Culp v. Polytechnic Institute of New York

• Decision Date: 05 October 1982
• Citation: 7 OBR 451,7 Ohio App.3d 352,455 N.E.2d 698
• Parties: , 7 O.B.R. 451 CULP, Appellant, v. POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE OF NEW YORK et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 352

7 Ohio App.3d 352

455 N.E.2d 698, 7 O.B.R. 451

CULP, Appellant, v. POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE OF NEW YORK et al., Appellees. ^*

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Oct. 5, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Satisfaction of due process requirements of minimum contacts, fairness, and substantial justice is a necessary condition precedent to valid service of process upon out-of-state defendants.

2. "Minimum contacts" does not mean "any contacts," and to so determine would be inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Knepper, White, Arter & Hadden, Sally Ann Walters and Richard A. Frye, Columbus, for appellant.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Richard A. Cheap and William M. Todd, Columbus, for appellee Polytechnic Institute of New York.

Murphey, Young & Smith Co., L.P.A., James A. Savage and Alan L. Briggs, Columbus, for appellee Peterson.

NORRIS, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court sustaining defendants' motion to dismiss his complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction.

Plaintiff sought from defendants, Polytechnic Institute of New York and Norman C. Peterson, recovery of the purchase price of used computer equipment shipped from plaintiff in Ohio to Polytechnic in New York. Defendants answered the complaint raising as one of their defenses lack of in personam jurisdiction, and then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction, accompanying their motions with affidavits from Peterson and a vice president of Polytechnic.

In his affidavit, Peterson stated that he was a professor of chemistry employed by Polytechnic; that he was a resident of New York; that plaintiff contacted him by telephone soliciting Polytechnic as a buyer of used computer equipment; that prior to the telephone call he had never heard of plaintiff or of his business; that all communications between himself and plaintiff occurred by telephone; that he never traveled to Ohio in connection with the transaction, either before or after the delivery of the computer equipment; that Polytechnic issued a purchase order and mailed the same from New York to Ohio; and that the equipment was shipped to Polytechnic in New York.

In his affidavit, the vice president stated that Polytechnic was an educational institution located in New York; that it issued a purchase order by mail from New York to plaintiff in Ohio; that the equipment was shipped by plaintiff to New York; and that Polytechnic engaged in no negotiations or transactions or business in Ohio.

Plaintiff's memorandum contra was accompanied by his affidavit, in which he stated that he " * * * entered into negotiations by long distance telephone for the purchase and sale of used computer equipment"; that numerous conversations transpired between himself and Peterson, many of which were initiated by Peterson; that Peterson had specific needs for computer equipment and that, in order to accommodate his needs, plaintiff agreed to locate and obtain specific items and obtained those items in the state of Illinois.

The trial court's decision granting defendants' motions, includes this language:

"Plaintiff * * * solicited business with nonresident New York defendants for the purpose of selling used computer equipment. Plaintiff and defendants negotiated the terms of the sale over the telephone and defendants never traveled to Ohio in connection with the transaction. Defendants completed a purchase order and mailed it to plaintiff who, in turn shipped the ordered equipment directly to defendants in New York. * * *

" * * *

" * * * [T]he Court finds that defendant Norman Peterson's conduct in participating in telephone negotiations with plaintiff does not constitute 'transacting any business in this state' within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code 2307.382(A)(1). As such, this Court cannot properly exercise in personam jurisdiction over him or over Polytechnic Institute, on whose behalf Mr. Peterson is alleged to have acted."

Plaintiff raises one assignment of error:

"The Municipal Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint on the basis that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over Defendants."

Plaintiff's assignment of error is predicated upon the trial court's application of a portion of Ohio's "long-arm" in personam jurisdiction statute, R.C. 2307.382:

"(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:

"(1) Transacting any business in this state;"

The "transacting any business in this state" standard of R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) is also embodied in the Civil Rules relative to service of process on out-of-state defendants:

"RULE 4.3. Process: out-of-state service

"(A) When service permitted. Service of process may be made outside of this state * * * in any action in this state, upon a person who at the time of service of process is a nonresident of this state * * * who * * * has caused an event to occur out of which the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose, from the person's:

"(1) Transacting any business in this state;"

Plaintiff contends that Ohio's long-arm statute extends in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the limits permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution citing in support of his contention our opinion in Green Terrace Development Co. v. Myles (June 30, 1975), No. 74AP-398, unreported. Accordingly, he argues that the question for our resolution is whether or not a determination by the trial court that defendants transacted business in Ohio so as to render them subject to the jurisdiction of Ohio courts would be permissible under the Due Process Clause. Actually, it may be argued that this court no longer adheres to the view that the long-arm statute extends the in personam jurisdiction of Ohio courts to the furthest limit permitted by the Due Process Clause, but that, instead, the "transacting any business" standard is more restrictive in its grant of in personam...