. Popejoy (Popejoys) appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment to appellees Carl Steinle and the Converse County Bank as personal representatives of the William E. Steinle Estate (Estate). Claiming that a joint venture relationship existed between William and his wife Constance E. (Connie) Steinle, the Popejoys seek to hold William's estate vicariously liable for Connie's alleged negligence in causing a traffic accident in which Ronald Popejoy was injured.

The Popejoys raise these issues on appeal:

1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of the joint venture relationship between William and Connie Steinle.

a. May a person have a joint venture relationship with his spouse in the acquisition of an appreciable asset to be raised in the family's sole business enterprise?

b. Is the gift of an appreciable asset, which is later to be sold, complete when purchased, or complete when sold and the proceeds are paid over to the donee?

c. Does the test for pecuniary interest in a joint venture mandate an expectation of profits, losses, both, or other factors?

d. May a person, as a parent, have a pecuniary interest, as a joint venturer, in an appreciable asset, to be purchased by that parent and his spouse and raised in the family business, and given to his 8 year old minor child?

2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment where there was a material issue of fact.

a. The nature of the family ranching and farming operation which was enjoyed by William and Connie Steinle was a question of fact for the jury.

Although the Popejoys raise multiple issues on appeal, the first of two issues presented by the Estate is clearly stated and dispositive in this instance:

I. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and finding that the requisite elements of a joint venture did not exist.

We affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

FACTS

On the morning of May 8, 1986, Connie Steinle, accompanied by her seven-year-old daughter and a niece, left the family ranch for Douglas, Wyoming. The purpose of the trip was to purchase a calf for the daughter to raise on the ranch. While en route to Douglas, the truck Connie was driving collided with a vehicle driven by Ronald Popejoy. Connie died as a result of the accident and Ronald sustained injuries initially diagnosed as a muscle strain. As a result of his injuries, Ronald received outpatient medical treatment at a local hospital. One week after the accident William Steinle completed the calf purchase for his daughter. The calf was raised on the Steinle ranch and sold the following year. The daughter received the proceeds from the sale.

Approximately fifteen months after the accident Ronald Popejoy began experiencing severe pain in his neck and back. Because other treatments failed to correct the problem, he underwent two separate neurosurgeries to fuse cervical vertebrae. Following the second surgical procedure, Ronald attempted unsuccessfully to reopen Connie Steinle's estate which had been probated and closed more than a year earlier. The Popejoys then filed a creditor's claim against William's estate as he had died in the interim following Connie's death. After the Popejoys' creditor's claim was rejected, they filed a complaint against the personal representatives of William's estate. The complaint was premised on the theory that William and Connie Steinle were engaged in a joint venture when Connie embarked on her May 8, 1986 "business trip" to pick up the daughter's calf.

After answering the complaint, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion, supported by the affidavits of three Steinle family members, was heard by the trial court and subsequently denied. In his decision letter denying summary judgment, the trial court judge stated in part:

There is in my mind a geuine [sic] issue of material fact as to the financial and business structure of the Steinle Ranch operation.

Following denial, the Estate moved to bifurcate the trial so that the issue of whether a joint venture relationship existed could be decided initially and separately from questions of negligence, liability and injury. The motion to bifurcate was granted and a trial date was set.

The Estate then filed a second motion for summary judgment accompanied by additional supporting documents. This motion was heard and granted by the trial court on June 6, 1990. In its decision letter, the trial court stated:

It is the decision of the Court that there is not a genuine issue of material fact to present to a jury in this case and I will award summary judgment to the Defendants.

It has been the hope of the Court that since the date of the last argument on Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, that discovery would reveal facts which could be determined as genuine issues involving the relationship between the Defendant, his wife and children.

In a careful reading of the depositions and affidavits, it appears that there was not a financial[,] pecuniary or other interest which would result in a contingent liability upon the Defendant and present a genuine issue of material fact for presentation to a jury.

Following the Popejoys' Motion for Reconsideration and a subsequent hearing, the trial court reaffirmed its decision to grant summary judgment as a matter of law and because it found no genuine issues of material fact. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This court's standard of review of a trial court's order granting summary judgment is:

We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same standards. Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Zmijewski v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo.1991) (citations omitted).

A fact is "material" if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a claim or defense asserted by the parties. S.C. Ryan, Inc. v. Lowe, 753 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo.1988). Although summary judgments are not favored in negligence actions, the entry of summary judgment is proper where the record fails to establish an issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MacKrell v. Bell H sub2 S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo.1990) (citing Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV, 713 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo.1986)).

In discussing the parties' burdens in the summary judgment context we have also said:

A motion for summary judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. We analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's burden.

TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo.1990) (quoting Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo.1987)) (citations omitted).

Finally, this court has said "if the trial court's judgment is sustainable on any theory, it will not be disturbed on appeal." DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 650-51 (Wyo.1986) (citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 935 (Wyo.1981)).

DISCUSSION

The Popejoys seek to impute Connie Steinle's alleged negligence to her husband William's estate by claiming that the Steinles were engaged in a joint venture relationship at the time of the accident. "The burden of establishing the existence of a joint venture is upon the party asserting that the relationship exists." Stone v. First Wyoming Bank N.A., Lusk, 625 F.2d 332, 341, n. 12 (10th Cir.1980). See also Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1119 (Wyo.1979). Consequently, the Popejoys are required to demonstrate each of the elements of a joint venture relationship in order to prevail. They must also show that the joint venture relationship existed at the time of Connie's alleged negligent conduct. Edler v. Rogers, 817 P.2d 886, 887 (Wyo.1991).

This court has never set forth a specific "test" of elements necessary to prove existence of a joint venture. The parties in this case and many courts from other jurisdictions frequently use the terms "joint venture" and "joint enterprise" interchangeably and the two terms are conceptually closely related. It has been stated that "[t]he term joint enterprise is often used interchangeably with joint venture, and it has been stated that when the term joint enterprise is used to describe a business or commercial undertaking, no significant differences between the terms may be drawn." 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 3 at 395 (1981).

In Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Wyo.1978), this court discussed the distinction between a joint venture and a joint enterprise and we adopted a four-part test for proving the existence of a joint enterprise:

The element of common enterprise, or as it is often termed, joint enterprise, is of material importance in this case. It is...