Crawford for Crawford v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 06 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12029,12029
• Parties: Marvelene CRAWFORD, as Guardian Ad Litem for Glynn Eckland CRAWFORD, Jr., Charles B. Crawford, and Kainoalani B. Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Vhonda Lehua Post CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 285

745 P.2d 285

69 Haw. 410

Marvelene CRAWFORD, as Guardian Ad Litem for Glynn Eckland

CRAWFORD, Jr., Charles B. Crawford, and Kainoalani

B. Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Vhonda Lehua Post CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12029.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Nov. 6, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party clearly demonstrates that he should prevail as a matter of law.

2. The primary duty in interpreting and applying statutes is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and to implement that intention to the fullest degree.

3. The explicit purpose of Hawaii's No-Fault law, HRS chapter 294, is to create a system of reparations for accidental harm and loss arising from motor vehicle accidents, to compensate these damages without regard to fault, and to limit tort liability for these accidents. The legislature did not intend, in enacting Hawaii's No-Fault Law, to supercede claims brought under Hawaii's Wrongful Death Statute, HRS § 663-3.

4. The relevant limitations period is determined from the nature of the claim or right based on the allegations contained in the pleadings.

5. Where plaintiffs allege deprivation of parental care, training, guidance, education and support as a result of the death of their father, the controlling limitations period is found in HRS § 663-3.

6. The running of the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action brought by a decedent's surviving children is suspended, under HRS § 657-13, during the infancy of the decedent's surviving children.

Clayton C. Ikei, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Harvey E. Henderson, Jr. (Paul A. L'Ecuyer and Arnold Hobson, Jr., with him on brief; Lee, Henderson, Chipchase & Wong, of counsel), Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

HAYASHI, Justice.

The facts of this case are undisputed. The sole legal question we face on this appeal is whether Plaintiffs-Appellants' wrongful death claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations found in the Hawaii Revised Statutes (hereinafter "HRS"). Answering this question in the negative, we reverse the trial court's order granting Defendant-Appellee's motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On October 7, 1977, Glynn E.L. Crawford (hereinafter "Decedent") was killed in a single-car accident while riding as a passenger in a van driven by Defendant-Appellee Vhonda Lehua Post Crawford (hereinafter "Appellee"). Decedent was unmarried and was survived by three minor children, Plaintiffs-Appellants Glynn E.L. Crawford, Jr., age 9; Charles B. Crawford, age 8; and Kainoalani B. Crawford, age 6. ¹ On December 20, 1977, their mother, Plaintiff-Appellant Marvelene Crawford, was appointed guardian ad litem with respect to their property. In re Crawford, G. No. 1098 (Haw. 1st Cir. Dec. 20, 1977) (order appointing guardian).

On June 6, 1978, Decedent's mother, Gertrude Crawford, petitioned the First Circuit Court to be appointed the legal representative of the Decedent's estate and to receive no-fault insurance benefits pursuant to HRS § 294-4(1)(B). On June 29, 1978, the court granted her petition and appointed her, as Decedent's legal representative, to receive no-fault benefits. In re Crawford, S.P. No. 4620 (Haw. 1st Cir. June 29, 1978). On August 17, 1978, she received no-fault benefits, and, pursuant to court order, subsequently paid Decedent's outstanding medical expenses and disbursed the remainder to the Chief Clerk of the First Circuit Court for deposit into an account for the Decedent's surviving children.

On October 2, 1985, Plaintiff-Appellant Marvelene Crawford filed the instant action on behalf of the three children (hereinafter collectively "Appellants"). Appellants' amended complaint, filed October 17, 1985, alleged that "[a]s a direct and proximate result of the gross negligence of the defendant, the plaintiffs have been deprived of parental care, training, guidance, education and support of their father Glenn [sic] Eckland Crawford, Sr." On October 27, 1986, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the theory that Appellants' action was barred by the no-fault statute of limitations contained in HRS § 294-36(b)(2). On February 20, 1987, the trial court granted the motion and the Appellants filed this timely appeal.

II.

Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party clearly demonstrates that he should prevail as a matter of law. Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 553, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983).

The basic issue is whether Appellants' wrongful death action is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the threshold determination we face is which statute of limitations governs the present case. Although Appellee concedes that this is a wrongful death action, she nevertheless contends that the statute of limitations codified in Hawaii's No-Fault Law, HRS chapter 294, ² is controlling. We disagree.

A.

The primary duty in interpreting and applying statutes is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and to implement that intention to the fullest degree. Peters v. Weatherwax, 69 Haw. 21, ---, 731 P.2d 157, 162 (1987); Boulton v. Boulton, 69 Haw. 1, ---, 730 P.2d 338, 339 (1986); Gakiya v. Hallmark Properties, Inc., 68 Haw. 550, ---, 722 P.2d 460, 463 (1986).

The explicit purpose of Hawaii's No-Fault Law is "to create a system of reparations for accidental harm and loss arising from motor vehicle accidents, to compensate these damages without regard to fault, and to limit tort liability for these accidents." HRS § 294-1(a) (1985). ³ HRS § 294-6(a) sets forth the limitation on tort liability, which is the bedrock of Hawaii's No-Fault Law. Doi v. Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty Co., 6 Haw.App. 456, ---, 727 P.2d 884, 888 (1986). However, HRS § 294-6(a)(1) expressly excludes certain types of tort actions, including death, from the abolition of tort liability. ⁴ We do not believe that the legislature, in enacting the no-fault law, intended to supercede the statutory cause of action contained in Hawaii's wrongful death statute, HRS § 663-3. ⁵ Cf. Doi, 6 Haw.App. at ---, 727 P.2d at 889-91 (no-fault statute was not intended to abolish common law claim for loss of consortium).

The no-fault statute does not create an independent tort cause of action for motor vehicle related injuries, it merely provides an alternative scheme of expedited reparations for certain types of economic loss, including earnings loss, medical expenses, and rehabilitative expenses. See HRS § 294-2(10) (1985). In contrast, HRS § 663-3 permits compensation of Decedent's survivors for economic loss and deprivation of love, affection and companionship. Hun v. Center Properties, 63 Haw. 273, 279, 626 P.2d 182, 187 (1981). Absent legislative history to the contrary, we conclude that the legislature did not intend that the no-fault law apply to Appellants' wrongful death claim. ⁶

B.

In Hun, 63 Haw. at 276, 626 P.2d at 185 (1981), we reaffirmed the standard governing our determination of the relevant limitations period in a given case: "the relevant limitations period is determined from the nature of the claim or right based on the allegations contained in the pleadings." Id.; Au v. Au, 63 Haw. 210, 214, 626 P.2d 173, 177, partial reconsideration denied, 63 Haw. 263, 626 P.2d 181 (1981).

In this case, Appellants alleged that they were deprived of parental care, training, guidance, education and support of their father. "These allegations were precisely what the wrongful death cause of action entails. The nature of the claim in this instance is recovery for the wrongful death of [Glynn E.L. Crawford]." Hun, 63 Haw. at 279, 626 P.2d at 186.

There are two further principles of construction which favor the application of the limitations period in HRS § 663-3 over HRS § 294-36. First, "courts will apply the longer limitations period when there is doubt as to which statute applies." Au, 63 Haw. at 264, 626 P.2d at 182 (per curiam). Second, "[w]henever possible, the court should apply the state limitations period governing actions founded on a liability created by statute." Bill's Crane Service, Inc. v. Quisenberry, 545 F.Supp. 359, 361 (D.Haw.1982). As will be discussed infra, application of HRS § 663-3 yields the longer limitations period in this case. Moreover, the limitations period in § 663-3 "specifically" applies to actions brought under that section. Cf. Bill's Crane Service, Inc., 545 F.Supp. at 361.

We are constrained to point out that Appellants did not seek no-fault insurance benefits in their complaint; their claim is for the wrongful death of their father. ⁷ We therefore hold that HRS § 663-3 is the applicable statute of limitations in the instant case. ⁸ See Hun, 63 Haw. at 279, 626 P.2d at 186.

III.

Having determined that HRS § 663-3 is the controlling statute of limitations in this case, we now turn to the issue of whether the limitations period is tolled by the infancy of Appellants. In Hun v. Center Properties, we held that the general infancy tolling provision in HRS § 657-13 ⁹ was applicable to the wrongful death statute of limitations in HRS § 663-3. Hun, 63 Haw. at 280-84, 626 P.2d at 187-90. We find the Hun rationale to be dispositive in the present case.

In Hun, after noting the split in authority in this issue, we discerned a trend of cases that applied infancy tolling provisions where the limitations period affected the remedy and not the right of action. Id. at 280-81, 626 P.2d at 187-88. We concluded that "the two-year limitations period in HRS § 663-3 merely affects the remedy, not the right of action." Id. at 281, 626 P.2d at 188.

We next turned to the legislative...