Crider v. State
| Citation | 783 S.E.2d 682,336 Ga.App. 83 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. A15A1922.,A15A1922. |
| Parties | CRIDER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
James Kenneth Luttrell, Woodstock, for Appellant.
Thomas Edward Kegley, Brian Keith Fortner, for Appellee.
, Judge.
Troy Crider appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of drug-related objects. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his trafficking conviction; (3) the trial court erred in not giving certain jury instructions; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in denying Crider's motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Crider was a passenger, as the officer did not unreasonably prolong the detention before obtaining the driver's consent to search. The trial court also did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of a motel room, as the court's factual finding that the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant is not clearly erroneous. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Crider's convictions, as the testimony of Crider's accomplice was corroborated independently. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on presumption of possession and equal access, as the State did not rely on a presumption of possession by Crider. Finally, the trial court did not err in rejecting Crider's claims that his trial counsel's performance amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, because the various actions or omissions by counsel of which Crider complains did not fall below a reasonable standard of representation or did not prejudice Crider's defense. Therefore, we affirm Crider's convictions.
Crider was a passenger in a car that was stopped by police. After some investigation of the sobriety of the driver, Buffie Douglas, police obtained her consent to search the vehicle. Finding methamphetamine under the seat where Crider had been sitting, police arrested both Crider and Douglas. Acting on information provided by Douglas, police searched a motel room, to which Crider had a key card on his person, finding additional methamphetamine and drug-related paraphernalia. Based on the two seizures and other evidence, including testimony for the prosecution by Douglas, Crider was prosecuted and convicted for trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of drug-related objects. We will address his appellate arguments as to the legality of the searches and seizures before considering his sufficiency argument, noting that different standards of review govern each inquiry.
1. Crider challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized (1) during a stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger and (2) in a subsequent seizure during a search of a motel room. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga.App. 120, 120, 684 S.E.2d 290 (2009)
(footnotes omitted). We may examine not only the evidence in the record of the hearing on the suppression motion, but also the evidence from the trial. Owens v. State, 334 Ga.App. 203, 205(1), 778 S.E.2d 830 (2015) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). However, Perez v. State, 249 Ga.App. 399, 399–400, 547 S.E.2d 699 (2001) (citation omitted). The reviewing court may also consider facts indisputably discernable from a videotape, as is available with respect to the traffic stop in this case. State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 2(1)(a), 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015).
(a) So viewed, the record shows that an officer observed the car driven by Douglas make a "rough movement" from the right lane into the left lane then swerve back into the right lane. The officer initiated a traffic stop, approached Douglas, and asked for her driver's license. The officer asked Douglas to step out of the car, questioned her about her travels that evening and whether she had consumed any alcohol or drugs, and checked the status of her driver's license and registration.1 The officer also asked Crider for his identification and questioned him about his travels. After conducting some sobriety tests on Douglas, the officer told her that her eyes were red but he did not smell any alcohol. The officer asked Douglas whether she had consumed any drugs or was on any prescription medications, or had anything illegal in the vehicle. Immediately thereafter, about eight minutes after the traffic stop began, the officer requested and was granted Douglas' permission to search the vehicle. Before searching the car, the officer spoke to Crider again, asked him to exit the vehicle, and patted him down. Finding what was later determined to be methamphetamine under the front passenger seat where Crider had been sitting, the officer told Douglas and Crider that they were under arrest, about 10 minutes after the stop began. In an oral ruling, the trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence gathered from the traffic stop.
Valid consent to search eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 425, 677 S.E.2d 68 (2009)
. However, consent cannot validate a search if the consent is the product of a wrongful detention. State v. Lanes, 287 Ga.App. 311, 313, 651 S.E.2d 456 (2007). A passenger may indirectly challenge the search of a vehicle on the basis that the search is a fruit of his own illegal detention. State v. Menezes, 286 Ga.App. 280, 281–82(1), 648 S.E.2d 741 (2007). Although there is no dispute in this case that the initial traffic stop was valid, "a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Duncan v. State, 331 Ga.App. 254, 255–56, 770 S.E.2d 329 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ).
A stop that extends beyond the conclusion of the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place is unreasonable, unless "good cause has appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention to pursue a different investigation."
Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362, 369(2)(b), 761 S.E.2d 19 (2014)
. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that the officer did not unreasonably lengthen the stop as he continued to investigate possible impairment of Douglas, the court citing Douglas' driving behavior and her red eyes as reasons for continuing the investigation. Crider argues that the search of Douglas' vehicle was conducted after the detention was illegally prolonged beyond the conclusion of the investigation that warranted the detention. He does not argue that the officer altogether lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate Douglas for DUI. Instead, Crider argues that, by the time the officer asked Douglas for permission to search her vehicle, the officer already had concluded that Douglas was not intoxicated to the point that she was less safe to drive.2
That assertion appears to be based on a police report in which, before stating that he asked for Crider's identification or sought Douglas' consent to search the vehicle, the officer said that he "checked [Douglas'] sobriety" and "determined that she was not under the influence of any intoxicating substance." But the police report does not recount events in chronological order. The officer testified, and the video recording confirms, that he asked for Crider's ID before performing field sobriety tests on Douglas. The officer testified that although the constricted pupils and redness in the eyes that he had observed in Douglas are indicative of someone being under the influence of a stimulant, his statement in the report was intended to convey that she did not appear to be intoxicated such that she could be charged with DUI. The trial court found that the officer continued his investigation of Douglas' possible impairment "as late as two minutes or so before the drugs were found," and the video shows that consent was requested and obtained about 90 seconds before the drugs were found.
The trial court's finding that the officer was still investigating was not clearly erroneous. Just before seeking Douglas' consent to search, the officer commented on her red eyes and asked her whether she had taken any drugs or used prescription medication, indicating he still had not resolved the question of whether she were intoxicated. As soon as Douglas responded that she had not taken any medication or drugs, the officer asked for consent to search. Thus, even if Douglas' responses to the officer's questions about drugs marked the end of his investigation into her possible impairment, the officer's contemporaneous request for her consent to search was permissible because it did not unreasonably prolong the detention. See Hayes v. State, 292 Ga.App. 724, 731(2), 665 S.E.2d 422 (2008)
(). Accordingly, Douglas' consent was valid, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence found in the search of the vehicle.
(b) Crider also challenges the seizures made by police at a motel room, arguing that a search warrant was not obtained until after police searched the room. An overnight guest in a hotel room has a constitutionally-protected reasonable expectation of privacy in the room, and thus the Fourth Amendment...
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