Copeland v. State

Docket Number21-0981
Decision Date10 March 2023
Citation986 N.W.2d 859
Parties Tommy Marion COPELAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa and Iowa Air National Guard, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Charles Gribble, Christopher C. Stewart, and Haley Bryan (until withdrawal) of Gribble, Boles, Stewart & Witosky Law, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Jeffrey Peterzalek and Alan W. Nagel, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

MAY, Justice.

Iowa honors our veterans through the veterans preference statute, Iowa Code chapter 35C. The preference gives veterans important advantages in obtaining and retaining public-sector jobs.

Like most laws, though, chapter 35C contains exceptions. One of them applies to veterans who "hold[ ] a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer." Iowa Code § 35C.8 (2020).

Our interpretations of this exception have not been uniform. Often, we have read it quite broadly. We have suggested that it applies whenever the veteran's delegated duties "require skill, judgment, trust and confidence." Brown v. State Printing Bd. , 230 Iowa 22, 296 N.W. 719, 720 (1941). And although the words of the exception require "a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer ," we have applied the exception to veterans who have no direct relationship with "the appointing officer." Iowa Code § 35C.8 (emphasis added).

Sometimes, though, we have read the exception more narrowly. In Ervin v. Triplett , we held that the exception did not apply to a veteran who worked as a police detective—a job that certainly requires skill, judgment, trust, and confidence. 236 Iowa 272, 18 N.W.2d 599, 602 (1945). We reasoned that although the detective's work "may be of a confidential nature," the detective only reported to his supervisor—and not to "the appointing officer," the police commissioner. Id. at 601–02. Therefore, the detective could not fit within an exception for workers who hold "strictly confidential relation[s] to the appointing officer. " Id. at 602 (emphasis added); see Iowa Code § 35C.8.

We conclude that Ervin ’s narrow reading is the better approach. It is more faithful to the words of the statute. And it prevents the exception from effectively swallowing the veterans preference by largely confining it to jobs that require "no discretion or responsibility." Tusant v. City of Des Moines , 231 Iowa 116, 300 N.W. 690, 698 (1941) (Stiger, J., dissenting). Nothing in the Code suggests that our legislature intended such a limited reward for our veterans’ valuable service.

Consistent with Ervin and the statutory text, we now hold that the exception cannot apply unless the veteran has a direct reporting relationship with the appointing officer. We vacate the court of appeals decision, reverse the district court's denial of petition for writ of certiorari, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Tommy Copeland is an honorably-discharged Army veteran. He was employed as an air base security guard at the Iowa Air National Guard base in Des Moines. He was part of a chain of command—Copeland reported to the security forces manager who, in turn, reported to the adjutant general and his deputies. The adjutant general is "the director of [Iowa's] department of public defense" and is charged with performing "all functions, responsibilities, powers, and duties concerning the military forces of the state of Iowa." Iowa Code § 29.1. But cf. id. § 29A.7 (providing that "[t]he governor is the commander in chief of the military forces").

The basic purpose of Copeland's position was to provide physical safety for the personnel and property at the air base. His duties included bearing arms, accessing restricted areas, maintaining his security clearance, maintaining military-level-weapon qualifications, and maintaining less-than-lethal-force qualifications. He had to be able to run, climb stairs, and perform apprehension and restraint techniques. Important to this case, Copeland was required to pass a strenuous physical agility test. Copeland was terminated because he failed to pass the physical agility test four times.

Following his termination, Copeland commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court. Copeland alleged that because of his veteran status, the State was required to provide him with a hearing prior to his termination. By failing to do so, Copeland claimed, the State had violated the veterans preference statute.

The State resisted. It claimed that the veterans preference statute did not apply because—in the words of Iowa Code section 35C.8 —Copeland held "a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer."

In the Iowa Air National Guard, the "appointing officer" is the adjutant general, the head of Iowa's department of public defense. Cf. Iowa Code § 8A.401(1) (providing that, as used in chapter 8A, " [a ]ppointing authority means the chairperson or person in charge of any state agency including, but not limited to, boards, bureaus, commissions, and departments, or an employee designated to act for an appointing authority"). The parties agree that the deputy adjutants general could also qualify as "the appointing officer." But no one claims that Copeland had any direct relationship with the deputy adjutants general or the adjutant general. Rather, it is undisputed that Copeland only reported to a security forces manager. And it is undisputed that the security forces manager was not "the appointing officer."

Nevertheless, the district court found that—because the duties delegated to Copeland required skill, judgment, trust, and confidence—Copeland fit the section 35C.8 exception for "person[s] holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer." Copeland appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. A divided panel affirmed the district court. Copeland sought further review. We granted his petition.

II. Discussion.

A. The Veterans Preference Statute. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Iowa "has recognized the enormous contributions made to our lives by veterans of our armed forces by giving preference to veterans seeking employment with the state, as well as employment with the cities, counties, and school corporations within the state." Williams v. Bullock , 960 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Stammeyer v. Div. of Narcotics Enf't of Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety , 721 N.W.2d 541, 542 (Iowa 2006) (citing Kitterman v. Bd. of Supervisors , 137 Iowa 275, 115 N.W. 13 (1908) )). Today, the veterans preference is codified in Iowa Code chapter 35C. It provides veterans with advantages in obtaining and retaining public-sector jobs. Relevant here, section 35C.6 provides:

No person holding a public position by appointment or employment, and belonging to any of the classes of persons to whom a [veterans] preference is granted under [chapter 35C], shall be removed from such position or employment except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated charges ....

Iowa Code § 35C.6.

Copeland believes that—because he's a veteran— section 35C.6 entitled him to a pretermination hearing. As explained, though, the veterans preference statute has exceptions. They appear in section 35C.8, which states, "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply to the position of private secretary or deputy of any official or department, or to any person holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer." Id. § 35C.8.

As noted, the question here is whether Copeland fell within the exception for "person[s] holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer." Id. The question "is one of law, not of fact, and thus a matter for judicial construction and determination." Richards v. Bd. of Control of State Insts. , 170 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1969).

This exception has a long history. It has been part of the veterans preference statute since its original enactment in 1904. 1904 Iowa Acts ch. 9, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 1056-a16 (Supp. 1907)). Over the decades, our court has considered the exception on many occasions. See Andreano v. Gunter , 252 Iowa 1330, 110 N.W.2d 649, 654 (1961) (compiling cases).

"The question" of when the exception applies "has always been troublesome." Richards , 170 N.W.2d at 245. In several cases, justices of this court have written dissenting opinions. See, e.g. , Allen , 254 N.W. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In so far as the foregoing opinion of the majority holds that the position of bookkeeper in the office of the treasurer of state is confidential in character I do not agree. In my opinion it partakes in no degree of such relationship.").

The troublesome issue here is whether the exception can apply to veterans (like Copeland) who have no direct reporting relationship with "the appointing officer." Many of our opinions suggest that it can. Under this approach, "[t]he term ‘confidential relation’ is a very broad one and is not at all confined to any specific association of the parties , but applies generally to all persons who are associated by any relation of trust and confidence." Richards , 170 N.W.2d at 245 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown , 296 N.W. at 720 ). This "relation" is sufficient, we have held, whenever "the duties of the appointing officer [are] of such a character that it is impossible for [the appointing officer] to personally discharge them, and of necessity [the appointing officer is] compelled to [entrust] the performance of them largely to others," including the veteran. Id. (quoting Brown , 296 N.W. at 720 ). The key limitation is that the duties delegated to the veteran must not be "merely clerical." Id. Rather, we have said, the duties must "require skill, judgment, trust and confidence." Id. (quoting Brown , 296 N.W. at 720 ). Whenever duties of that sort are "delegated" to a...

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