Crawford v. Gilchrist
| Citation | 64 Fla. 41,59 So. 963 |
| Parties | CRAWFORD, Secretary of State v. GILCHRIST, Governor. |
| Decision Date | 23 October 1912 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Suit by Albert W. Gilchrist, as Governor and as an individual against H. Clay Crawford, as Secretary of State. From an order granting a temporary injunction, defendant appeals, and he applies for a supersedeas under the statute. Supersedeas denied.
Syllabus by the Court
It is the duty of the court to facilitate and not to retard the determination of litigated causes.
Where on application for a supersedeas order to suspend the operation of an injunction, the merits of the cause are fully argued, and the granting or refusal of a supersedeas will virtually dispose of the cause in which the people of the state are vitally interested, the court may, for the public welfare, consider the cause on its merits in adjudicating the application for a supersedeas; questions of law only being involved.
A determination of whether an amendment to the Constitution has been validly proposed and agreed to by the Legislature is to be had in a judicial forum where the Constitution provides no other means for such determination.
There act of the Secretary of State in publishing and certifying to the county commissioners proposed amendments to the Constitution is in its nature ministerial, involving the exercise of no discretion, and, if the act is illegal, it may be enjoined in appropriate proceedings by proper parties there being no other adequate remedy afforded by law.
Where an alleged illegal ministerial official act has relation to legislative action, such action may be considered by the courts in determining the validity or invalidity of the ministerial act. This is not an interference by the courts with the legislative department of the government.
The Governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen taxpayer, and elector, is a proper complainant in proceedings brought to enjoin the Secretary of State from publishing at public expense and certifying proposed amendments to the Constitution upon the ground that such proposed amendments are invalid because they have not been duly 'agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each House' of the Legislature.
If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the Constitution, it violates the right of all the people of the state to government regulated by law.
It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution.
The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the Constitution to 'be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each House' of the Legislature is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that such amendments shall be agreed to by the deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the requisite number of the members of each House at a regular session.
Every word of a state Constitution should be given its intended meaning and effect, and essential provisions of a Constitution are to be regarded as being mandatory.
The amendment article of the Constitution does not preclude the Senate, in acting upon proposed amendments to the Constitution, from the exercise of its power under the Constitution to determine the rules of its proceedings, or prevent the operative effect of any other provision of the Constitution not in conflict with the amendment article.
In the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, the power given by the Constitution to the Senate 'to determine the rules of its proceedings' extends to the determination of the propriety and effect of any action taken by the Senate under the Constitution, including the right of a majority of a constitutional quorum to reconsider the passage by a three-fifths vote of a proposed amendment to the Constitution.
A right to reconsider action taken is an attribute of all deliberative bodies, and it is not forbidden to the Legislature by the Constitution.
When not otherwise provided by law, all deliberative bodies have a right during the session to reconsider action taken as they deem proper, and it is the final result only that is to be regarded as the thing done.
A vote adopting a resolution and a vote duly taken to reconsider the vote of adoption, 'like positive and negative quantities in equation, destroy one another and are as if they were expunged from the journals.'
When the Senate duly determines that the passage by it of a proposed amendment to the Constitution has been reconsidered, such determination is binding on the courts, and such reconsideration nullifies the vote of adoption, and the proposed amendment has the status of a pending matter in the Senate.
Where the Senate Journal clearly shows that a resolution has been reconsidered and that the future reconsideration of the resolution is fixed for a day certain, an entry in the journal on a subsequent day that the motion to reconsider the resolution is made subject to call must be regarded as a clerical error, and should be construed as referring to the further consideration of the resolution, and not to the motion to reconsider.
Under the Constitution, the due proposal of constitutional amendments by the requisite action of the Legislature is not an immaterial technical form that may be disregarded in amending the Constitution.
An important vital element in the adoption of a valid amendment to the Constitution is that it shall be 'agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each House' of the Legislature. If a proposed amendment is passed by the requisite vote in the Senate, it is done subject to the right of the Senate under the rules to reconsider such passage, and if such passage is duly reconsidered, and the proposed amendment is not afterwards duly 'agreed to,' its publication and submission to the electors is not authorized by the Constitution and may be enjoined in appropriate proceedings where no other adequate remedy is afforded by law.
Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., for appellant.
D. A. Finlayson and T. L. Clarke, both of Monticello, Wm. W. Flournoy, of De Funiak Springs, and J. B. Johnson, of Live Oak, for appellee. During the regular session of the Legislature of 1911, certain proposed amendments to the state Constitution were considered by both Houses of the Legislature under the designation of House Joint Resolution No. 222.
The Secretary of State is publishing the propositions contained in the said Joint Resolution, and the further publication and certification thereof have been enjoined. The defendant appealed and applies for a supersedeas.
It appears that House Joint Resolution No. 222, proposing an amendment to the state Constitution, was considered by the House, and by a vote of 37 to 24 'failed to receive required number of votes' (page 1362, House Journal). Subsequently this vote was reconsidered, and the joint resolution was duly adopted by the requisite three-fifths vote of the House of Representatives and spread upon the Journal of the House (page 1505) under an enacting clause, viz., 'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Florida'; that the same resolution was certified to the Senate under an adopting clause, viz., 'Be it resolved by the Legislature of the state of Florida' (Senate Journal, p. 1185); that such resolution was on May 24, 1911, 'passed' by the requisite three-fifths vote of the Senate and spread upon the Journal of the Senate (Senate Journal, p. 1250), and such passage was certified to the House of Representatives with the resolution (Senate Journal, p. 1760); that on the succeeding day (May 25, 1911) as provided by the rules of the Senate adopted pursuant to the authority given by the Constitution to each House to determine its own rules, a motion was duly made in the Senate to reconsider the vote by which House Joint Resolution No. 222 was passed by the Senate, which motion to resconsider went over under the rules (page 1337, Senate Journal); that the resolution was on a motion agreed to by the Senate recalled from the House of Representatives (page 1424, Senate Journal) and duly returned to the Senate (House Journal, p. 1907; Senate Journal, p. 1529); that as shown by the Senate Journal, p. 1497, 'Mr. Calkins raised the point that House Joint Resolution No. 222 having been passed by three-fifths of all the members elected to each House, and the yeas and nays having been entered upon their respective journals, the Senate cannot now reconsider their vote whereby said Joint Resolution was agreed to by the Senate.
'Mr. Calkins moved that the motion to reconsider House Joint Resolution No. 222 be tabled.
'Upon which a yea and nay vote was demanded.
'The roll was called and the vote was:
'Yeas (names omitted) 7.
'Nays (names omitted) 21.
'So the motion to reconsider was not laid on the table;' that thereupon, as shown by the Senate Journal, pp. 1497 and 1498:
'The question recurred upon the reconsideration of the vote by which the resolution passed the Senate.
'A yea and nay vote was demanded.
'The roll was called and the vote was:
'Yeas (names omitted) 16.
'Nays (names omitted) 13.
'So the motion to reconsider was agreed to.
'Mr. Calkins moved that the consideration of this House Joint Resolution No. 222 be made an order for to-morrow.
'Mr. Flournoy moved to amend the motion by making House Joint Resolution No. 222 be made a special order for 9:30 tomorrow, Tuesday, May 30th.
'Which was agreed to.'
On page 1548 of the Senate Journal it is recorded that: 'The motion to reconsider the vote by which House Joint Resolution No. 222 passed the Senate.
'Was taken up.
'Mr Calkins moved that the further consideration of the motion to...
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