Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth., Inc.
Decision Date | 13 September 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 63590,63590 |
Parties | UNIVERSAL COACH, INC. et al., Appellants, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, INC. et al., Appellees. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Nicholas M. DeVito, Cleveland, for appellants.
Baker & Hostetler, H. Stephen Madsen, Wayne C. Dabb and R. Timothy Coerdt, Cleveland, for appellee.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Eric M. Oakley and Jill G. Okun, Cleveland, for appellees Flxible Corp. and Gen. Auto. Corp.
Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner, Chicago, Michael B. Roche, and L. Andrew Brehm, Porter & Wright and Hugh E. McKay, Cleveland, for appellee Blitz Corp.
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, and Robert P. Ducatman, Cleveland, for appellee New Jersey Transit.
Universal Coach, Inc. and Udelsohn Equipment Company, Inc., timely appeal from a judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas which granted summary judgment on behalf of New York City Transit Authority, Inc. ("NYCTA"), Flxible Corp. ("FLX"), General Automotive Corp. ("GAC"), Blitz Corp. and New Jersey Transit ("NJT"), pursuant to Civ.R. 56.
Our review compels modification in part and reversal in part.
In January 1985, NYCTA announced its intention to sell eight hundred thirty used Grumman buses and spare parts through a limited advertisement program in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, City Record, City Sun, American Metal Market, Iron Age and Passenger Transport. In the fall of 1985, Universal contacted NYCTA to express an interest in purchasing the buses and a series of negotiations ensued. During the process, Universal and Udelsohn formed a joint venture for the purpose of the purchase, remanufacture and resale of the buses.
A year later, Universal, Udelsohn and NYCTA entered into a purchase agreement for the sale. The agreement, however, provided that the transaction was conditioned upon the approval by the chairman of NYCTA, the New York State Department of Transportation, and the comptroller of the state of New York. The chairman of NYCTA refused this approval, thus preventing the proposed sale.
On June 30, 1989, Universal and Udelsohn filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas naming NYCTA, FLX, GAC, Blitz and NJT as defendants. The complaint principally alleged that these defendants had violated the Ohio Corrupt Activity Act ("RICO"), R.C. 2923.31 et seq., as a result of conduct which prevented the sale of the buses to the plaintiffs. In addition, the complaint raised claims of fraud, conspiracy, tortious interference with contract and bad faith/breach of contract.
In response to the complaint, NYCTA filed a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment based upon a lack of in personam jurisdiction per Civ.R. 12(B)(2) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted per Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The remaining defendants filed motions to dismiss. On March 24, 1992, the trial court, after treating each motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, granted summary judgment on behalf of each of the defendants.
The would-be purchasers, upon appeal, have raised two assignments of error which essentially argue that the trial court erred by granting the motions. Since the assignments of error have a common basis in law and fact, this court will consolidate them for review. 1
We initially note that the record before this court fails to demonstrate that the trial court possessed in personam jurisdiction over NYCTA (Brooklyn, New York), GAC (Ann Arbor, Michigan), Blitz (Chicago, Illinois) and NJT (Newark, New Jersey). In order to invoke the in personam jurisdiction of the trial court over a foreign person or corporation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the nonresident person or corporation had "minimum contacts" with the forum state; and (2) out-of-state service of process does not offend traditional notions of fair play as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. In addition, "there [must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus, invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1295.
R.C. 2307.382, which sets forth the "minimum contacts" required in order to vest long-arm jurisdiction in a trial court over a foreign person or corporation, provides that:
In addition, Civ.R. 4.3(A), which describes the persons subject to long-arm jurisdiction and extraterritorial service of process, provides that:
We fail to find the existence of any ground, pursuant to R.C. 2307.382(A) or Civ.R. 4.3(A), which conferred personal jurisdiction over NYCTA, GAC, Blitz or NJT on the trial court. Not one of these defendants conducted business within the state of Ohio which related directly or indirectly to the claims of a RICO violation, fraud, conspiracy, tortious interference with contract and bad faith/breach of contract. Gen. Environmental Science Corp. v. Horsfall (N.D.Ohio 1990), 753 F.Supp. 664; Berning v. BBC, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 1983), 575 F.Supp. 1354. In addition, that record fails to disclose that (1) the defendants took advantage of the privileges and benefits of the state of Ohio; (2) the defendants actively solicited business within the state of Ohio; (3) it was foreseeable that the defendants would litigate within the state of Ohio; and (4) it was convenient to the litigants and fairness required the defendants to come to the state of Ohio. Sales Consultants v. Buehler Lumber Co. (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 289, 607 N.E.2d 94; Erie Shore Indus., Inc. v. Cumberland Steel, Inc. (June 7, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 57053, unreported, 1990 WL 75221. See, also, Ohio State Tie & Timber, Inc. v. Paris Lumber Co. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 236, 8 OBR 309, 456 N.E.2d 1309; Culp v. Polytechnic Inst. of New York (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 352, 7 OBR 451, 455 N.E.2d 698. As a result, the trial court did not possess in personam jurisdiction over NYCTA, GAC, Blitz and NJT and should have...
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