Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court of Sixth Precinct
| Decision Date | 20 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA--CIV,1 |
| Citation | 7 Ariz.App. 460,440 P.2d 1000 |
| Parties | James D. CROUCH, Appellant, v. The JUSTICE OF the PEACE COURT OF the SIXTH PRECINCT, George T. Witten, Justice of the Peace of the Sixth Precinct, Yuma County, Arizona, Appellees. 737. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
David S. Ellsworth, Yuma County Atty., by Paul E. Hunter, Jr., Deputy County Atty., for appellees.
This case comes before us on an appeal from the denial of a writ of prohibition by the Superior Court for Yuma County.
James D. Crouch, appellant, was charged under A.R.S. § 28--692 with the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The charge was filed in the Justice Court of the Sixth Precinct, Yuma County. The appellant entered a plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury. The trial was held in the courtroom of the Justice Court Building in Wellton, Arizona, with the Honorable George T. Witten, appellee herein, Justice of the Peace of the Sixth Precinct, Yuma County, Arizona, presiding.
During the preparation of this opinion, the opinion rendered by Division Two of this Court in the case of Abbey et al. v. City Court of City of Tucson, 7 Ariz.App. 330, 439 P.2d 302, decided 3 April 1968, has come to our attention. In Abbey, the Court of Appeals reviewed the action of a city court by an extraordinary writ. In the case now under consideration, the action of a Justice Court was reviewed by the Superior Court and an appeal was taken from the decision of the Superior Court. In Abbey we find no discussion of the potential question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and we assume that the issue was not presented by counsel or raised by the Court on its own motion. It is well established in Arizona that courts exercising appellate jurisdiction may, on their own motion, raise the issue of jurisdiction. The Judges of Division One of the Court of Appeals entertain serious doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to consider extraordinary writs save and except in relation to the judicial acts of Judges of the Superior Court, being judicial acts in a pending Superior Court action wherein the case is appealable to the Court of Appeals. There may be some judicial acts which are ministerial in nature and may be the subject of mandamus. The exception to this limitation of authority is the statutory grant of authority to issue writs of certiorari with reference to the Industrial Commission. Entertaining these doubts, we have undertaken a review of our authority and in this review we must give consideration to the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Arizona Supreme Court and of the Superior Court.
The Judicial Article of the Arizona Constitution is Article VI which was amended in the year 1960. Section 5 of Article VI, A.R.S. states, in part:
'Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have:
'1. Original jurisdiction of habeas corpus, and quo warranto, mandamus, injunction and other extraordinary writs to state officers.
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* * * '4. Power to issue injunctions and writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.
'3. Appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings except civil and criminal actions originating in courts not of record, unless the action involves the validity of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, statute or municipal ordinance.
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Section 14 of the Judicial Article states, in part:
'The superior court shall have original jurisdiction of:
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Section 16 is as follows:
'The superior court shall have appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justice and other courts inferior to the superior court as may be provided by law.'
Section 18 is as follows:
A.R.S. § 12--2001, is as follows:
'Granting of writ
'The writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.'
A.R.S. § 12--2021, relating to writs of mandamus, vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and in the Superior Court, a jurisdiction which is not related to the appellate jurisdiction exercised by either court.
Section 1 of the Judicial Article authorizes the creation of intermediate appellate courts and Section 9 of said Article is as follows:
'The jurisdiction, powers, duties and composition of any intermediate appellate court shall be as provided by law.'
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the Court of Appeals was created by a 1964 Legislative Enactment, the Court coming into effective being on the first Monday of January 1965. Contained within the act creating the Court of Appeals we find § 12--120.21 which provides, in part:
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It will be noted that this statutory section contains no counterpart to Subsection 1 of Section 5 of the Judicial Article. It will be noted that Subsection 4 of the statutory The antecedents of A.R.S. § 12--2001 are § 4391 of the Revised Code of Arizona, 1928, and § 28--101 of the Arizona Code Annotated 1939. Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Arizona Supreme Court has reviewed the action of the Justices of the Peace and the action of Superior Court Judges sitting as Magistrates, even in the absence of a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. Illustrative cases are Kinnison v. Superior Court, 46 Ariz. 133, 46 P.2d 1087 (1935); Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952); Vazzano v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 249 P.2d 837 (1952) and State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens, 79 Ariz. 298, 288 P.2d 1077 (1955). There have been a number of cases written by the Court of Appeals in relation to jurisdictional problems which arise out of procedural inadequacies and these need not be discussed in this opinion. The Court of Appeals has rendered opinions in relation to its jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of proposed appeals. Illustrative of these decisions are, State v. Mileham, 1 Ariz.App. 67, 399 P.2d 688 (1965); State v. Sheppard, 2 Ariz.App. 242, 407 P.2d 783 (1965) and State v. Nixon, 4 Ariz.App. 407, 420 P.2d 979 (1966). In Mileham and Nixon, the Court of Appeals held that it was without jurisdiction, the same not having been granted by statute, and in both instances the cases were transferred to the Arizona Supreme Court as authorized by A.R.S. § 12--120.22. Thereafter the Supreme Court rendered its opinion on the merits. In Mileham, the Supreme Court opinion is reported in 100 Ariz. 402, 415 P.2d 104 (1966). In Nixon the Supreme Court opinion is reported in 102 Ariz. 20, 423 P.2d 718 (1967).
section is similar to Subsection 4 of Section 5 of the Judicial Article omitting, however, the right of the Court of Appeals to exercise 'revisory' jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in State v. Court of Appeals, 101 Ariz. 166, 416 P.2d 599 (1966).
A criminal misdemeanor which is tried on its merits in the Justice Court or in a City Court may be appealed to the Superior Court. The decision of the Superior Court is final and there is no further right of appeal. Therefore, in our opinion, the Court of Appeals cannot entertain an extraordinary writ in relation to the judicial act of a Judge of the Superior Court presiding in the appeal from a City Court or a Justice Court in that should the Court of Appeals attempt to take such action, it would not be acting in relation to a matter 'proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction'. See A.R.S. § 12--120.21 hereinbefore quoted.
In candor we must note our opinion in Erdman v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz.App. 3, 429 P.2d 495 (1967) wherein Division One of the Court of Appeals undertook to review the action of a Superior Court in relation to a matter which was not appealable to the Court of Appeals. We recognize that our decision in Erdman was vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court on review in a case reported in 102 Ariz. 524, 433 P.2d 972 (1967). The opinion of the Court of Appeals and the opinion of the Supreme Court does not discuss the question of jurisdiction.
There are cases in other jurisdictions which support the view that extraordinary writs may be used only in aid of appellate jurisdiction. See for example: State ex rel. Buis v. Hendricks Superior Court, 246 Ind. 1, 201 N.E.2d 697 (1964); City of Dallas v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Civ.App., 1962); and Anderson v. McLaughlin, 263 F.2d 723 (9 Cir.1959). In the case now under consideration, the action of the Justice of the Peace was questioned in an original action filed in the Superior Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 12--2001
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