Creamer v. State, 57995
Decision Date | 22 June 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 57995,57995 |
Citation | 258 S.E.2d 212,150 Ga.App. 458 |
Parties | CREAMER v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Morgan & Morgan, David E. Morgan, III, Abbeville, J. Laddie Boatright, Hazlehurst, for appellant.
D. E. Turk, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Jimmy Creamer was indicted, tried and convicted of burglary. He brings this appeal following the denial of his motion for a new trial.
1. In his first three enumerations of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge to the array of grand jurors and motion that any further action by the state to procure an indictment against him be continued until the next term of court, and in denying his motion to quash the indictment.
Appellant was first indicted on November 27, 1978. The trial court subsequently granted his motion to quash the indictment because he was an on-duty police officer at the time of the alleged offense and was not served with a copy of the proposed indictment, given notice of the contemplated action by the district attorney, or given notice and opportunity to appear before the grand jury. At the district attorney's request, the grand jury was reconvened on December 7, 1978. A copy of the proposed indictment, however, was served on appellant's counsel of record on December 5, 1978, and he agreed to have the accused present at the grand jury considerations on December 7. The district attorney claims that appellant was personally served a few minutes before appearing before the grand jury. After the evidence was presented, appellant and his counsel were excused, and the district attorney testified that no further evidence was presented from the time appellant left until he left a few minutes later. This testimony was corroborated by the foreman of the grand jury.
Code Ann. § 27-706 provides: "Before an indictment against a peace officer charging such officer with a crime which is alleged to have occurred while he was in the performance of his duties shall be returned by a grand jury, the rights provided in section 89-9908, relating to certain officials, shall be afforded such officer and such officer shall be notified of such contemplated action by the district attorney of the county wherein the grand jury shall convene." Code Ann. § 89-9908 provides:
Appellant's contention that he did not have adequate notice of the proposed indictment is without merit. There is no statutory time requirement set forth in § 89-9908 and the five-day rule required under Code Ann. § 81A-106 is not applicable as that rule applies to court hearings on motions and an appearance before a grand jury is not a hearing on a motion. See Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga.App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972). Any defect that might have existed in the service of the motion was waived by his attorney's agreement to the December 7 date and his appearance. There was no evidence to show that appellant was deprived of his right to be present when all the evidence was presented. Both the district attorney and the grand jury foreman testified that no evidence was presented after he left the grand jury room.
Appellant's challenge to the array of grand jurors and his motion to continue appear to be based on the premise that because he was not present when the grand jury considered the first indictment and heard the testimony of GBI agent Dan Rakestraw who did not testify at the second consideration of the indictment, the grand jury was biased against him and he should have had the opportunity to have the proposed indictment considered by a different grand jury who had not previously heard any evidence.
In determining whether or not grand jury proceedings are biased against an accused, it is an unquestioned rule of law that members of the grand jury may not be selected in a manner that discriminates against persons of a particular race or religion. However, ...
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...265 Ga. 732(6), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995). 41. Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 719(2)(a), 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989). 42. Creamer v. State, 150 Ga.App. 458, 461(1), 258 S.E.2d 212 (1979). 43. See Isaacs, supra at 720(2)(b), 386 S.E.2d 316. 44. See Lance, supra at 20-22(19)(b), 560 S.E.2d 663; DeYoung ......
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