County of Sacramento v. Lackner
Decision Date | 12 September 1979 |
Citation | 97 Cal.App.3d 576,159 Cal.Rptr. 1 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO and County of Alameda, political subdivisions of the State of California, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Jerome LACKNER, M.D., Director of Health, State of California, and Marion Woods, Director of Benefit Payments, State of California, Defendants and Appellants, County of San Mateo, a political subdivision of the State of California, Intervener and Respondent. Civ. 17051. |
Evelle J. Younger and George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., John J. Klee, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Warriner, Elisabeth C. Brandt, Asher Rubin, and John E. Fourt, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and appellants.
L. B. Elam, County Counsel, Warren E. Thornton, Acting County Counsel, J. Steven Burris, Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent, County of Sacramento.
Richard J. Moore, County Counsel and Kelvin H. Booty, Jr., Senior Deputy County Counsel, Oakland, for plaintiff and respondent, County of Alameda.
Keith C. Sorenson, Dist. Atty., and James A. Aiello, Asst. Dist. Atty., for intervener and respondent, County of San Mateo.
This appeal presents a controversy over Medi-Cal payments which plaintiff counties allege are due them from the defendants. Defendants appeal from a judgment granting the County of Sacramento, County of Alameda, and intervener County of San Mateo (unless otherwise specified, referred to as plaintiffs) declaratory relief and a peremptory writ of mandate. The judgment found that certain Medi-Cal payments made were insufficient in amount and directed reimbursement to the counties and declaratory relief.
In 1965, California adopted the Medi-Cal program (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 14000 et seq.) 1 for the purpose of extending individualized medical treatment to those traditionally unable to afford such services. To achieve that result the program, in conjunction with a federal program (42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.), provided for reimbursement to both public and private health care providers for medical services rendered.
When enacted, the Medi-Cal program established two plans for reimbursing counties providing health care services to indigents. Under the "standard" county plan ( § 14150), a county was required to pay the state a specific sum, in return for which the state would pay for the medical care of all individuals falling within certain welfare eligibility categories (hereinafter referred to as linked individuals). Financial responsibility for non-linked individuals, i.e., those who did not fall within the welfare eligibility classification, remained with the counties.
The second alternative, known as the "option plan" ( § 14150.1) provided that annually a county would be required to pay the state a sum equal to 100 percent of the county's health care costs (which included both linked and non-linked individuals) provided in the 1964-1965 fiscal year, with an adjustment for population increase; in return the state would pay the county's entire cost of medical care. The election to enter the "option" program was made irrevocable until June 30, 1970. ( § 14150.1.) The plaintiffs chose the option plan.
After its enactment the cost of implementing the Medi-Cal program escalated rapidly; in 1967, in order to limit these increases, the Legislature enacted section 14150.2 2 which imposed strict limits on future cost increases for counties under the option plan and established a $44,000,000 ceiling on funds available for the care of non-linked individuals in option counties.
Despite that legislation, state Medi-Cal costs again escalated to unacceptable levels. In December 1970, the Director of the then Department of Health Care Services declared a fiscal emergency and imposed a 10 percent cutback in payments to health care providers and adopted regulations causing a postponement of certain elective services under Medi-Cal. (See California Medical Assn. v. Brian (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 637, 106 Cal.Rptr. 555.)
Against this historical background, in 1971 plaintiffs (who are option counties) filed the instant mandate action. While the exact nature of the pleadings is in question, the main thrust of the suit sought to enjoin defendants from implementing the so-called emergency regulations. Plaintiffs' action was consolidated for trial with a similar action, California Medical Assn. v. Brian, supra. The trial court, in the consolidated proceeding, found the emergency regulations invalid, issued findings and conclusions, and awarded judgment to plaintiffs.
The defendants in California Medical Assn. v. Brian separately appealed the action. We affirmed the judgment. (California Medical Assn., supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 637, 106 Cal.Rptr. 555.) A purported appeal by defendants in this case was ordered dismissed under the one final judgment rule (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1), as the issue of damages remained unresolved.
The matter then went to trial in this proceeding on the question of the extent of "damages." The court awarded the County of Sacramento $1,556,305.20, County of Alameda $3,120,695.63, and the County of San Mateo $1,184,445, with interest, in each case, from June 1971.
On appeal, defendants do not contest the trial court's conclusion that the 10 percent cutback and the December 15 regulations were invalid, but rather limit their attack to the issue of whether the damages awarded plaintiffs were, in whole or part, proper. To this end defendants present five major contentions.
Defendants first contend the amounts awarded each plaintiff for costs of health care exceeded the amount each county was entitled to receive pursuant to sections 14150.1 and 14155. Defendants assert that if plaintiffs were entitled to recovery at all, they could recover only the increased cost of medical services occasioned by the 10 percent cutback and the emergency regulations. The contention is without merit.
We have reviewed the pleadings and all amendments presented by the three plaintiffs and agree with defendants that the issue of total reimbursement under sections 14150.1 and 14155 was not specifically raised. However, the petitions in each case request any relief the court deems appropriate, and contrary to defendants' argument plaintiffs did during trial declare their intention to seek damages for the state's failure to reimburse as required by sections 14150.1 and 14155, irrespective of the December 15 regulations and 10 percent cutback. The following colloquy during the proceedings make this point clear:
Moreover, we do not agree with defendants' argument that the damages awarded were outside the scope of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Findings of fact numbers 41 through 45 provide as follows:
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