Crisman v. Cooper Industries

• Decision Date: 11 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 05-87-00119-CV,05-87-00119-CV
• Citation: 748 S.W.2d 273
• Parties: Alan CRISMAN, Individually and in his Representative Capacity, Appellant, v. COOPER INDUSTRIES, d/b/a Gardner-Denver Co., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 273

748 S.W.2d 273

Alan CRISMAN, Individually and in his Representative Capacity, Appellant, v. COOPER INDUSTRIES, d/b/a Gardner-Denver Co., Appellee.

No. 05-87-00119-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

March 11, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1988.

John H. Cochran, Dallas, for appellant.

C. Michael Moore, Thomas E. Shaw, Dallas, for appellee.

Before WHITHAM, McCLUNG and STEWART, JJ.

STEWART, Justice.

Alan Crisman, individually, in his capacity as executor of the Estate of Mary Crisman, deceased, and as next friend of their minor children, (appellant) appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing this cause of action against Cooper Industries, Inc., appellee. By his cause of action, appellant alleges claims for strict products liability and wrongful death and seeks to recover actual and exemplary damages for the death of his wife, Mary Crisman. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment finding that Florida substantive law was applicable and, as a result, appellant's claims were barred pursuant to Florida's statute of repose. In five points of error appellant contends that: (1) Texas substantive law should be applied; the Florida statute of repose (2) is not applicable to Florida wrongful death actions; (3) has been amended and current law is applicable; (4) is procedural only; and (5) violates the Texas Constitution's open courts guarantee. Concluding that Florida substantive law applies in this case and that Florida's statute of repose barred appellant's cause of action, we affirm.

This action arises from an automobile accident in Florida on May 19, 1984. Alan and Mary Crisman, and their daughter Emily, were traveling late at night on a Florida highway when their car collided with a pickup truck towing an air compressor trailer. The truck allegedly pulled out from a stopped position on the shoulder of the highway resulting in the collision and the death of Mary Crisman. Appellant alleges that the trailer was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because it was marketed without tail lights, stop lights, brake lights, turn signals or license plate lights. Appellee is the successor by merger to Gardner-Denver, the manufacturer of the trailer.

The trailer was manufactured in Quincy, Illinois, and was originally sold and distributed to Industrial Equipment and Marine (located in Florida) in March, 1963. At the time of the accident, the trailer was owned by Suwanee Block and Building Materials, Inc. (a Florida Corporation) and was in the control and possession of a Florida resident (the truck driver). Industrial Equipment, Suwanee Block and the truck driver are not parties to this action. Appellee claims that it has not had ownership, possession or control of the trailer since March, 1963.

Appellant is a resident of the state of Tennessee. Additionally, the deceased was a resident of Tennessee before her death. Appellee is incorporated under the laws of the state of Ohio, conducts business in Texas under the assumed name of Gardner-Denver and maintains its principal business office in Houston, Texas.

Appellee contends that the Florida statute of repose, as substantive law, bars appellant's products liability action because the accident in question occurred more than twelve years after the trailer was delivered to its original purchaser. Florida's statute of repose provides that actions for products liability must begin within twelve years after the completed product is delivered to the original purchaser regardless of when the defect is discovered. FLA.STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981), amended by, 1986 Fla.Laws Ch. 86-272. A products liability action which is brought after the twelve year period "forms no basis for recovery because the statute prevents the accrual of a right of action." Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 631 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.Fla.1986). Thus, we agree with appellee that the Florida statute of repose defines substantive rights, and we overrule appellant's third point, contending that the statute is procedural.

Consequently, we next address appellant's fourth point of error which contends that the trial court erred in applying Florida substantive law. Under the "most significant relationship" test, appellant argues that the contacts and interests of Texas, pertinent to this cause of action, outweigh those of Florida and, as a result, Texas substantive law should apply. Inasmuch as neither party contends that the substantive law of Illinois, Ohio or Tennessee controls, we need not discuss the contacts, interests or applicability of the laws of these states. Instead, our inquiry is limited to whether Texas or Florida substantive law should apply. The choice of law decision as between the two will have a decisive impact on this case. As previously stated, Florida's statute of repose prevents the accrual of a right of action in this case; in contrast, Texas does not have a statute of repose which would bar appellant's claims.

The Texas Supreme Court adopted a new choice of law rule for application in tort actions in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex.1979). The traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti which directed that the substantive law of the state where the injury or death occurred controls was rejected and replaced by the "most significant relationship" test found in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 6, 145 (1971). The "most significant relationship" rule was later extended to cover all civil matters except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex.1984).

Appellant's cause of action arises under Texas' wrongful death statute which provides in pertinent part that an action for wrongful death of an out-of-state resident may be enforced in the courts of this State, although the cause of the death took place in a foreign state. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.031(a) (Vernon 1987). In regards to choice of law, Texas' wrongful death statute directs that "[t]he court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate under the facts of the case." Id. at § 71.031(c). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase to require a "most significant relationship" approach in a wrongful death action. Total Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Garcia, 711 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex.1986); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317-18 n. 3 (Tex.1979). Consequently, under both the wrongful death statute and under the Duncan rule governing civil matters generally, we must utilize a "most significant relationship" analysis in determining whether Texas or Florida substantive law applies in this case.

Application of the "most significant relationship" analysis does not turn on the number of contacts with one state, but more importantly on the qualitative nature of those contacts as affected by the policy factors set out in section 6 of the Restatement. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex.1979). Section 6 contains the general principles involved in this type of analysis. It states:

§ 6 Choice-of-Law Principles

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include,

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).

Section 145 lists the factual matters to be considered when applying the section 6 principles to a given case. It provides:

§ 145 The General Principle

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).

Concerning the first prong of the test, it is undisputed that the death occurred in Florida. Concerning the second prong, the conduct allegedly causing the injury is the design and manufacture of this trailer in 1963. The parties agree that the trailer was manufactured in Illinois. However, there is no evidence in the record concerning where the trailer involved in the accident was designed, and the only evidence concerning who is presently responsible for the design of products that are the same or similar to the trailer at issue is appellee's response to one of appellant's interrogatories. That response reveals that the manager of engineering and construction of products who is responsible for such design is located in Virginia. Further, the mere design or manufacture of a defective product is not actionable. To invoke the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the product producing injury or damages must enter the stream of commerce. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.1978). The undisputed evidence in...