Cooper, Matter of
Decision Date | 01 February 1993 |
Parties | In the Matter of William Thomas COOPER, Deceased. Ernest Chin, Appellant; Regina V. Kelly, Executrix, etc., Respondent. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Bradley B. Davis, New York City, for appellant.
Ethel Fitzgerald, Brooklyn, for respondent.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., New York City (Lawrence S. Kahn, of counsel), appearing pursuant to Executive Law § 71 (no brief filed).
Judith E. Schaeffer, Washington, D.C., and Evan Wolfson, New York City, for Lambda Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., amicus curiae.
Before MANGANO, P.J., and BRACKEN, SULLIVAN and BALLETTA, JJ.
The question to be resolved on this appeal is whether the survivor of a homosexual relationship, alleged to be a "spousal relationship", is entitled to a right of election against the decedent's will, pursuant to EPTL 5-1.1. In our view, the question must be answered in the negative.
William Thomas Cooper died on February 19, 1988. The decedent died testate, leaving everything to the petitioner as a specific and residuary legatee, with the exception of certain real estate, allegedly constituting over 80% of the value of the estate, which was left to a former homosexual lover of the decedent.
In support of this proceeding to determine that he is entitled to exercise a right of election against the decedent's will, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, as follows:
Upon submission of opposing papers and an application to dismiss the petition by the executrix of Cooper's estate, Acting Surrogate Pizzuto held that a survivor of a homosexual relationship, alleged to be a "spousal relationship", was not entitled to a right of election against the decedent's will pursuant to EPTL 5-1.1, stating, inter alia:
. (Matter of Cooper, 149 Misc.2d 282, 283, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684.)
The right of election by a "surviving spouse", insofar as is relevant to the facts at bar, is contained in EPTL 5-1.1(c)(1)(B), as follows:
We reject the petitioner's argument that he must be considered a "surviving spouse" within the meaning of the statute. "Generally, in the construction of statutes, the intention of the Legislature is first to be sought from a literal reading of the act itself or of all the statutes relating to the same general subject-matter" (McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 92, at 182). The Legislature has expressly defined a "surviving spouse" in EPTL 5-1.2, as follows:
Indeed, even in the absence of any express definition of the term "surviving spouse", an interpretation of the statute to the same effect would be warranted. It is well settled that "the language of a statute is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense * * * in accordance with its ordinary and accepted meaning, unless the Legislature by definition or from the rest of the context of the statute provides a special meaning" (McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 94, at 191-194). An illustration of this latter approach may be ascertained from the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185. In that case, the court rejected an argument that the absence of an express statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages evinced a legislative intent to authorize such marriages. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held in this regard (Baker v. Nelson, supra, at 311, 191 N.W.2d at 185-186):
(see also, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc.2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499; Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc.2d 548, 549, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590).
We reject, as meritless, the contention of both the petitioner and the amicus curiae that, based on the Court of Appeals decision in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49, the traditional definition of the term "surviving spouse" must be rejected, and replaced with a broader definition which would include the petitioner. In Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co. (supra ), the Court of Appeals held that same-sex partners were "family members" for purposes of the rent control regulations at issue therein, prohibiting the eviction of "family members" upon the death of the tenant of record. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated (Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., supra, at 211, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49):
.
However, in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 155 A.D.2d 11, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 651, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 572 N.E.2d 27, this court held, in an opinion and order subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that a lesbian partner was not a "parent" under Domestic Relations Law § 70(a) and rejected, as "totally misplaced" (Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., supra, at 15, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321) the argument that the holding in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co. (supra), compelled a different result.
Accordingly, the term "surviving spouse", as used in EPTL 5-1.1, cannot be interpreted to include homosexual life partners.
The petitioner and the amicus curiae argue that such a narrow definition of the term "surviving spouse" is unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause of the State Constitution. Specifically, they argue that this unconstitutional definition directly derives from, and compounds, the State's unconstitutional conduct in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Domestic Relations Law as prohibiting members of the same sex from obtaining marriage licenses (see, e.g., Frances B. v. Mark B., 78 Misc.2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc.2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, supra ).
It is to this argument that we now turn.
It is well settled that there are three standards that may be applied in reviewing equal protection challenges: strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and rational basis review (City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-441, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313).
We note that Acting...
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