Crabtree v. State, 49A04-0107-CR-297.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-0107-CR-297.,49A04-0107-CR-297. |
| Citation | 762 N.E.2d 217 |
| Parties | Jeffrey CRABTREE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William F. Thoms, Jr., Thoms & Thoms Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-defendant Jeffrey Crabtree ("Jeffrey") appeals his conviction for Possession of Marijuana,1 a class D felony. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the baggie of marijuana the police found on his person because the search of his person violated Crabtree's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
On March 14, 2001, Officer Michele Van Arsdall of the City of Lawrence Police Department stopped a car driven by Terrence Crabtree ("Terrence") because the occupants were not wearing seatbelts. Jeffrey, Terrence's brother, was a front-seat passenger in the car. Officer Van Arsdall asked for Terrence's license and registration for the vehicle, but Terrence was not able to supply either document. Officer Van Arsdall conducted a registration check on the license plate and found that the plate on the car driven by Terrence was not registered to that vehicle. Tr. at 6. Officer Van Arsdall also ran a check on Terrence's license and discovered that his license had been suspended. Tr. at 7.
Officer Van Arsdall then walked back to the vehicle driven by Terrence and noticed an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Tr. at 8. Officer Van Arsdall asked Terrence if there were any narcotics in the vehicle, to which Terrence responded, "No." Tr. at 8. She placed Terrence under arrest for driving with a suspended license and prepared to conduct a search of the vehicle incident to Terrence's arrest. Tr. at 9.
Officer Mark Osborn of the City of Lawrence Police Department, assisting Officer Van Arsdall as back up, approached the vehicle in which Jeffrey was still sitting as a passenger. Officer Osborn asked Jeffrey if he had any weapons. When Jeffrey answered that he did not have any weapons, Officer Osborn asked him to step out of the vehicle for a pat-down search and to clear the vehicle of occupants for a search incident to Terrence's arrest. Tr. at 9, 15.
As Jeffrey either stepped out or was "pulled out" of the vehicle, Officer Osborn noticed a clear baggie, containing green leafy vegetation, hanging from the front "pouch" of Jeffrey's sweatshirt. Tr. at 15, 17-18. Before removing the baggie, which turned out to contain marijuana, Officer Osborn searched Jeffrey for weapons. Tr. at 15. After placing Jeffrey under arrest, Officer Osborn asked Jeffrey whether there was any more marijuana in the vehicle. Tr. at 16. Jeffrey responded that there was more marijuana in the glove compartment. Tr. at 16. Officer Osborn then opened the glove compartment and Officer Van Arsdall seized the marijuana inside it. Tr. at 16.
Jeffrey was subsequently charged with possession of marijuana. He filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. At a bench trial, the State introduced as exhibits the marijuana seized from Jeffrey's person and the glove compartment. The trial court admitted the exhibits over Jeffrey's continuing objection. Tr. at 49. After trial, the court found Jeffrey guilty as charged. He now appeals.
Jeffrey contends that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was illegal and the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana and in admitting the evidence at trial. Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind.2001) (). Id. (citations omitted).
We note that our supreme court in Edwards set forth a standard of review different from Supreme Court of Indiana and Indiana Court of Appeals Fourth Amendment precedent. In Murphy v. State, decided seven months before Edwards, our supreme court stated: "In reviewing the trial court's decision, we consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted substantial evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling." 747 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. 2001) (emphasis supplied) (reviewing motion to suppress evidence of contraband and subsequent admission of contraband into evidence at trial). Similarly, many of this court's recent opinions set forth the following standard of review in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases: Williams v. State, 754 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (emphasis supplied and citation omitted), trans. denied; accord Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000),
trans. denied; Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993), and Warner v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 (Ind.1991)). Although Edwards—a Fourth Amendment case—rests on Fifth Amendment precedent, we will apply the standard of review announced in the our supreme court's latest opinion. It is our supreme court's prerogative to clarify, harmonize, or remain silent about its different review standards in Murphy and Edwards.
Crabtree cites Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution in his appellate brief but develops no state constitutional argument separate from federal constitutional law. Therefore, we will apply only Fourth Amendment search and seizure law in the instant case; any state constitutional claim has been waived. See Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 2001)
. The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the federal constitution, searches and seizures "`conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Ind.1999) (footnote omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). The State carries the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless search or seizure falls within one of the exceptions. Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind.1995). Any evidence seized in contravention of the Fourth Amendment may be considered "fruit of the poisonous tree," and hence, subject to exclusion from evidence. Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ind.1999).
One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine. "Three conditions must exist to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence under this doctrine: 1) `the officer [must] not have violate[d] the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed'; 2) the `incriminating character' of the evidence must be `immediately apparent'; and 3) the officer must `have a lawful right of access to the object itself.'" Middleton, 714 N.E.2d at 1101 (alterations in original) (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).
Jeffrey contends that there is disputed evidence regarding whether Officer Osborn discovered the marijuana before or during the pat-down search. Officer Osborn testified that, although he observed the marijuana baggie before searching Jeffrey, he did not retrieve the baggie until after the weapons search. Tr. 15-16. In addition, the probable cause affidavit prepared by Officer Van Arsdall reads: "During the patdown, Officer Osborn observed in the passenger's front sweatshirt pocket a large soft baggie which, in his experience, he believed to be marijuana." Appellant's App. at 18. According to Jeffrey, Officer Osborn discovered the baggie of marijuana during an illegal search for weapons. Appellant's brief at 4. The search was illegal, so the argument goes, because Officer Osborn lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the weapons search.
Jeffrey concedes that the evidence is in dispute regarding when Officer Osborn observed the baggie.2 When evidence is conflicting,...
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