CSX Transp., Inc. v. Levant
| Citation | 262 Ga. 313,417 S.E.2d 320 |
| Parties | CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. LEVANT. S91G1599. |
| Decision Date | 25 June 1992 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Arnold Young, Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, Savannah, Jack H. Senterfitt, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, for CSX Transp., Inc. Billy E. Moore, Agnew, Schlam & Bennett, Paul R. Bennett, Columbus, John Wright Jones, Jones, Boykin & Associates, Savannah, for Levant.
Gary Parker, Decatur, amicus appellee.
The trial court entered judgment for Levant on the jury verdict awarding him $1,000,000 in an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Levant, 200 Ga.App. 856, 410 S.E.2d 299 (1991).
We granted certiorari to determine whether the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals should be reversed under Central of Georgia R.R. Co. v. Swindle, 260 Ga. 685, 398 S.E.2d 365 (1990).
After 17 minutes of deliberation, the jury awarded Levant a verdict of one million dollars ($56,000 more than that specifically requested by his counsel), although at trial Levant established lost wages through the date of trial of $46,342.97 and medical expenses of $11,694.79.
1.
Viewing [excerpts of Levant's closing argument] it is apparent that in addition to arguing for legitimate damages, [Levant]'s counsel informed the jury that the railroad was maintaining its tracks with an inadequate number of people and would continue to do so unless the jury made them pay; that the railroad did not care about [Levant]; that the jury should do right by [Levant] whom counsel considered to be a good man and his friend; and, that the jury should stamp out those (the corporate appellant) who would try to have the jury not give [Levant] an award of adequate damages because [Levant] is a "labor man." Inherent within [Levant]'s closing argument is the message that the big railroad needed to be punished for these transgressions. This is precisely the danger condemned in Swindle and which provided the primary support for the court's conclusion therein. [dissent in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Levant, 200 Ga.App. at 864, 410 S.E.2d 299.] 1
2. As we stated in Swindle, supra:
[W]e find the jury verdict in this case to be a verdict that can only be logically explained as having resulted from a punitive cause, which is an improper cause in FELA cases.... "[A] detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages," [cits.] leads us to believe that the verdict here "raise[s] an irresistible inference that ... [an] improper cause invaded the trial." [Swindle, 260 Ga. at 686, 687, 398 S.E.2d 365.]
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except CLARKE, C.J. and BENHAM and SEARS-COLLINS, JJ., who dissent.
1. I cannot agree with the majority's assertion that this case is controlled by Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Swindle, 260 Ga. 685, 398 S.E.2d 365 (1990). In Swindle, supra, we recognized that the jury's determination of the amount of damages to be awarded in an FELA suit is
inviolate, 'absent an award so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or another improper cause invaded the trial.' [Cits.]
Id., at 686, 398 S.E.2d 365. After making "a detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages" (Grunenthal v. Long Island R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159, 89 S.Ct. 331, 333, 21 L.Ed.2d 309 (1968)), this court concluded that an "improper cause" had invaded the Swindle trial, i.e., that the jury had impermissibly intended that a portion of the verdict have the effect of punishing the defendant and influencing its conduct. Id. 1
The case at bar differs dramatically from Swindle, for here there is proof that the jury's verdict did not result from an "improper cause." After appellant filed its motion for new trial, the eleven jurors still living executed affidavits sustaining their verdict. "The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict." OCGA § 9-10-9. Tolbirt v. State, 124 Ga. 767, 770, 53 S.E. 327 (1906); CSX Transportation v. Darling, 189 Ga.App. 719, 721, 377 S.E.2d 217 (1988), cert. denied 189 Ga.App. 911; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Nash, 150 Ga.App. 68, 256 S.E.2d 619 (1979); King v. State, 92 Ga.App. 616, 89 S.E.2d 585 (1955). The jurors swore that there was no mistake, undue bias or prejudice on the part of any juror in rendering the verdict, and that the only matters discussed were the character and permanency of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, the possibility that the plaintiff's condition could worsen, the resultant pain and suffering, the resultant monetary losses, the resultant diminished future work capacity, and whether the defendant was liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Several affiants averred that at no time during deliberations was the concept of "punishing" the defendant raised. Each affiant/juror stated that the verdict was in keeping with what the affiant, together with the other jurors, thought was fair, equitable, and reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for the injuries suffered. In light of the affidavits of the eleven remaining jurors who heard the evidence in this case, we have no basis to assume that the jury was responding to anything other than the evidence presented in assessing damages. See Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486(6), 220 S.E.2d 448 (1975); CSX v. Darling, supra.
[A]ppellant's contention that the trial court erred in considering the affidavits of the [eleven] jurors who heard this case is not meritorious where the affiants state that each did not consider [an improper factor] in reaching his verdict and was guided only by the evidence in the case and the court's charge thereon. [Cits.]
Seaboard C.L.R. Co. v. Towns, 156 Ga.App. 24(4), 274 S.E.2d 74 (1980).
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