Crenshaw v. Dywan

• Decision Date: 22 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 2:98-CV-522-RL-2.,2:98-CV-522-RL-2.
• Parties: Zena CRENSHAW, Plaintiff, v. Jeffery J. DYWAN and Anita M. Hodgson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

34 F.Supp.2d 707

Zena CRENSHAW, Plaintiff, v. Jeffery J. DYWAN and Anita M. Hodgson, Defendants.

No. 2:98-CV-522-RL-2.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

January 22, 1999.

Zena D. Crenshaw, Gary, IN, for plaintiff.

Wayne E. Uhl, Indiana Attorney General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, Caroline L. Young, William P. Wooden, Wooden and McLaughlin, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

ORDER

LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Judge Dywan's Motion to Dismiss and For Entry of Final Judgment, filed on October 28, 1998, and Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Disqualification of the Honorable Judge Rudy Lozano, filed on December 18, 1998. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for disqualification is DENIED and the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS Defendant Judge Jeffery J. Dywan from this case.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, Zena Crenshaw ("Crenshaw") is an African-American female attorney practicing law in Lake County, Indiana. In 1993, Crenshaw filed a product liability claim in the Lake Superior Court, Civil Division, on behalf of her clients against a corporation represented by Defendant, Anita M. Hodgson ("Hodgson"). Defendant Judge Jeffery J. Dywan ("Judge Dywan") presided over the case. On May 8, 1997, Hodgson verbally requested that the court assess attorney's fees against Crenshaw because the product liability claims were clearly frivolous, groundless, and unreasonable. Over Crenshaw's objection, Judge Dywan entered judgment against Crenshaw pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-1-32-1(b), stating that Crenshaw persisted with claims after they became clearly groundless and unreasonable.

Crenshaw filed a complaint against Judge Dywan and Hodgson in the Lake Superior Court seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief. The complaint alleges violations of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, the prohibition against excessive fines and penalties under the Eighth Amendment, due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title 42 United States Code sections 1983 and 1985, as well as Article I of the Indiana Constitution, Indiana's common law of conspiracy, and Indiana's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.

The case was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1446. The record does not indicate any basis for diversity jurisdiction over Crenshaw's state claims. Judge Dywan then filed the instant motion to dismiss based on judicial immunity.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Disqualification

Crenshaw claims the Court should be disqualified from this case based on 28 U.S.C. section 455. Section 455 provides that a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding where he has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Crenshaw states her intention to take the Court's deposition relating to Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 824 F.Supp. 842 (N.D.Ind.), a case previously before this Court in which Crenshaw was sanctioned. She alleges that the parallel between the sanctions imposed against her in Buggs and those imposed against her in the case before Judge Dywan indicates a pattern of bias against minority attorneys. According to Crenshaw, this parallel infers that "Judge Lozano's motive(s) for sanctioning [Crenshaw] may be probative of [Judge] Dywan's motive(s) for doing so." Thus, Crenshaw maintains that the Court "has relevant personal knowledge, at least as to his own motives." Crenshaw offers no case law supporting her proposition in either her original brief or her reply brief.

The law is clear in this circuit: "`Personal' knowledge of evidentiary facts means `extrajudicial.' ... Facts learned by a judge in his or her judicial capacity regarding the parties before the court, whether learned in the same or a related proceeding, cannot be the basis for disqualification." Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 991 F.2d 1249, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Cf. Green v. State, 676 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ("personal knowledge which requires recusal is knowledge acquired from extrajudicial sources, not what the judge learned from his participation in this case"). A judge need not recuse himself because of knowledge of a party gained in a judicial capacity. Geneva Assurance Syndicate, Inc. v. Medical Emergency Services Assoc., S.C., No. 92C1652, 1993 WL 384566, *4 (N.D.Ill.1993) (quoting United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1241 (7th Cir.1988)). In her motion for disqualification, Crenshaw does not imply that the Court has any extrajudicial knowledge. She concedes that the Court imposed the sanctions during a judicial proceeding, that being the Buggs case.

Further, Crenshaw has not alleged the Court's knowledge of "disputed evidentiary facts" concerning the sanctions issued by Dywan as required by section 455(b)(1). Crenshaw's attempt to analogize Buggs to the case at hand does not satisfy this requirement. Cf. Lac Du Flambeau, 991 F.2d at 1255 (finding it "difficult to imagine how judicially-learned facts about different parties in a case similar to the one being tried would require disqualification"). Because Crenshaw has not shown that this Court has extrajudicial knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, the Court will not disqualify itself pursuant to section 455(b)(1).

Crenshaw intends to discover the Court's motives for issuing sanctions in Buggs through a deposition. Crenshaw offers no federal or state case law to support her contention that the Court may be deposed regarding its decisions. She merely quotes Indiana Rule of Evidence 501(a), which states that no one may refuse to be a witness except as provided by Indiana's constitutional, statutory, or common law. Contrary to Crenshaw's belief, Indiana courts have recognized the prejudicial effect of allowing a judge to testify on behalf of a party regarding matters that took place before him in his judicial capacity. See Cornett v. Johnson, 571 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (noting that where a judge testifies in such case, "the judge appears to be throwing the weight of his position and authority behind one of two opposing litigants"). Therefore, "the judge hearing the underlying action should not testify in a subsequent ... action". Id.

The Court may refuse to submit to questioning regarding its mental processes, and will do so here. In Matter of Cook, the Seventh Circuit noted that a federal judge properly declined a subpoena requiring her to submit to cross-examination about the proceedings in her court and the rationale for her findings. 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir.1995). "[F]ederal judges speak through their opinions[;] ... their mental processes are not subject to examination." Id. (citing Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-07, 25 S.Ct. 58, 49 L.Ed. 193 (1904) (finding that a trial judge was incompetent to testify about the basis of his earlier decision for the purpose of determining whether the issue was actually litigated and a therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata)). Judges have not been allowed to testify regarding their mental processes for several reasons, "including unfair prejudice to the opposing party, the difficulty inherent in accurately recreating a mental process, the appearance of impropriety generated by a testifying judge and the solemnity of the record of a decision." Georgou v. Fritzshall, No. 93C997, 1995 WL 248002, *4 (N.D.Ill. April 26, 1995) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Fayerweather, 195 U.S. at 306, 25 S.Ct. 58; Cornett, 571 N.E.2d at 576. Because the Court will not submit to the deposition, there is no need for the Court to recuse from this case. Crenshaw's motion for disqualification is DENIED.

Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint should state "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). All of the facts and inferences within the complaint should be treated as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir.1994); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir.1996). A complaint should not be dismissed "if the plaintiff could prevail `under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Luckett v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 53 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). However, plaintiffs "may not avoid dismissal ... simply by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the bases of their claims." Perkins v. Silverstein 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir.1991). The Court "will not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs which are not contained within the complaint." G.L. Indus. of Mich., Inc. v. Forstmann-Little, 800 F.Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.Ind.1991) (citing Coates v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir.1977)).

Crenshaw alleges federal and state claims for damages and declaratory relief against Judge Dywan. When a plaintiff presents state law claims pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. section 1367,

[t]he general rule is that when ... the federal claim drops out before trial ... the federal district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental claim.... If, however, an interpretation of state law that knocks out the plaintiff's state claim is obviously correct, the federal judge should put the plaintiff out of his misery then and there, rather than burdening the state courts with a frivolous case.

Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1846, 137 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1997); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir.1994). In this case...