Crawford v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 13 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. B036621,B036621
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 211 Cal.App.3d 485 211 Cal.App.3d 485, 213 Cal.App.3d 156 Byron Daniel CRAWFORD, M.D., Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Respondent.

Page 414

259 Cal.Rptr. 414

Previously published at 211 Cal.App.3d 485

211 Cal.App.3d 485, 213 Cal.App.3d 156

Byron Daniel CRAWFORD, M.D., Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Respondent.

No. B036621.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

June 13, 1989.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 12, 1989.

Review Denied Aug. 31, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Jan. 22, 1990.

See 110 S.Ct. 868.

Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, Edward M. Rosenfeld, Helmut F. Furth, Donald G. Norris, Roberta M. Klein and Roger M. Rosen, Los Angeles, for petitioner

Richard W. Younkin and William B. Donohoe, San Francisco, for respondent.

INTRODUCTION

SPENCER, Presiding Justice.

Petitioner Byron Daniel Crawford, M.D., seeks a writ of prohibition, or in the alternative a writ of mandate, to restrain further

contempt proceedings against him by respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB).

BACKGROUND

Dr. Crawford is a psychiatric expert witness specializing in stress-related and other mental disorders. Through an alter ego corporation, he has been providing medical evaluation reports submitted in workers' compensation cases since 1978. The corporation employs approximately 30 persons to take medical histories and write the medical evaluation reports. Dr. Crawford is the sole physician employed by the corporation. Some of the employees are psychologists. The corporation generates approximately 50 to 80 reports each week. All of the reports are signed by Dr. Crawford.

In 1986 several persons brought to the WCAB's attention deficiencies in Dr. Crawford's reports; and in September 1986 a workers' compensation judge (WCJ), based on testimony before her in Frances Morales v. U.S. Borax, WCAB No. 84 LA 515162, referred Dr. Crawford to the WCAB regarding possible contempt. After a complex and extensive investigation, the WCAB on April 29, 1988, issued an accusation, a citation, and an order to show cause charging Dr. Crawford with 36 counts of contempt.

Dr. Crawford moved to dismiss the order to show cause. A WCAB commissioner granted the motion as to two counts (33 and 34) without prejudice to renewal and set the matter for hearing of the remaining counts.

Dr. Crawford then petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition restraining further proceedings by the WCAB. We initially denied the petition; however, the Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to this court with directions to issue an alternative writ to be heard before this court. We issued an alternative writ requiring the WCAB either to desist from further proceedings in the matter or in the alternative to show cause why a peremptory writ restraining the WCAB from further proceedings in the matter should not issue.

ACCUSATION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The accusation and order to show cause are supported by extensive affidavits, declarations, deposition testimony of Dr. Crawford and other witnesses, and medical evaluation reports signed by Dr. Crawford in numerous cases involving claims of injured workers for compensation benefits.

In essence, 18 of the counts charge Dr. Crawford with willful violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, chapter 4.5, section 10606 (rule 10606) in failing to identify the persons who took the medical histories and assisted in preparing and writing 17 medical evaluation reports submitted in workers' compensation cases in 1985 and 1986. ¹ An additional 13 counts For example, one of these five counts (27) in essence charges that Dr. Crawford filed false medical reports and liens in Peter Padilla v. California Commerce Bank; Mission Insurance Co., WCAB No. 84 LA 514764, for psychotherapy services rendered to applicant Padilla on dates after his death, the medical reports and liens being signed by Dr. Crawford only, without assistance of any other person. Another count (35) charges that Dr. Crawford filed false medical reports and liens in two other workers' compensation cases (Robert J. Kelley v. Panama Moving and Storage, WCAB No. 85 LA 525604, and Robert J. Kelley v. Goldrich & Kest Management, WCAB Nos. 85 LA 542858, 85 LA 542859, 85 SBR 113311), alleging in essence that a few months after Dr. Crawford filed medical reports and liens in the first Kelley case to the effect applicant Kelley had undergone eight psychotherapy sessions in 1985 and was evaluated as totally disabled psychiatrically, Dr. Crawford filed medical reports and liens in the second Kelley case to the effect that applicant Kelley had never filed a previous workers' compensation claim, had never previously undergone psychiatric treatment, and had no previous treatment for mental or emotional problems.

                charge Dr. Crawford with deceit in failing to identify the persons who prepared medical reports and in willfully misrepresenting to the WCAB that Dr. Crawford alone took medical histories and prepared the reports.  As to these 31 counts based in essence on violation of rule 10606, it is alleged that Dr. Crawford's conduct constituted contempt under Code of Civil Procedure section 1209, subdivisions (a)(4), (5), and (8). 2  The remaining five counts charge "deceit" due to misrepresentations made in medical evaluation reports signed by Dr. Crawford submitted in workers' compensation cases in 1985 and 1986
                

Two counts charge in essence that Dr. Crawford willfully violated rule 10606 in connection with medical evaluation reports for 1,000 "Doe" injured workers in other workers' compensation cases. The WCAB dismissed these Doe counts (33 and 34) without prejudice to renewal.

Based on the accusation and accompanying exhibits, the WCAB ordered that Dr. Crawford appear before a WCAB commissioner at a certain time and place and show cause, if any, why he should not be held in contempt pursuant to Labor Code section 134.

DISCUSSION

We address the issues in accordance with the principle that the Supreme Court's transfer order does not ipso jure establish petitioner is entitled to the relief sought and the Supreme Court's action means only that this court must decide the issues presented. (Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 500, 165 Cal.Rptr. 748.)

We first note that the California Workers' Compensation Act (Lab.Code, § 3200 et seq.) is a statutory system enacted pursuant to constitutional grant of plenary power to the Legislature to establish a complete and exclusive system of workers' compensation including "full provision for vesting power, authority and jurisdiction in an administrative body with all the requisite governmental functions to determine any dispute or matter arising under such legislation, to the end that the administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character; all of which matters are expressly declared to be the social public policy of this State...." (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4; Lab.Code, § 3201; see Graczyk v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 997, 1002, 229 Cal.Rptr. 494.)

The Legislature has vested all judicial powers under the Workers' Compensation Act in the WCAB (Lab.Code, § 111), including the power to issue all necessary process in proceedings for contempt. (Lab.Code, § 134; Morton v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 924, 928, 238 Cal.Rptr. 651; Rowen v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 633, 639, 174 Cal.Rptr. 185; Marcus v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 598, 604, 111 Cal.Rptr. 101.) As stated in Lipsey v. Danish Convalescent Home et al. (1986) 51 Cal.Comp.Cases 443, 447 (in bank), the WCAB is authorized to exercise judicial power in all disputes arising under the Workers' Compensation Act as a constitutional court subject to general legal principles which circumscribe and regulate the judgments of all judicial tribunals and in general has inherent power to control its practice and procedure to prevent frustration, abuse, or disregard of its processes.

In vesting the WCAB with the power to punish contempt, the Legislature specified that the WCAB or any member thereof "may issue ... all necessary process in proceedings for contempt, in like manner and to the same extent as courts of record." (Lab.Code, § 134; Morton v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 928, 238 Cal.Rptr. 651.) Consequently, the WCAB must follow the applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to contempts (Code Civ.Proc., § 1209 et seq.); and when the alleged contempt is not committed in the WCAB's presence, the contempt proceedings are in the nature of indirect contempt, the WCAB must proceed by way of order to show cause supported by affidavit (Code Civ.Proc., § 1212), and the alleged contemnor is entitled to appear before and be heard by the WCAB. (Morton v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 928, 238 Cal.Rptr. 651; Rowen v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 639, 643, 174 Cal.Rptr. 185; Marcus v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at p. 605, 111 Cal.Rptr. 101; see Arthur v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 404, 408-409, 42 Cal.Rptr. 441, 398 P.2d 777.)

With these principles in mind, we address the issues raised by petitioner.

1. Statute of Limitations

In the instant petition, petitioner places primary emphasis on Penal Code section 802 in support of his contention the contempt proceedings are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. In his reply brief, however, he appears to shift emphasis to Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 2, in this regard, noting that even if the herein contempt proceeding is not criminal in nature but merely quasi-criminal, then section 340, subdivision 2, applies. ³ (Alpine Palm Springs Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 523, 79 Cal.Rptr. 415.) Thus, petitioner asserts: "In any event, the question whether the present proceedings are criminal in nature...