Cruz v. R2Sonic, LLC

• Decision Date: 26 September 2019
• Docket Number: 1:18-CV-397-RP
• Parties: Celina CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. R2SONIC, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

405 F.Supp.3d 676

Celina CRUZ, Plaintiff,

v.R2SONIC, LLC, Defendant.

1:18-CV-397-RP

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division.

Signed September 26, 2019

Austin Harris Kaplan, Kaplan Law Firm, PLLC, Melissa Anne Jacobs, Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc., Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

Edward M. Smith, Alan Lin, Andrew J. Broadaway, Cornell Smith Mierl & Brutocao, LLP, Austin, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER

ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Celina Cruz ("Cruz"), (Dkt. 36), and Defendant R2Sonic, LLC ("R2Sonic"), (Dkt. 35). Also before the Court is R2Sonic's motion to strike, which pertains to portions of Cruz's summary judgment evidence and briefing. (Dkt. 40). Having considered the parties' arguments, the evidence, and the relevant law, the Court will grant in part R2Sonic's motion to strike, deny its motion for summary judgment, and grant in part Cruz's motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a disability discrimination case. Cruz started at R2Sonic as a temp in February 2015. (Cruz Dep., Dkt. 35-1, at 51:24–25). She was hired to be the small company's operations coordinator, which involves tasks like documenting shipping documents and invoices, scheduling and receiving shipments, order fulfillment, kitting products, inventory management, and answering phones. (Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2. Later that year she was hired full-time, and the following April she was promoted to Operations Coordinator II, which entailed a $4-per-hour raise but did not change her responsibilities. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶ 3; Cruz Dep., Dkt. 35-1, at 52:9–53:1). She remained in that position until being fired in April 2017. (Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2, ¶ 2).

In January 2017, R2Sonic organized a voluntary trip to Yellowstone for its employees. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶ 5; Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2, ¶ 4). Cruz went snowmobiling on that trip and crashed, injuring her head and shoulder. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶ 6). When she returned to Austin on January 23, she visited her primary physician when she returned to Austin, he diagnosed her injury as a concussion and recommended that she stay home from work for about one week. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶¶ 8–9). R2Sonic accommodated her medical absence. (Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2, ¶ 5). Cruz's doctor approved her to return to work on February 6 but limited her to working four hours per day and lifting less than 20 pounds. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶¶ 11–12; Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2, ¶ 5). R2Sonic likewise accommodated those restrictions. (Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2, ¶ 5). Cruz then returned to work full-time on February 13 with restrictions against working overtime or lifting over 30 pounds. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶ 12; Cruz Dep., Dkt. 35-1, at 92:3–22; R2 Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 35, at 5). Those two restrictions remained in place until Cruz was fired on April 20. (Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2.

The parties dispute the reason that Cruz was fired. According to R2Sonic, Cruz had been inefficient for almost as long as she had been working there. (Bonneau Decl., Dkt. 35-3, ¶¶ 6–12). R2Sonic's CFO, Yating Lai ("Lai") testified that Cruz's post-injury performance had nothing to do with her termination; she was fired "for pre-January 20th performance only." (Lai Dep., Dkt. 38-4, at 67:11–22). Cruz argues that not only is the timing suspicious but that, for a variety of other reasons as well, R2Sonic's stated reason is unworthy of credence. (Cruz Resp., Dkt. 38, at 15–16).

The parties also dispute whether Cruz was given all of the accommodations she requested after Cruz returned to work full-time. On March 6, Cruz's doctor recommended that she be given 15-minute breaks every one to two hours. (Lai Decl., Dkt. 35-2, ¶ 6). R2Sonic accommodated that request. (Id. ). But Cruz says that she requested various other accommodations—such as the temporary reassignment of certain tasks to other employees or help with physical tasks—that her supervisor Lori Bonneau ("Bonneau") denied. (Cruz Decl., Dkt. 36-1, ¶ 15). In fact, Cruz says in her declaration that R2Sonic took away assistance that she had received before her injury, such as help from another employee answering phones. (Id. ¶ 17). Ultimately, Cruz believes that R2Sonic "never engaged in a process" to discuss potential accommodations, forcing her to routinely work overtime in violation of her doctor's recommendation. (Id. ¶¶ 18–20). R2Sonic responds that Bonneau told Cruz not to work overtime and that Cruz did so on her own accord. (Bonneau Decl., Dkt. 35-3, ¶ 17).

Cruz asserts several causes of action against R2Sonic. She alleges that the company violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001 et seq. ("TCHRA"), in three ways: first, by discriminating against her on the basis of a disability; second, by refusing to accommodate her disability; and third, by retaliating against her for seeking accommodations for her disability. (Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-3, at 3–4). R2Sonic seeks summary judgment in its favor as to each of Cruz's claims. (R2 Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 35, at 1–2, 7). Cruz, meanwhile, seeks only partial summary judgment—she asks the Court to grant her judgment as a matter of law on the issues of whether she was disabled and whether R2Sonic failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disability. (Cruz Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 36, at 6–16, 20). She also asks for summary judgment on each of R2Sonic's affirmative defenses. (Id. at 17–20). Finally, R2Sonic filed a motion to strike portions of Cruz's declaration and her motion. (Mot. Strike, Dkt. 40).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "A fact is material if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law." Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex. , 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotations and footnote omitted). When reviewing a summary judgment motion, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Further, a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of proof, after it has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When the movant bears the burden of proof, she must establish all the essential elements of her claim that warrant judgment in her favor. See Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp. , 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2002). In such cases, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017).

Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr. , 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, the nonmovant is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. , 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006). Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. After the nonmovant has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted. Miss. River Basin All. v. Westphal , 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000). Cross-motions for summary judgment "must be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc. , 395 F.3d 533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

A. R2Sonic's Motion to Strike

Cruz filed a declaration in support of her partial motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 36-1). R2Sonic asks the Court to strike Paragraphs 4, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 from her declaration. (Mot. Strike, Dkt. 40, at 2–6).¹ According to R2Sonic, each of those paragraphs should be struck under the so-called "sham affidavit" rule because they are inherently inconsistent with deposition testimony she gave before making the declaration. (Id. at 4). R2Sonic also asks the Court to strike Part V of Cruz's partial motion for summary judgment because she used a table to present her arguments against R2Sonic's affirmative defenses.

1. Cruz's Declaration

A party may not "defeat a motion for summary judgment using an affidavit that impeaches, without explanation, sworn testimony." S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc. , 72 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 952 F.2d 128, 137 n.23 (5th Cir. 1992) ). Accordingly, a nonmoving party may not submit such an affidavit simply to "manufacture a genuine issue of material fact." Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. ,...