Corley v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1888
• Citation: 7 S.W. 255,50 Ark. 305
• Parties: CORLEY v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

7 S.W. 255

50 Ark. 305

CORLEY v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 3, 1888

APPEAL from Logan Circuit Court, JAMES F. READ, Special Judge.

Reverse and remand.

T. C Humphrey, for appellant.

1. Under the circumstances detailed in this case, the confession of appellant was not admissible in evidence. It was the result of threats, entreaty, promises of leniency, and protection by officers of the law. 15 N. Y. Ct. App., 384. The smallest inducement held out to the prisoner by those in authority, excludes the confession as not voluntary. Wharf. Cr. Ev., note 1, p. 670; Ib., secs. 646, 671, 677; 22 Ark 336.

2. The appellant was entitled to prove the influences operating on him to induce the confession. 43 Ark. 100; 22 Id., 336.

3. The indictment charged more than one offence, and the state's attorney should have been required to elect upon which count he would prosecute.

Dan W Jones, Attorney General, for the State.

1. The indictment charges only one offence, though alleged to have been committed in different modes and by different means. Mansf. Dig., sec. 2108; 32 Ark. 203; 34 Id., 433; 38 Id., 556.

Appellant's confessions were voluntary and admissible. 34 Ark. 650. The fact that he was in custody at the time does not render his confession inadmissible. 35 Ark. 35; 19 Id., 156; 14 Id., 556.

Whether the confession was voluntary or not is a question for the trial court to determine, and its rulings will not be reversed unless shown to have been arbitrary and an abuse of its powers. 28 Ark. 121.

OPINION

COCKRILL, C. J.

The principal question in this case is as to the admissibility of the confession upon which the prisoner was convicted.

The rule is established in this state, in accord with the unvarying current of authority elsewhere, that a confession of guilt, to be admissible, must be free from the taint of official inducement, proceeding either "from the flattery of hope or the torture of fear." Austin v. State, 14 Ark. 555; Meyer v. State, 19 Ark. 156; Butler v. State, 34 Ark. 480;Ford v. State, 34 Ark. 649; Yates v. State, 47 Ark. 172, 1 S.W. 65. Whether or not a confession is voluntary, is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the court. It is the duty of the trial judge to decide the facts upon which the admissibility of the evidence depends, and his finding is conclusive on appeal as it is in other cases where he discharges the function of a jury. Runnels v. State, 28 Ark. 121; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 219. The conclusion to be drawn from the facts is a question of law and is reviewable by the appellate court. State v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205; State v. Efler, 85 N.C. 585. If the confession is fairly traceable to the prohibited influence, the trial judge should exclude it, (Love v. State, 22 Ark. 336; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116, S. C., 34 Am. Dec. 672;) and his failure to do so is error for which the judgment may be reversed.

The defendant objected to the introduction of the confession in this case; the jury was withdrawn and the court heard the evidence that led to the confession, to determine whether it was admissible in evidence. This was the approved practice.

It was made to appear that the prisoner had been suspected of complicity in rifling the county treasurer's safe. He was himself deputy treasurer, and knew the combination of the lock at the time the contents of the safe were stolen. The evidence tended to show that the safe had been unlocked, the money removed, and the locks broken afterwards as a blind to detection. The prisoner had been entreated, threatened and finally arrested to induce him to tell about the offence. He firmly protested his innocence and utter ignorance of the whole matter. He was released from arrest. Finally the grand jury met and summoned him before them. He still asserted ignorance of the perpetrators of the crime. The grand jury persisted in the effort to extract some intimation from him that might serve as a clue to unravel the mystery. He was before them at different times on three successive days, and remained under guard subject to their order. The record does not purport to set the facts out in the order of their occurrence, and there is a slight mist of uncertainty as to the sequence of the representations made to the defendant by different members of the grand jury and others, while he was in the custody of the officer in whose presence the confession, which was received in evidence, was finally made.

It seems that after a time the defendant gave evidence of breaking down. The grand jurors pressed the opportunity and exhorted him to tell the truth. He expressed a fear of personal violence at the hands of those whom his testimony might implicate. Grand jurors promised him protection. Two of the three members of that body who testified, insisted that the protection promised was protection only from personal violence such as one citizen might give to another; and one of them said the defendant was informed that the jury regarded it as their duty to indict him, and expressed the opinion that the prisoner must have known he would be indicted; but the same witness testifies that when they promised him protection they did not explain what kind of protection was meant; and the third witness, who was the foreman, testified that if he had been in the prisoner's place he would have understood the promise and assurances of the grand jury to mean that he was not to be prosecuted. The defendant, at this juncture, made a statement implicating others in the offence, making an effort still to shield himself. He was then removed from the grand jury room under a guard furnished at his request to protect him from violence, to await the further direction of the grand jury, the foreman instructing the guard to allow no one access to him. In this interval, as we understand it, the prosecuting attorney sought him and assured him that if he would tell the whole truth, the state would deal fairly with him. The next morning, while waiting to be called before the grand jury, Grady, Chitwood and Taylor--the witnesses who testified to his confession--were admitted by his guard to his presence. They told him that they understood he had made a statement to the grand jury about the safe robbery which was not regarded as satisfactory; the spokesman informed him that it did not clear up some persons who were suspected, and that he ought to tell the whole truth, let the guilt rest where it might. The prisoner replied that that was Just what he was going to do, and produced a statement which he had written out on a pocket memorandum book, making the confession which was given in evidence and read it to them. He stated that it was prepared for the grand jury, and that he had previously made up his mind not to tell anything until he got before the grand jury, where he could have protection. He was called at once before the grand jury where he made the same statement. When informed by them that he was to be indicted he expressed great surprise.

The court refused to permit anything which transpired in the grand jury room to go to the jury, but admitted the statement made to the three witnesses named. The confession made to these witnesses is, we think, fairly traceable to the hope inspired by the assurances made by the grand jurors and prosecuting attorney. These officers, in their commendable zeal to ferret out the perpetrators of the crime, evidently led the prisoner to expect favor from his confession. It was the natural consequence of the course pursued that such an impression should rest upon his mind. It is true one of the witnesses testified that he was satisfied the prisoner understood all the while that he was to be indicted, but none of them testified that a hope of leniency in the prosecution...