Crouch v. State
| Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-1910 |
| Citation | 147 N.E.3d 1026 |
| Parties | John CROUCH, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. STATE of Indiana, Britni Saunders, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Ryan Sullivan, Andrew Dutkanych, III, Biesecker Dutkanych & Macer, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Abigail R. Recker, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] John Crouch appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We affirm.
[2] On December 5, 2018, Crouch filed a complaint and demand for jury trial against the State of Indiana and Britni Saunders, the State Personnel Director, in her official capacity and her individual capacity. According to the complaint, on or about June 5, 2001, Crouch was "employed by the Defendant in the Attorney General's office" as a senior compliant analyst, which was a non-attorney position, and Defendant terminated Crouch's employment on or about March 25, 2003.1 Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 8. Crouch alleged that he applied for positions with the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") in 2018 but was not selected and subsequently learned that the State Personnel Department had identified him as not eligible for rehire and "Defendant did not provide any notice to Crouch that he was being designated as [not eligible for rehire] in its Peoplesoft database." Id. at 9. The complaint alleged Count I, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment; and Count II, blacklisting as a violation of Ind. Code §§ 22-5-3-1(a) and 22-5-3-2. Crouch requested the court: require the State to remove his name from any list, database, or program that lists him as not eligible for rehire, enjoin the State from categorizing him or any other employee as not eligible for rehire without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, require Saunders in her individual capacity to pay damages to Crouch, and require the State to pay penal damages for its violation of Ind. Code § 22-5-3-1(a).
[3] On February 6, 2019, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) and a memorandum of law. The Defendants argued Crouch did not have a liberty interest in being rehired by the State and that Ind. Code §§ 22-5-3-1 and 22-5-3-2 did not apply to his claim. Crouch filed a response, and the Defendants filed a reply. In June 2019, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss,2 and on July 19, 2019, granted the motion and ordered the cause dismissed with prejudice.
[4] A motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. , 80 N.E.3d 170, 173 (Ind. 2017). The rule requires that we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. We review 12(B)(6) motions de novo and will affirm a dismissal if the allegations are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances. Id. We will also affirm a dismissal if the decision is sustainable on any basis in the record. Id.
[5] Crouch argues that the State and Saunders deprived him of his occupational liberty interest by categorizing him as not eligible for rehire without notice and an opportunity to be heard in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He asserts that the Defendants created a stigma that foreclosed other job opportunities by coding him as not eligible for rehire.
[6] Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[7] Section 1983 creates no substantive right of its own, but acts only as a vehicle to afford litigants a civil remedy for deprivation of their federal rights. Myers v. Coats , 966 N.E.2d 652, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), reh'g denied ). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, "the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under the color of state law." Id. (citing J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson , 346 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2003), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied , cert. denied , 541 U.S. 975, 124 S. Ct. 1891, 158 L.Ed.2d 470 (2004) ). The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits any state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
[8] Whether a governmental entity is amenable to suit under Section 1983 depends on the meaning of the term "person." "The U.S. Supreme Court has held that for § 1983 purposes that term does not include a state or its administrative agencies." J.A.W. v. State, Marion Cty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare , 687 N.E.2d 1202, 1203 (Ind. 1997) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ). See also Cantrell v. Morris , 849 N.E.2d 488, 506 n.26 (Ind. 2006) (). Thus, we affirm the court's dismissal of Crouch's complaint against the State.
[9] As to the dismissal of Crouch's claim against Saunders in her official capacity, we note that "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’ " Will , 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312 (citing Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 167, n.14, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3106, n.14, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ; Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S. Ct. 441, 453-454, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) ). See also Chang v. Purdue Univ. , 985 N.E.2d 35, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (), reh'g denied , trans. denied .
[10] Crouch's complaint requested the trial court to "[e]njoin the State from categorizing [him] or any other employee as not eligible for rehire without first providing that individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 11. However, Crouch did not request injunctive relief or other prospective relief as to Saunders in her official capacity. Accordingly, we affirm the court's dismissal of Crouch's claim against Saunders in her official capacity.
[11] As to the dismissal of Crouch's claim against Saunders in her individual capacity, we note "a state official may be sued in his or her individual capacity for retrospective relief under § 1983." Chang , 985 N.E.2d at 49. Crouch requested that the trial court require Saunders in her individual capacity to pay damages for "[a]ll wages, benefits, compensation, and other monetary loss suffered as a result of Defendant's unlawful actions," "[c]ompensation for any and all other damages suffered as a consequence of Defendants' unlawful actions," and punitive damages. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 11.
[12] "In addressing a claim of an unconstitutional denial of procedural due process, we undertake a two step analysis." Larry v. Lawler , 605 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1978). Initially, we must determine whether Crouch's interest rises to the level of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. See id. If there is a recognizable property or liberty interest at stake, then we must weigh the competing interests of the individual and the Government in order to reach a resolution of what process is due. Id.
[13] Crouch asserts only that his interest constituted a protected liberty interest. The United States Supreme Court has held:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty ... guaranteed (by the Fourteenth Amendment), the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 572, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2706-2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) ).
[14] In Larry , the Seventh Circuit discussed Roth and held:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd.
...held that for Section 1983 purposes, the term "person" does not include a state or its administrative agencies. Crouch v. State , 147 N.E.3d 1026, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ); see also Howlet......
- Edwards v. State
-
Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Anderson ex rel. Everroad
...A state official in her official capacity is a "person" under § 1983 when sued for injunctive (prospective) relief. Crouch v. State , 147 N.E.3d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Will , 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312 ). Anderson has not requested injunctive relief; rather, she seeks an ......