Coomes v. Finegan
| Decision Date | 09 February 1943 |
| Docket Number | 46064. |
| Citation | 7 N.W.2d 729,233 Iowa 448 |
| Parties | COOMES v. FINEGAN, Sheriff, et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Helmer & Minnich, of Carroll, for appellant.
White & Bruner, of Carroll, for appellees.
Adda Coomes died intestate on January 26, 1941, seized of about ninety-one acres of land in Carroll County, Iowa, and left surviving, her husband, the plaintiff, seven children, and the children of a deceased daughter. Prior to the death of the intestate, the defendant, Dreesen, had procured a judgment in the District Court of Carroll County against Albert Miller and wife, Lola Miller. The latter was a daughter and an heir of the intestate. On March 18, 1941, Lola Miller filed in the office of the Clerk of said District Court the following instrument:
"I, Lola Miller, do hereby definitely and finally renounce and reject any and all right of inheritance which I might or could have as heir at law of Adda Coomes, deceased and I renounce and reject any and all right, title or interest which I might or could claim in any property, either real or personal, of which the said Adda Coomes died seized or possessed."
It was executed by Lola Miller on March 14, 1941.
There is no dispute as to the facts. In addition to the facts already stated, it was stipulated that: letters of administration were issued on February 8, 1941; all of the heirs of the intestate except Lola Miller, on April 29, 1941, executed and delivered to the plaintiff a quit claim deed to all of their interest in said real estate, which deed he had recorded about that time; Lola Miller made no affirmative action in any way toward claiming or doing anything with the property involved prior to her renunciation or thereafter; on August 15, 1941, the execution and levy was made upon the alleged one-twelfth interest of Lola Miller in said real estate; and on September 17, 1941, the injunction was issued and served.
The defendant, Dreesen, alleged that the purported renunciation was made without consideration, with intent to defraud this defendant, and to defeat the collection of the judgment; that it in no way affected his prior and superior right, or the validity of his judgment lien, or execution levy. There is no proof respecting consideration or of any intent to defraud creditors.
I. The only question presented for determination is whether or not a child who takes an interest in real estate from an intestate parent, under the Iowa statutes of descent, can, by renunciation of that interest, defeat the lien of a prior judgment.
Counsel inform us that this court, so far as they can determine, has never answered the question, and that after long and diligent research they are confident in asserting that the point has not been directly passed upon in the United States and that any reference to this question of law in any case is pure dictum. In quite an extensive search, we have had no better success than counsel. Questions closely akin to this one have been determined in this state and elsewhere.
A testamentary trust, bequest or devise may, prior to any act of acceptance, be renounced by the beneficiary, so long as there is no estoppel, or fraud or collusion for the benefit of the renouncer, and such renunciation when made will revert back to the death of the testator, and will displace the lien, of any personal judgment against the beneficiary existing at that time, or of any levy upon the property made subsequent thereto. Such a renunciation will prevent the testamentary disposition from having any effect to pass any title or interest, and since it relates back to the death of the testator, or the taking effect of the gift there is nothing to which a lien or levy may attach. Renunciation is not an assignment, contract or conveyance and is not the equivalent of a transfer by a debtor to defeat his creditors. Creditors have no right, and courts have no jurisdiction, to control the right of such beneficiary to accept or to refuse such a gift. It is true that one is presumed to have accepted a gift, testamentary or otherwise, which is beneficial to him, yet he may withhold indicating such acceptance or assent, and upon renunciation the presumption is displaced as of the death of the testamentary donor, or of the time of making the gift.
The following decisions of this court fully sustain the above-made statements: In re Estate of Stone, 132 Iowa 136, 140, 141, 109 N.W. 455, 457, 10 Ann.Cas. 1033; Mohn v. Mohn, 148 Iowa 288, 300, 126 N.W. 1127; Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 477, 187 N.W. 20, 27 A.L.R. 465; Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 314, 316, 213 N.W. 608; Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 660, 239 N.W. 564, 566; In re Estate of Murphy, 217 Iowa 1291, 1293, 252 N.W. 523; Bogenrief v. Law, 222 Iowa 1303, 1306, 271 N.W. 229; McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Iowa 37, 43 et seq., 282 N.W. 786; Brown v. Kalene, 230 Iowa 76, 296 N.W. 809; In re Lage, D.C.N.D.Iowa, 19 F.2d 153, 154; In re Meiburg, D.C.S.D.Iowa, 1 F.Supp. 892, 895. They have the support of the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, although there is quite a strong minority. See notes in 27 A.L.R. 472, 67 A.L.R. 1226; 133 A.L.R. 1428. Such a renunciation has been held effective to defeat a collateral inheritance, or other succession, tax. See In re Estate of Stone, supra, 132 Iowa 136; People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848, 60 A.L.R. 305; In re Wolfe's Estate, 89 A.D. 349, 85 N.Y.S. 949, 953; Brown v. Routzahn, 6 Cir., 63 F.2d 914, 915. Such a tax ordinarily takes effect as of the death of the testator. In re Estate of Wells, 142 Iowa 255, 120 N.W. 713. In Lehr v. Switzer, supra, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564, the judgment creditor had acquired a sheriff's deed to the land devised to a beneficiary two years before the renunciation, but the renunciation was held to defeat the deed.
II. In Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa 272, 228 N.W. 93, 67 A.L.R. 1218, the grantor conveyed by deed a tract of land subject to the grantee's paying to himself, as trustee for a beneficiary, $25,000 within ten years after the death of the grantor, with annual interest payable to the beneficiary. The grantee accepted the deed with the obligation, and recorded it on May 22, 1926, after the death of the grantor. Before the deed was executed there were two judgments against the beneficiary. Another judgment was secured after the execution of the deed, but before the death of the grantor. A fourth judgment was purchased by the grantee on May 26, 1926. On February 9, 1928, the beneficiary executed a renunciation of "any and all benefits, interest, gifts and annuities which do, may or might accrue to her" under the deed. It was stipulated that the beneficiary had never received any part of the income from the trust, and that the trustee held no such income, and that the beneficiary had never signified her intentions toward the trust until her renunciation. The plaintiff, in July, 1926 began an equitable action under section 11815, Code 1927, in the nature of a creditor's bill to subject the property to his judgment and thereby obtained a specific equitable lien upon it. The court held that the renunciation defeated any rights of the plaintiff. Justice DeGraff filed a pursuasive dissent on the law and the facts.
In Shedenhelm v. Cafferty, 174 Iowa 195, 201, 203, 156 N.W. 340, 343, the surviving widow by refusing to take under the will was allotted as her distributive share 140 acres of land absolutely, in which the will had given her but a life estate with the remainder to all of the children. One son, Oscar, was given nothing except this remainder interest. Necessarily this remainder was eliminated when the widow took fee title, requiring contribution from the other devisees to make it up. The children, including Oscar, mutually agreed that none would claim compensation from another. The court held that "such liens [prior judgments] could not be defeated by the mere agreement or waiver of the debtor."
In Schoonover v. Osborne, supra, 193 Iowa 474, 477, 187 N.W. 20, 22, 27 A.L.R. 465, the appellee strongly relied on the Shedenhelm ruling, but that decision was distinguished by holding "there was no renunciation in the Shedenhelm case, but an attempt, by waiver, to pass the interest of a devisee to the mother."
III. It is also the holding of this court, and of courts generally, that the legacy or devise, which is released, becomes intestate property and passes to the heirs or next of kin, including the legatee or devisee, if he be such. Brown v. Kalene, supra, 230 Iowa 76, 79, 296 N.W. 809; Lehr v. Switzer, supra, 213 Iowa 658, 663, 239 N.W. 564.
IV. We have also held that a surviving husband may elect between the provisions made for his benefit in the will of his deceased wife and his statutory rights in her estate, and his creditors cannot control this right although by the will he would take nothing which they might subject to their claims and by an election to take under the statute the contrary would be true. Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa 500, 119 N.W. 529, 134 Am.St.Rep. 430.
V. We have also held that an expectant heir may by an agreement, with the one from whom he expects to inherit, for a consideration release, or bar himself by estoppel from claiming his intestate share. While nothing passes at the time, and the expectant heir has no interest or estate in esse, and nothing but a naked possibility or expectancy, the assignment, whether it be to the ancestor or to another, if fair to and without fraud upon the assignor, and for adequate consideration, will be enforced by a court of equity, after the estate vests. No creditor, of course, could have any rights against such a naked possibility. See Stolenburg v. Diercks, 117 Iowa 25, 90 N.W. 525; Hickey v. Davidson, 129 Iowa 384, 105 N.W. 678; Calhoun...
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