Cruz Vargas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00CV2334.,00CV2334.
• Citation: 218 F.Supp.2d 109
• Parties: Irene CRUZ VARGAS, individually and as next-of-friend and natural guardian of Eli Rogelio Figueroa Cruz, and Luis Rogelio Figueroa Cruz, Plaintiffs, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY; R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc.; Nabisco Group Holdings, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

218 F.Supp.2d 109

Irene CRUZ VARGAS, individually and as next-of-friend and natural guardian of Eli Rogelio Figueroa Cruz, and Luis Rogelio Figueroa Cruz, Plaintiffs, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY; R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc.; Nabisco Group Holdings, Defendants.

No. 00CV2334.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 28, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Amarilys Arocho-Maldonado, Utuado, PR, Herbert Muriel St. Thomas, VI, Archie Jennings, St. Thomas, VI, for plaintiffs.

Salvador Antonetti-Zequeira, Rosalie Irizarry-Silvestrini, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, L. Christine Buchanan, John M. Walker, Atlanta, GA, Diane G. Pulley, James R. Johnson, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Irene Cruz Vargas ("Cruz"), Eli Rogelio Figueroa Cruz, and Luis Rogelio Figueroa Cruz bring the present diversity action against Defendants, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds"), R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. ("R.J.R. Nabisco"), and Nabisco Group Holdings ("Nabisco Holdings"). Docket Document No. 25. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, attorney fees, and other costs. Id.

Plaintiffs and Defendant Reynolds file cross-motions for summary judgment and respective opposition motions. Docket Document Nos. 54, 64, 69, 77.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Unless otherwise indicated, we derive the following factual summary from the statements of uncontested facts submitted by the parties in their summary judgment and opposition motions. Docket Document Nos. 54, 64, 69, 77.

Plaintiff Cruz is a resident of Puerto Rico and is the widow of Luis Rogelio Figueroa Serrano ("decedent"), who died on October 18, 1999. Plaintiffs Eli Rogelio Figueroa Cruz and Luis Rogelio Figueroa Cruz are the sons of Plaintiff Cruz and the decedent, and both are residents of Puerto Rico. Docket Document No. 25.

Defendant Reynolds is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina. Id. Defendant Reynolds designs, manufactures, and sells cigarettes, including Winston cigarettes, in Puerto Rico. Id. Defendant R.J.R. Nabisco is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York. Defendant R.J.R. Nabisco is the parent company of Defendant Reynolds. Id. Defendant Nabisco Holdings is corporation incorporated under the law of Delaware with its principal place of business outside of Puerto Rico. Id.

The decedent was born on August 28, 1951, and lived in Utuado, Puerto Rico his entire life. He worked as a mechanic, tow truck driver, and a public taxi driver. His primary language was Spanish. The decedent did not read newspapers or magazines and did not watch television. He could not read, write, or speak English.

The decedent attended the Juan Ponce de Leon school from 1968 to 1971. He began smoking Winston cigarettes during high school. Plaintiffs contend that the decedent began smoking as early as 1968. Docket Document No. 77. Defendant Reynolds maintains that the decedent did not begin to smoke until 1970. Docket Document No. 54. By the time he was twenty-six years old, the decedent was smoking at least two packs of cigarettes a day. The decedent continued to smoke two or three packs of Winston cigarettes a day until he died on October 18, 1999.

Beginning in 1994 or 1995, the decedent was diagnosed with hypertension. The severity of his illness is disputed by the parties. See Docket Document Nos. 54, 77. The decedent's medical records indicate that he did not consistently: take his hypertension medicine, participate in diagnostic testing, follow dietary instructions, or attend medical appointments. Docket Document No. 54. However, Plaintiff Cruz attests that she supervised the decedent's medication intake, dietary habits, and other medical instructions to ensure the decedent's compliance. Docket Document No. 77.

In 1993 or 1994, the decedent's physician told him that smoking was affecting his health. In 1995 or 1996, the decedent's doctors informed him that his high blood pressure was related to smoking and that smoking exacerbated the high blood pressure.

Plaintiff Cruz discussed the health risks of smoking with the decedent more than nineteen years before he died.

Plaintiffs admit that they believed that the decedent was addicted to smoking for at least a year before he died.

The decedent passed away suddenly on October 18, 1999. On the date of his death, the decedent was forty-eight years old. No autopsy was performed.

Defendant Reynolds contends that other factors, besides smoking, were substantial contributing factors in the decedent's illness and death. These factors include: obesity, noncompliance with medical treatment, uncontrolled hypertension, family history of hypertension, possible renal stenosis, and possible pheochromocytoma. Docket Document No. 54.

Plaintiffs maintain that the decedent's smoking caused and aggravated his hypertension, and that smoking was as much as thirty percent responsible for his death. Docket Document No. 77. They also argue that pheochromocytoma and renal stenosis did not cause the decedent's death. Id.

Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on October 17, 2000, Docket Document No. 1, and submitted an amended complaint on August 20, 2001. Docket Document No. 25. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges state law negligence and strict liability claims pursuant to 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (1991 & Supp. I 1998). Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that Defendant Reynolds' cigarettes are defectively designed, because they cause addiction, hypertension, and death. Id. Plaintiffs also assert that the health warnings on Defendant Reynolds' cigarette packages are inadequate, and that Defendant Reynolds had a duty to print Spanish health warnings on cigarette packages sold in Puerto Rico. Id.

Defendant Reynolds filed a motion for summary judgment on May 1, 2002, asserting that: (1) Plaintiffs' failure to warn claims are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("the Labeling Act"), 15 U.S.C §§ 1331-1341 (1994 & Supp. I 2001); (2) Plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability claims are preempted pursuant to the doctrine of conflict preemption; (3) Defendant Reynolds' cigarettes were not a proximate cause of the decedent's illness or death; (4) Defendant Reynolds' cigarettes are not defective under Puerto Rico law; and (5) Plaintiffs Cruz and Luis Rogelio Figueroa Cruz's claims are time-barred. Docket Document No. 54. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendant's motion on June 7, 2002. Docket Document No. 77.

On May 7, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that Defendant Reynolds had an obligation to include Spanish warnings on cigarette packages sold in Puerto Rico. Docket Document No. 64. Defendant Reynolds tendered an opposition on May 21, 2002.

II.

Motion for Summary Judgment Standard under Rule 56(c)

The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir.1988). A factual dispute is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and "genuine" if the evidence is such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue as to a material fact is on the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. See id. In other words, "[t]he party moving for summary judgment . . . bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial." Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir.1998). This burden "may be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After such a showing, the "burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor." DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the moving party and the court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment by merely underscoring the "existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties"; the requirement is that there be a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993). In addition, "factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment exists to "pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings," Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992), and "determine whether a trial actually is necessary." Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d...