Cunningham v. State

• Decision Date: 22 November 1983
• Citation: 457 N.E.2d 693,469 N.Y.S.2d 588,60 N.Y.2d 248
• Parties: , 457 N.E.2d 693 Helen T. CUNNINGHAM, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Edward T. Cunningham, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. (And 19 Other Actions.)
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 588

469 N.Y.S.2d 588

60 N.Y.2d 248, 457 N.E.2d 693

Helen T. CUNNINGHAM, Individually and as Administratrix of

the Estate of Edward T. Cunningham, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. (And 19 Other Actions.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 22, 1983.

[457 N.E.2d 694] Eugene C. Tenney, Buffalo, for appellants

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Peter J. Dooley and Peter H. Schiff, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Judge.

The issue presented in each of these 20 appeals, Cunningham v. State, 92 A.D.2d 725, 461 N.Y.S.2d 126; Monteleone v. State, 92 A.D.2d 725, 461 N.Y.S.2d 995; Hardie v. State, 92 A.D.2d 726, 461 N.Y.S.2d 998; Prave v. State, 92 A.D.2d 726, 461 N.Y.S.2d 124; Stockholm v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 996; Krotz v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 998; Mitzel v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 995; Robbins v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 995; Curtiss v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 994; Johnson v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 994; Knickerbocker v. State, 92 A.D.2d 727, 461 N.Y.S.2d 993; Smith (Eugene) v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 996; Van Buren v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 996; Lyons v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 996; Smith (Arthur) v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 991; Walker v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 997; Zymowski v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 997; Almeter v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 994; Fargo v. State, 92 A.D.2d 728, 461 N.Y.S.2d 997; Watkins v. State, 92 A.D.2d 729, 461 N.Y.S.2d 999, is whether claimants are foreclosed by the finality and exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law from maintaining actions against an employer for intentional assault. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the actions should all be dismissed because either (1) the claimant applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for the injury in question, or (2) there is a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board that the claimant's injury was accidental, employment-related, and compensable.

These appeals relate to the uprising at the Attica Correctional Facility in September, 1971. In Cunningham and two other actions, claimants seek damages for wrongful death, claiming that the injuries to decedents, who were guards, were intentionally inflicted by persons under the control of the State. In Prave and 16 similar claims, employees who had been taken hostage assert damage claims for intentional assault inflicted by persons under the State's control. In each of these actions the State has moved for summary judgment asserting that claimants' actions are precluded by the Workers' Compensation Law. The Court of Claims denied the motions and the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the suits. We now affirm.

The initial question to be resolved whenever a defense of workers' compensation is presented is whether the claimant has a right to bring a plenary action. "If the right to sue the employer has been stripped away by [workers'] compensation coverage, it is an arrogation of jurisdiction to consider a tort complaint on its merits." (O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 221, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 359 N.E.2d 1347.) Section 11 of the Workers' Compensation Law provides that the liability of an employer under that law shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability to the employee or his dependents for the injury or death of the employee. ¹ Under subdivision 6 of section 29 of the Workers' Compensation Law, the right to compensation is the exclusive remedy to an employee or his dependents against the employer when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ. A decision or award of the Workers' Compensation Board is, pursuant to section 23 of the Workers' Compensation Law, final and conclusive upon the parties and the State Insurance Fund as to all questions within its jurisdiction, unless modified or reversed on appeal. These provisions operate to preclude claimants' actions.

In the wrongful death actions, the record reveals that the claimants have applied for and received workers' compensation benefits. By applying for and accepting such benefits, these claimants have forfeited their rights to maintain wrongful death actions against respondent for intentional torts. (Werner v. State of New York, 53 N.Y.2d 346, 348-349, 441 N.Y.S.2d 654, 424 N.E.2d 541; Mylroie v. GAF Corp., 55 N.Y.2d 893, 894, 449 N.Y.S.2d 21, 433 N.E.2d 1269.) ² Claimants allege that their actions should not be dismissed because they were misled by the State into applying for and accepting the benefits. That issue however, is one that must be addressed to the Workers' Compensation Board, not the courts. (Werner v. State of New York, 53 N.Y.2d 346, 352, n. 2, 441 N.Y.S.2d 654, 424 N.E.2d 541, supra.) The Legislature has placed the responsibility for such factual determinations in the Workers' Compensation Board, and claimants may not circumvent this procedure and choose the courts as the forum for resolution of such questions. (O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 359 N.E.2d 1347, supra.)

II

In the cases brought by the former hostages, the record shows that the State continued to pay the claimants their salaries during their absence from work due to injury and sought reimbursement for those payments from the State Insurance Fund. As to each claim, the Workers' Compensation Board made a determination that the injuries were accidental, related to employment, and compensable, and issued an award. In addition to providing salary reimbursement, the fund also paid certain medical expenses.

These claimants contend that they should not be barred from bringing suit against the State because it was the State, and not they, who filed the claims for compensation with the board, and because they have never received any "direct" benefits from the fund, as the State was obligated to pay their salaries under a collective bargaining agreement. But the board has the discretion to process a claim, whether filed by an employee or an employer, even if the claimant objects and a civil action is pending. (O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 227-228, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 359 N.E.2d 1347, supra.) A determination by the Workers' Compensation Board that a claimant...