Marryott v. State, No. A03A1743.
Decision Date | 04 September 2003 |
Docket Number | No. A03A1743. |
Citation | 263 Ga. App. 65,587 S.E.2d 217 |
Parties | MARRYOTT v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lance T. McCoy, Cartersville, for appellant.
T. Joseph Campbell, Dist. Atty., Martha K. Helppie, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Defendant William R. Marryott was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for him to drive (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1)), driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more within three hours of driving as a result of alcohol consumed before the driving activity ended (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5)), and violation of the open container law (OCGA § 40-6-253(b)). Marryott appeals from the denial of his amended motion for new trial challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his DUI convictions. Otherwise, he claims that the superior court erred in rehabilitating a prospective juror; erred in refusing to strike a juror for cause as a volunteer in the prosecutor's office; erred in charging the jury that it could convict him of DUI in a manner not charged by the accusation; and erred in charging the jury that it could convict him of DUI to the extent it was less safe for him to drive absent evidence showing that he operated his vehicle in a less safe manner. These claims of error as without merit, we affirm.
Marryott and his wife, Kimberley, left a Cartersville party for their home in Kennesaw at approximately 11:00 p.m., Saturday, November 17, 2001, having arrived about two and a half hours earlier. As the couple left the party, Ms. Marryott was upset in that Marryott had been drinking because they had earlier agreed not to do so during her pregnancy. Ms. Marryott testified that she drove on the way home because she had consumed no alcohol. She further testified that they got lost and argued; that their quarrel grew worse after Marryott had her make an incorrect turn; that she stopped the car and walked away, leaving Marryott because of his tone of voice and abusive language; and that she "ran walk[ed]" a mile to I-75 where she called her brother-in-law in Acworth by cell phone who then picked her up.
Responding to a suspicious vehicle dispatch at approximately 12:30 a.m. that night, Patrolman S. Witt of the Bartow County Sheriff's Department found Marryott asleep in the driver's seat of the vehicle, vomit still dripping to the ground from the edge of the window where his head rested and several open beer bottles in plain view. After being awakened and getting out of the car, Marryott told Patrolman Witt that he was waiting for friends and had not driven. Patrolman Witt administered field sobriety tests on the scene, each of which Marryott failed. Marryott then contradicted himself, admitting for the first time that he had pulled over when he realized that he was intoxicated. Two State-administered breath tests, given upon Marryott's consent, determined his blood alcohol content to be 0.163 and 0.155, respectively. Held:
1. The record shows that Marryott "volunteered" the statement that he stopped his vehicle because he had too much to drink to Patrolman Witt at the crime scene. There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found Marryott guilty of the DUI offenses as charged, such evidence, among other things, including Marryott's admission to police, the admissibility of which he concedes by his brief on appeal; the condition of Marryott's person upon being arrested; and Marryott's failure of the field sobriety tests administered on the scene as well as the breath tests administered shortly thereafter. See Schoolfield v. State, 251 Ga. App. 52, 55(3), 554 S.E.2d 181 (2001) ( ); see also Susman v. State, 256 Ga.App. 94, 95-96(2), 567 S.E.2d 736 (2002) ( ); Crawford v. City of Forest Park, 215 Ga.App. 234, 235, 450 S.E.2d 237 (1994) ( ). 2. Citing Foster v. State, 258 Ga. App. 601, 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002), Marryott argues that the superior court erred in refusing to strike one of the jurors as inadequately rehabilitated. In Foster, we held that "a trial court may not rely solely on a prospective juror's isolated and extracted statement of impartiality, where ... consideration of the entirety of [the juror's] voir dire reveals a prospective juror with a fixed and definite bias that [the juror] was unable to set aside in deciding the case." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 609(3), 574 S.E.2d 843. This is not such a case.
The juror in issue ("Juror L") responded, Defense counsel then twice "led" the juror, saying, "In other words, you don't think you can be impartial?" Juror L replied only, "Impartial[,]" and defense counsel continued, Juror L answered, "I've been wrestling with that, and I really don't feel I could." Marryott's attorney then moved to strike Juror L for cause. This the superior court denied upon the following colloquy:
It is for the trial judge to determine whether there is impartiality, and in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, we are without authority to require a new trial. See generally Menefee v. State, 270 Ga. 540, 541-542(2), 512 S.E.2d 275 (1999). Unlike Foster, Juror L is never emphatic in stating that she could not be a fair and impartial juror. Foster v. State, supra at 606(3), 574 S.E.2d 843. Instead, even after an apparent effort to elicit testimony indicating that she could not be fair and impartial, Juror L opined only the "feeling" that she could...
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