Crockett v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 28 May 1975
• Docket Number: S.F. 23240
• Citation: 121 Cal.Rptr. 457,14 Cal.3d 433,535 P2d 321
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 535 P.2d 321 Henry L. CROCKETT et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

Page 457

121 Cal.Rptr. 457

14 Cal.3d 433, 535 P.2d 321

Henry L. CROCKETT et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 23240.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

May 28, 1975.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1975.

Sheldon Portman, Public Defender, C. Randall Schneider, Deputy Public Defender, Singleton & Brown and Craig M. Brown, San Jose, for petitioners.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., John T. Murphy, Kenneth C. Young and James M. Lee, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and for real party in interest.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Petitioners Henry L. Crockett and Beverly Ann Crockett, alleging denial of their constitutional right to a speedy trial, seek a writ of mandate to compel the dismissal of robbery charges (Pen.Code, § 211) pending against them in respondent court. ¹ We conclude for reasons hereinafter discussed that petitioners have not been denied a speedy trial and accordingly reject the petition and discharge the alternative writ. ²

On July 20, 1973, petitioners were charged by information filed in Santa Clara County with the commission of two robberies in that county. On that same day they were arrested in Alameda County for several crimes allegedly committed in that county. On October 5 petitioners pleaded guilty to one of the charges in Alameda County and were placed on probation. One of the conditions of probation was that each serve six months in the county jail with credit being allowed for time theretofore spent in custody.

While petitioners were incarcerated in Alameda County and pursuant to the provisions of section 1381, each made demand on the District Attorney of Santa Clara County for a speedy trial of charges pending there. ³ Such demands were received by the district attorney on or about November 7. ⁴ In December petitioners completed their time in jail in Alameda County and were then taken into custody by law enforcement officials of Santa Clara County where they were held to answer on the pending charges in that county. They were arraigned on February 5, 1974, and trial was set for March 27.

On March 22, some 5 days prior to the date set for trial, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the pending charges on the ground that more than 90 days had elapsed since the demands had been received by the district attorney (§ 1381). The motion was granted by the respondent court and the pending charges were dismissed.

Petitioners were rearrested on March 27 on a new complaint charging the commission of the same robberies and a burglary which had been included in the prior information. After being held to answer they were arraigned on the current information. (See fn. 2, supra.) On May 20 they again moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that they had been denied a speedy trial. ⁵ After the motion was denied on June 3 the instant proceedings were commenced by petitioners.

Section 1387 provides that an order of dismissal of a criminal charge is not 'a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense . . . if it is a felony.' Included in such orders of dismissal are those granted by reason of the fact that the defendant was not brought to trial within statutory time limits. Although the right to a speedy trial is grounded in both the United States and California Constitutions (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 88, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90) the timely refiling of charges once dismissed for denial of a speedy trial has been deemed constitutionally permissible absent a showing by the accused of actual prejudice. (People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 622--623, 79 Cal.Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 633; Barker v. Municipal Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, 812--813, 51 Cal.Rptr. 921, 415 P.2d 809; People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 154, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452; People v. Stuart (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 817, 822--823, 83 Cal.Rptr. 841.)

The rule that the burden is on the accused to show prejudice when an information has been refiled or a new indictment has been found must be distinguished from the rule which is applicable to the motion which results in the dismissal of charges for failure of the People to comply with the terms of section 1382. We have stated that in the latter circumstances 'A dismissal is thus mandated in those situations covered by the statute if, at the time a defendant moves therefor, the (statutory) period has elapsed and good cause for the delay is not shown by the prosecution. In these circumstances the defendant is not required to make any further showing, and in particular he is not required to make any affirmative showing that he has been prejudiced by the delay. (Citations.)' (Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 88--89, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 789, 507 P.2d 90, 93.)

When, however, as in the instant case the court has granted a motion for dismissal of the charges and the People are not otherwise precluded from refiling new charges pursuant to section 1387, the defendant is burdened with the obligation to demonstrate that he is prejudiced if he is to forestall the cause from proceeding to trial. (People v. Williams, supra, 71 Cal.2d 614, 623, 79 Cal.Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 633.) Sykes dealt only with the placing of the burden of justification for delay Prior to dismissal based upon the ground of denial of a speedy trial; it did not in any way alter the accused's burden of demonstrating prejudice if he is required to respond to a new information or indictment recharging the same offense or offenses. (See Bellizzi v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 33, 38, 115 Cal.Rptr. 52, 524 P.2d 148.) If such accused cannot show that he has been prejudiced and the People are not barred by limitations applicable to the filing of an information or the presentment of an indictment (see § 800), the rule is that the statutory time period within which to bring a defendant to trial starts to run anew. (See People v. Godlewski (1943) 22 Cal.2d 677, 683, 140 P.2d 381; People v. Stuart, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 817, 822--823, 83 Cal.Rptr. 841.)

Petitioners urge defects of constitutional dimensions in the rule requiring an accused to demonstrate prejudice if he is to escape prosecution under charges filed pursuant to section 1387. They argue that because the right to a speedy trial is mandated in our state Constitution a dismissal of charges based on a denial of a speedy trial pursuant to section 1381 constitutes a recognition of at least a prima facie denial of constitutional rights; that in reasserting the charges the burden of showing good cause should be on the People who were responsible for the withdrawal of the constitutional protection rather than placing the burden on the accused to demonstrate prejudice.

In Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90, we stated: 'In our view section 1382 constitutes a legislative endorsement of dismissal as a proper judicial sanction for violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial and as a legislative determination that a trial delayed more than 60 days is prima facie in violation of a defendant's constitutional right.' (Id., at p. 89, 106 Cal.Rptr. at p. 790, 507 P.2d at p. 94.) Sykes involved the applicability of section 1382 in a situation not expressly covered by that or any other statute. As distinguished from section 1381 which provides for the 90-day period on which to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial after demand therefor, section 1382 requires that the trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony be commenced within 60 days after the filing of criminal charges or the occurrence of other particular events necessitating a retrial of such charges. In the absence of specific statutory coverage we applied in Sykes the self-executing constitutional provision and held that the accused was entitled to the dismissal of criminal charges which were not brought to trial within the 60-day period. We recognized that judicial interpretations have resulted in aligning the meaning of the constitutional provision with statutory provisions in those situations wherein the Legislature has made specific rules. ⁶ In Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55, 285 P. 699, for instance, we stated that the Legislature 'by necessary inference had said that a trial delayed more than sixty days without good cause is not a speedy trial, and the courts have not hesitated to adopt and enforce the legislative interpretation of the constitutional provision.' (Id., at p. 61, 285 P. at p. 701; see also Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 89--91, fn. 7, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)

In recognizing that we have looked to legislative enactments to construe and give meaning to our constitutional provision for a speedy trial, we hold that petitioners are bound by the interpretations which have been or must be given to those enactments. It is clear that the Legislature intends that in appropriate circumstances the state may refile and pursue charges against an accused which had theretofore been dismissed pursuant to sections 1381, 1381.5 (demand for trial by accused incarcerated in a federal prison) or 1382. (§ 1387.) No distinction has heretofore been made merely because the initial dismissal was mandated by section 1381 (see People v. Godlewski, supra, 22 Cal.2d 677, 140 P.2d 381) as distinguished from section 1382 (see People v. Williams, supra, 71 Cal.2d 614, 622--623, 79 Cal.Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 633). Section 1387 purports to provide for the refiling of any charge theretofore dismissed 'as provided in this chapter' which, of course, includes charges dismissed pursuant to section 1381 and section 1382.

Section 1387 does not provide, as petitioners would have us construe it, that as a condition for refiling a charge the People must be ready to demonstrate,...