Cook v. State of RI, Dept. of MHRH, Civ. A. No. 90-560-T.
Decision Date | 19 February 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 90-560-T. |
Citation | 783 F. Supp. 1569 |
Parties | Bonnie COOK v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, RETARDATION AND HOSPITALS. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Lynette Labinger, Cooperating Atty., R.I. Affiliate, ACLU, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.
John L.P. Breguet, Cranston, R.I., for defendant.
Bonnie Cook ("Cook") seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and monetary damages from the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals ("MHRH") for what she alleges was discrimination based on her obesity in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794. This case is presently before the Court on MHRH's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That motion requires the Court to consider whether obesity is a "handicap" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794.
The complaint alleges that, since sometime before 1978, Cook's weight has been at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate for her height, a condition known as "morbid obesity." From 1978 to 1986, Cook worked as an institutional attendant at the Ladd Center, a residential facility for the mentally disabled that is operated by MHRH. It is not clear why her employment terminated but, in 1988, she re-applied for a similar position and was accepted contingent upon satisfactorily completing a physical examination.
MHRH acknowledges that its examining physician refused to approve Cook's application unless she reduced her weight to something less than three hundred pounds. When Cook failed to satisfy that requirement, she was refused employment.
Cook contends that MHRH's action amounts to discrimination on the basis of a handicap in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and several Rhode Island statutes pursuant to which she has asserted pendent state law claims. She seeks a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring the MHRH to award her the next available position as an institutional attendant with applicable seniority, promotions and salary increases retroactive to November, 1988. In addition, she seeks back pay, compensatory damages and attorney's fees.
MHRH contends that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because obesity is not a "handicap" within the meaning of the aforesaid statutes. Alternatively, MHRH argues that, even if obesity is a handicap, it made a reasonable accommodation by agreeing to hire Cook if she reduced her weight to less than three hundred pounds. MHRH also asserts that the complaint should be dismissed as "untimely."
MHRH does not specify the rule on which it relies in seeking dismissal of the complaint. However, it is obvious from the tenor of MHRH's memorandum that the motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In passing on such a motion, the Court's function is not to make factual determinations. Rather, the Court must consider all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint to be true. Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1202 (1st Cir.1987). If the allegations, when viewed in that light, are sufficient to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be denied. Knight v. Mills, 836 F.2d 659, 664 (1st Cir.1987).
MHRH's argument that Cook's complaint is "untimely" requires little discussion. To the extent that the Court is able to decipher that argument, it appears to rest on the erroneous premise that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 required Cook to commence this suit within thirty days after her complaint was denied by the State Office of Equal Opportunity. Accordingly, MHRH concludes that Cook's suit is barred because it was not initiated until more than two months after denial.
The flaw in that argument is that § 2000e-16 does not apply to Cook's claim. Cook's claim is brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794 which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1988). Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, upon which MHRH relies, is part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Title VII includes a comprehensive array of remedies available to aggrieved individuals. As a precondition to bringing suit, it also requires compliance with an elaborate procedural process prescribing specific time limits for seeking redress. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1988) ( ).
Unlike Title VII, the provisions of Title VI that are applicable to Cook's case provide for remedial action only by the agency disbursing federal funds. Title VI does not provide for redress to the individual who is the subject of the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988). Consequently, the courts have recognized an implied private cause of action on the part of those individuals. See Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2825, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1460 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1102, 113 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991).
Since Title VI does not include either the procedural process contained in Title VII or its concomitant time limits, the only time constraint applicable to claims under 29 U.S.C. § 794 is that set forth in the pertinent state statute of limitations governing causes of action most analogous to the claim being asserted. See Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683 (7th Cir.1987); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 732 F.Supp. 895, 900 (N.D.Ill. 1990); Jones v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ., 689 F.Supp. 535, 538-39 (D.Md. 1988).
In this case, MHRH has not addressed what statute that is. However, it appears that it would be R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-1-14 governing actions for personal injury. See, Bush, 732 F.Supp. at 900 ( ). If that is the case, Cook's suit was brought well within the three year period prescribed by that statute and, therefore, is "timely."
Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), prohibits discrimination on the basis of "handicap" in connection with activities conducted by federal agencies or programs receiving federal funds. Specifically, it provides:
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988) (emphasis added).1
The determination as to whether obesity is a "handicap" must begin with the definition of "handicap" contained in § 706(8)(B). The relevant portion of that subsection states:
(B) Subject to subparagraphs (C) and (D), the term "individual with handicaps" means, for purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter 29 U.S.C. §§ 780-785, 790-794d, any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp.1991).
MHRH concedes that obesity may lead to a number of incapacitating afflictions. Nevertheless, it contends that obesity, itself, is not a "physical impairment" that "substantially limits" a person's "major life activities."
Unfortunately, the Rehabilitation Act does not define any of those terms. Moreover, the legislative history of the Act fails to provide any clues as to precisely what Congress intended. Consequently, in seeking guidance regarding the meaning of those terms, the Court must, first, look to the regulations promulgated by the administrative agencies charged with immediate responsibility for implementing the law particularly since such regulations were subject to Congressional oversight under the statute. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (citations omitted). The regulations adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the "DHHS Regulations") are particularly pertinent in this case because it is through that department that the Ladd Center receives its federal assistance. See generally 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84 (1989).
The DHHS Regulations attempt to define a physical impairment in two ways: first, by reference to the bodily systems affected and second, by providing an illustrative list of conditions and diseases regarded as impairments. Thus, the DHHS Regulations provide:
(i) "Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one...
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...Passenger Corp. , 724 F.2d 394, 395 (3d Cir. 1984), §551.1.11 Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep ’ t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 783 F. Supp. 1569 (D. R.I. 1992), §615 Cooper Cos. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co. , 31 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1100, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 508 (1995), §424.7 Cooper Tire ......
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Commonly Used Experts
...evidence establishing a physiological basis for her handicap. In Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 783 F. Supp. 1569 (D. R.I. 1992), the claimant was refused employment when she refused to comply with a requirement that she reduce her weight to less than 30......
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Table of Cases
...Passenger Corp. , 724 F.2d 394, 395 (3d Cir. 1984), §551.1.11 Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep ’ t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 783 F. Supp. 1569 (D. R.I. 1992), §615 Cooper Cos. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co. , 31 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1100, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 508 (1995), §424.7 Cooper Tire ......