Cowan v. Flannery, 89-1083
| Citation | 461 N.W.2d 155 |
| Decision Date | 19 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1083,89-1083 |
| Parties | Gordon M. COWAN, Appellant, v. Tommy A. FLANNERY and Tom Flannery, Sr., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Edward J. Keane and Daniel L. Flaherty of Margolin, Gildemeister, Willia, Mugan & Keane, Sioux City, for appellant.
Michael P. Jacobs of Kindig, Beebe, Rawlings, Nieland, Probasco & Killinger, Sioux City, for appellees.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
In this comparative fault case, the jury awarded damages for medical expenses, both past and future, but did not allow damages for pain and suffering. Plaintiff's motion for new trial based upon an inadequate award was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the court of appeals found the district court had abused its discretion and reversed the court's judgment. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
On July 8, 1987, an automobile driven by Gordon Cowan collided in an intersection with a grain truck owned by Tom Flannery, Sr., and driven by Tommy A. Flannery. Cowan brought an action alleging the negligence of Flannery caused the collision and resulting damages. The Flannerys denied negligence and denied Cowan had sustained any compensable injuries.
At trial the court instructed the jury regarding witness credibility. The court advised the jury:
In determining the facts, you may have to decide what testimony you believe. You may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony.
. . . . .
You may disregard all or any part of a witness's testimony if you find the witness made inconsistent statements before trial.
Upon the question of damages, the court instructed the jury:
If you find a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages, you will determine the amount. In doing so you will consider the following items:
(1) The reasonable value of his necessary expenses for medical services from the date of the accident to the present time.
(2) The present value of any reasonable and necessary medical expenses which he will have in the future.
(3) The present value of any loss of his future earning capacity.
(4) The loss of function of his body from the date of the accident to the present.
(5) The present value of any future loss of functions of his body.
(6) His physical and mental pain and suffering from the date of the accident to the present.
(7) The present value of any physical and mental pain and suffering which he will have in the future.
The court submitted the following question as a part of the special verdict form:
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff without taking into consideration any reduction of damages due to his own negligence?
State the amount, if any, which you find for each item of damages.
ANSWER
Past medical expense $ 4,000
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Future medical expense $17,220
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Loss of future earning capacity $ --
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Past loss of bodily function $ --
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Future loss of bodily function $ --
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Past pain and suffering $ --
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Future pain and suffering $ --
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Total: $21,220
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The jury found thirty percent of the combined negligence was attributable to Cowan and seventy percent to Flannery. The jury also found Cowan failed to wear a seat belt and that as a result his damages should be reduced three percent.
Based upon the jury's verdict, the court entered judgment in favor of Cowan in the amount of $2716 plus interest at 9.15% from the date of filing the petition and judgment of $11,692.38 plus interest at the rate of 9.15% from June 2, 1989, the date of the jury verdict.
Cowan filed a motion for new trial or conditional new trial. Iowa R.Civ.P. 244, 250. The court in its ruling found:
The plaintiff contends that the verdict is internally inconsistent and that it is not supported by the evidence.
The total amount of damages found by the jury is reasonable and supported by the evidence. The itemization of personal injury damages is normally a matter for the jury to determine, especially when the damages relate to future earning capacity, loss of bodily function and pain and suffering.
Since the advent of the damage itemization requirement, this court has not received any verdict which was not subject to the argument made by the plaintiff in this case. Considerable deference must be given to the jury's itemization of damages if we are ever again to have final verdicts in personal injury actions.
I. Comparative Fault--Interest on Award for Future Damages. A negligence claim for damages resulting from injury to a person is now brought under the provisions of chapter 668 of the Iowa Code; liability in tort--comparative fault. This chapter requires a jury to answer special interrogatories as to the amount of damages each claimant will be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded and the percentage of the total fault allocated to each claimant. Iowa Code § 668.3(2). The court should not discharge the jury until the court has determined the verdict or verdicts are consistent with the total damages and percentage of fault. Iowa Code § 668.3(6). Interest is allowed on all money due on judgments. Interest awarded for future damages accrues from the date of the entry of the judgment; interest awarded for past damages accrues from the date of the commencement of the action. Iowa Code § 668.13(1)(4). As a consequence of this statutory provision, adopted in 1987, the jury must identify the amount of the award given for future damages.
II. Inadequate Damages as a Ground for New Trial.
A. General. Under our rules of civil procedure an aggrieved party may be granted a new trial where the jury awarded excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been influenced by passion or prejudice, or where the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 244(d) and (f). The court may permit a party to avoid a new trial by agreeing to such terms or conditions as a court may impose. Iowa R.Civ.P. 250. A new trial is not a matter of right. The grounds for new trial listed in our rules are not exclusive. In ruling upon motions for new trial, the court has a broad but not unlimited discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice between the parties. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(3). We are slower to interfere with the grant of a new trial than with its denial. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(4).
In Kautman v. Mar-Mac Community School District, 255 N.W.2d 146 (Iowa 1977), we stated:
It is well settled the trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial. Ordinarily the jury should be allowed to settle disputed fact questions, but that, too, is a limited power and one which must be exercised within the framework of the evidence in any particular case. A verdict should not be set aside as either too large or too small simply because the reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. The court always has inherent power to set aside a verdict which fails to do substantial justice between the parties.
It is not for us to invade the province of the jury. In fact a verdict will not be set aside or altered unless it is, (1) flagrantly excessive or inadequate; or (2) so out of reason as to shock the conscience or sense of justice; or (3) raises a presumption it is the result of passion, prejudice or other ulterior motives; or (4) is lacking in evidential support.
If the verdict has support in the evidence the others will hardly arise, if it lacks support they may all arise. The real question in most cases, and here, is the amount and sufficiency of evidence to support the award made. Certainly where the verdict is within a reasonable range as indicated by the evidence the courts should not interfere with what is primarily a jury question.
Although the evidence may have justified a higher award, such is not controlling. The determinative question posed is whether under the record, giving the jury its right to accept or reject whatever portions of the conflicting evidence it chose, the verdict effects substantial justice between the parties.
Id. at 147-48 (citations omitted).
B. Special Verdicts. The itemizations of damages required by the special verdict form constitute a special finding by the jury. The findings must be supported by evidence. When a special finding of the jury is not supported by the evidence, a new trial must be granted. Peck v. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa 320, 328-29, 55 N.W. 511, 514 (1893). In Webster v. City of Colfax, 250 Iowa 181, 93 N.W.2d 91 (1958), we affirmed the trial court's granting of a new trial where the jury verdict awarded medical expenses only. The plaintiff received personal injuries in a fall upon an allegedly defective sidewalk. The verdict was for $623.23. The court instructed the jury that if it found the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the amount she was entitled to recover for pain and suffering was left to the sound discretion and sole judgment of the jurors. A special interrogatory asked what amount, if any, they found would compensate the plaintiff for her pain and suffering. In answer to the interrogatory the jury answered "none." We stated:
While it is true that the assessment of unliquidated damages is peculiarly within the discretion of the jury, yet we have often said that discretion is not unlimited. The applicable rule is that courts will usually not interfere unless the result is a verdict so large or so small that it shocks the conscience. Obviously, the jury awarded damages...
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