Crawford v. City of Forest Park

• Decision Date: 18 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. A94A1666,A94A1666
• Citation: 215 Ga.App. 234,450 S.E.2d 237
• Parties: CRAWFORD v. CITY OF FOREST PARK.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 237

450 S.E.2d 237

215 Ga.App. 234

CRAWFORD v. CITY OF FOREST PARK.

No. A94A1666.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Oct. 18, 1994.

Reconsideration Denied Nov. 16, 1994.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 23, 1995.

Virgil L. Brown & Associates, Virgil L. Brown, Eric D. Hearn, Bentley C. Adams III, James D. Rogers, Zebulon, for appellant.

Carl A. Adcock, Morrow, for appellee.

POPE, Chief Judge.

Defendant appeals a superior court order affirming his DUI conviction in municipal court. See OCGA § 40-13-28.

Evidence at trial showed that Officer Randall stopped defendant's vehicle in the early morning hours of June 13, 1993, because defendant did not have a 1993 decal on his license tag. Defendant showed Randall he had the decal in the car, but Randall noticed that defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and his person, that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, that his speech was slightly slurred, and that there were several open cans of beer in his car. Randall therefore asked defendant to get out of the car and recite the alphabet. Although defendant said he knew the alphabet, he left out a number of letters in his recitation. Randall also asked defendant to touch each of his fingers to his thumb while counting one-two-three-four-four-three-two-one. Defendant said he understood and could do that, but he could not. Randall then administered an alco-sensor test, which showed the presence of alcohol. Based on all these things, Randall concluded defendant was a less safe driver and arrested him. Defendant was taken back to the station where an intoximeter test was taken, and the result of that test was .09.

1. Viewed in a light most favorable to support the verdict, this evidence was sufficient to enable a reasonable factfinder to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1); see also OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(3) (intoximeter test result in excess of .08 gives rise to presumption that person was under influence of alcohol).

2. Defendant argues that his accusation (the Uniform Traffic Citation issued at the time of his arrest) should have been quashed as too vague to provide notice of what he was accused. The citation informed defendant that he was accused of operating a specific vehicle at a specific time on a specific date while under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, and that a breath test given him showed a result of .09. As this was sufficient to inform defendant of the charges against him so he could present a defense at trial, the trial court's refusal to quash the accusation was proper. See Broski v. State, 196 Ga.App. 116(1), 395 S.E.2d 317 (1990).

Citing Scott v. State, 207 Ga.App. 533, 428 S.E.2d 359 (1993), defendant contends the accusation was insufficient because it failed to specify under which subsection of OCGA § 40-6-391(a) the State was charging him. In Scott, the alleged facts would have allowed the State to proceed against the defendant under either § 40-6-391(a)(1) (less safe driver) or § 40-6-391(a)(4) (test result of .10 or more), and we said the State should have indicated in the accusation which subsection it was proceeding under to avoid confusion. In this case, on the other hand, the facts alleged could only support a prosecution under subsection (a)(1), so the failure to specify that sub-section could not have confused defendant.

3. Defendant also enumerates as error the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the results of his intoximeter test. Specifically, defendant argues the results should have been suppressed because he was not afforded an opportunity for an independent test of his own choosing. See OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(3).

After being informed of his right to an independent test, defendant said he wanted a blood test, and Officer Randall took him to a hospital for that purpose. According to defendant's testimony, however, when he got to the hospital a nurse told him his blood alcohol level would register higher on a blood test. Officer Randall did not say anything, but when defendant turned around and looked at him he "kind of gave me a nod as in yes." Defendant then concluded he was wasting his time...