Crest Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. v. Hadley

• Decision Date: 10 December 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 15502,15503,s. 15502
• Citation: 239 Conn. 437,685 A.2d 670
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CREST PONTIAC CADILLAC, INC., et al. v. Nancy HADLEY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, et al.

Page 670

685 A.2d 670

239 Conn. 437

CREST PONTIAC CADILLAC, INC., et al. v. Nancy HADLEY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, et al.

Nos. 15502, 15503.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 30, 1996.

Decided Dec. 10, 1996.

Vincent F. Sabatini, Newington, with whom were Sandra Rachel Baker, and David E. Kamins, Windsor, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Priscilla J. Green, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Job Taylor III, pro hac vice, New York City, with whom were Marcella Hourihane, Hartford, Eric A. Richardson, pro hac vice, New York City and, on the brief, Louise M. Zeitzew, pro hac vice, New York City, Michael K. Brown, Thomas L. Casagrande and Isabel E. Chenoweth, New Haven, for appellee (defendant Mazda Motor of America, Inc.).

Before BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the mailing provisions of General Statutes § 4-180(c) ¹ are mandatory, such that an agency's failure to abide by those provisions tolls the time period in which an appeal of that agency's decision must be filed. We conclude that the mailing provisions of § 4-180(c) are directory in nature, and that, where timely actual notice of an agency's decision has been provided, the agency's failure to follow those provisions to the letter does not prevent its decision from becoming effective for the purpose of calculating the time period in which an appeal of that decision must be brought.

The plaintiffs, Crest Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. (Crest), and Morande Brothers, Inc. (Morande), appeal separately from the trial court's dismissal of their joint appeal of a ruling by the defendant department of motor vehicles (department) ² granting a license to the defendant Gorin's Sports Car Center, Inc. (Gorin), to sell automobiles distributed by the defendant Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (Mazda), at Gorin's business location at 170 Weston Street in Hartford. ³ Because the plaintiffs filed their appeal forty-nine days after the department's decision was mailed, four days beyond the time allotted for appeal of such decisions; see General Statutes § 4-183(c); ⁴ the trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are undisputed. On November 14, 1991, the department issued Gorin a license to sell Mazda automobiles. On November 21, 1991, Gorin and Mazda entered into a dealership agreement under which Gorin would sell Mazda automobiles at Gorin's established Jaguar-Alfa Romeo dealership located at 170 Weston Street in Hartford. ⁵ Pursuant to this agreement, Gorin purchased the assets of a Mazda dealer in East Windsor. Neither Mazda, Gorin, nor the department notified the plaintiffs, who were also Mazda dealers, of the dealership agreement or license application.

On November 22, 1991, the plaintiffs filed a formal protest with the department because Mazda had not notified them of the agreement and because there had been no hearing as allegedly required by General Statutes § 42-133dd (a). ⁶ The department declined to grant a hearing because it considered the Mazda-Gorin agreement to be a relocation of an established dealership within that dealership's area of responsibility under § 42-133dd (b) ⁷ and, therefore, exempt from the hearing requirements of § 42-133dd (a). The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, and the trial court, Maloney, J., ordered the department to conduct a hearing to determine whether the Mazda-Gorin agreement established a new dealership and, if so, to hold a hearing pursuant to § 42-133dd (a) in order to determine whether there was good cause to deny Gorin a license to sell Mazdas. The department thereafter held the first hearing over two days, September 10, 1992, and November 4, 1992, after which the department hearing officer ruled that the Mazda-Gorin agreement had established a new dealership.

Between May 12, 1993, and August 4, 1993, the second hearing pursuant to § 42-133dd (a) was conducted before hearing officer Brian C. Carey. On July 27, 1994, Carey rendered a decision concluding that there was no good cause to deny Gorin a license to sell Mazdas. Carey's final decision was mailed to the parties and their attorneys via "bulk certified mail" on Wednesday, July 27, 1994. ⁸ By Friday, July 29, 1994, all parties had received copies of the decision.

On September 6, 1994, within forty-five days of the mailing of the decision, the plaintiffs served notice of their appeal on all parties. On September 14, 1994, forty-nine days after the decision had been mailed and forty-seven days after all parties had received it, the plaintiffs filed an appeal of the decision in the Superior Court.

Prior to oral argument on the plaintiffs' appeal, the trial court, sua sponte, raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' appeal appeared to have been filed beyond the statutory time limit. See General Statutes § 4-183(c). All of the defendants except Gorin promptly filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 4-183(c). ⁹ On November 30, 1995, the trial court, concluding that the mailing provisions of § 4-180(c) were merely directory and, thus, that the plaintiffs' appeal was untimely, dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed separately from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeals to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly concluded that the mailing provisions of § 4-180(c) ("United States mail certified or registered, postage prepaid, return receipt requested") were merely directory and that the department's failure to comply with the mailing provisions did not free the plaintiffs from the statutory requirement that they file their appeal within forty-five days of the mailing of the department's decision. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that: (1) the subsection's use of the word "shall" in setting forth the mailing provisions indicates their mandatory nature; (2) the mailing provisions are related to matters of substance and not merely an attempt to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings; and (3) the legislative history of the statute indicates a legislative intent that the provisions be mandatory. ¹⁰ In response, the defendants argue that the mailing provisions are merely directory in that they were established for the convenience of the parties, and not to affect any substantive rights, and that the legislative history supports this interpretation. In addition, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot claim prejudice because they had timely notice of the decision and, therefore, could have filed their appeal within the forty-five day period mandated by § 4-183(c). We agree with the defendants.

The plaintiffs recognize that failure to comply with this time limitation normally would deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See footnote 9. They assert, however, that the limitation period of § 4-183(c) should not be applied to their appeal because the department did not mail the hearing officer's final decision by "certified or registered [mail], postage prepaid, return receipt requested," as required by § 4-180(c). ¹¹ Section 4-180(c) provides in pertinent part: "The [agency's] final decision shall be delivered promptly to each party or his authorized representative, personally or by United States mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid, return receipt requested. The final decision shall be effective when personally delivered or mailed or on a later date specified by the agency." The plaintiffs argue that the legislature's use of the word "shall" is indicative of the mandatory nature of the section. We disagree.

"Well established principles of statutory construction govern our determination of whether [a statute's provisions are] mandatory or directory. Our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993); Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction, 222 Conn. 254, 258, 608 A.2d 1174 (1992); Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193, 200, 585 A.2d 96 (1991)." Stewart v. Tunxis Service Center, 237 Conn. 71, 76-77, 676 A.2d 819 (1996).

"While we generally will not look for interpretative guidance beyond the language of the statute when the words of that statute are plain and unambiguous; Beloff v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 45, 54, 523 A.2d 477 (1987); our past decisions have indicated that the use of the word 'shall,' though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty. Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates, 196 Conn. 270, 278, 492 A.2d 180 (1985); Tramontano v. Dilieto, 192 Conn. 426, 433-34, 472 A.2d 768 (1984)." Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989). In order to determine whether a statute's provisions are mandatory we have traditionally looked beyond the use of the word "shall" and examined the statute's essential purpose. Id. "The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience.... If it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. If, however, the legislative provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory, especially where the requirement is stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words." (Internal...