Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 05-93-01575-CV,05-93-01575-CV
• Citation: 887 S.W.2d 465
• Parties: DALLAS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. FUNDS RECOVERY, INC. d/b/a Asset Resolution Corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 465

887 S.W.2d 465

DALLAS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. FUNDS RECOVERY, INC. d/b/a Asset Resolution Corporation, Appellees.

No. 05-93-01575-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

Aug. 31, 1994.

Mike Tabor, Henry J. Voegle, Robert J. Davis, Dallas, for appellant.

Jay S. Fichtner, Dallas, for appellee.

Before LAGARDE, BURNETT, and MALONEY, JJ.

OPINION

LAGARDE, Justice.

The Dallas County Appraisal District (the District) appeals from the trial court's grant of mandamus ordering it to "accept and process" the property tax exemption applications filed by appellee Funds Recovery, Inc. d/b/a Asset Resolution Corporation (A.R.C.) under the Property Tax Code (the Code). ¹ Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we dismiss. ²

After reviewing public property tax records to find homeowners with unclaimed homestead exemptions, A.R.C. contacts these homeowners to secure an authorization and appointment to act as the homeowners' agent to obtain their legally entitled refunds. A.R.C. is compensated for its service. The District is a political subdivision of the State of Texas that processes tax exemption applications through its chief appraiser.

In October 1991, A.R.C. filed with the District a large number of applications for individual residential homestead exemptions for the 1990 and 1991 tax years. Each application contained the required Appointment of Agent form promulgated by the state comptroller's office under authority of the Code. ³ Through its president, A.R.C. had signed the Appointment of Agent forms appointing itself as tax agent for each homeowner. Each application also contained a form signed by the homeowner ("Homeowner Authorization") containing the following:

I hereby authorize and appoint A.R.C. to act as my agent in accordance with V.T.C.A. Tax Code Section 1.111, to do anything legally reasonably necessary to apply for and obtain the funds to which they believe I am entitled, to use my name, to receipt for me and endorse on my behalf checks, drafts or instruments, negotiable or otherwise.

On October 29, 1991, the District returned all the applications to A.R.C. with a letter from Junell Pogue, Manager of Exemptions for the District. The letter stated that A.R.C.'s Homeowner Authorizations did not authorize A.R.C. to appoint tax agents. The letter explained that "the Appointment of Agent form[s] must be signed by one of the following: the property owner; a person the owner has specifically authorized to name tax agents; or by a corporate officer (if the owner is a corporation)." ⁴ The letter requested A.R.C. to resubmit the exemption applications with appropriate signatures. The letter noted that those "applications that were submitted are not valid and new applications will need to be filed with this office."

A.R.C. petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and other relief. ⁵ A.R.C. alleged that "[d]espite written and oral demands made by [A.R.C.] upon [the District], it has persisted in its refusal to accept applications for refund from [A.R.C.] and refuses to process applications for refund filed by [A.R.C.]." Neither A.R.C.'s petition nor its summary-judgment evidence reflected any appeal of the District's action to the Appraisal Review Board, the protest board established by the Code. See TEX.TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992). A.R.C. prayed, in part, that the District "immediately receive and process" the 1990 and 1991 applications, pay A.R.C. and its clients monetary damages, and indemnify A.R.C. for its attorney's fees.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on the mandamus claim. A.R.C. based its motion on the grounds that it "complied with all of the provisions, conditions and requirements of the Texas Property Tax Code in acting as tax agent for its clients, and therefore, there is no issue as to any material fact to preclude summary judgment." A.R.C. contends, essentially, that, as a matter of law, the authority delegated to it by the Homeowner Authorizations is broad enough to encompass the naming of tax agents.

The District based its motion for summary judgment in the mandamus action on an absence of a clear legal duty to perform nondiscretionary acts. It argues that because the forms submitted did not specifically grant authority to name tax agents, the District exercised its discretion to determine the sufficiency of the forms. The District moved for summary judgment on A.R.C.'s remaining claims based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the trial court (i) granted A.R.C. summary judgment for mandamus relief, (ii) denied the District summary judgment on the mandamus action, and (iii) granted the District summary judgment on A.R.C.'s remaining claims.

Jurisdiction over Appeal

During oral argument, A.R.C. re-urged its presubmission motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.R.C.'s motion challenged our jurisdiction over this appeal on the grounds that the District (i) failed to file a cost bond, (ii) filed a defective notice of appeal, and (iii) asserted an indefinite point of error. A motions panel of this Court denied A.R.C.'s motion without opinion. We conclude that A.R.C.'s jurisdictional arguments are meritless.

First, an appraisal district is exempt from filing an appeal bond. Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Institute for Aerobics Research, 751 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex.1988). As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by supreme court authority that has not been overruled. Howe State Bank v. Crookham, 873 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1994, no writ). A.R.C. asserts, however, that the Institute for Aerobics Research opinion has been called into doubt by Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Municipal Utility District, 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993). We disagree. Monsanto is a statutory construction case interpreting section 16.061 of the civil practice and remedies code. Monsanto Co., 865 S.W.2d at 938. Monsanto does not overrule, or even question, the supreme court's Institute for Aerobics Research opinion interpreting section 42.28 of the tax code. We overrule A.R.C.'s first jurisdictional argument. ⁶

Second, A.R.C. asserts that the District's notice of appeal was defective in identifying the appealed-from judgment. We overrule this argument as moot because the defect has been cured by an amended notice of appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P. 46(f); 83.

Finally, A.R.C. asserts this Court lacks jurisdiction because the District's "point of error is too indefinite" ⁷ and "fail[ed] to comply with the briefing requirements." See TEX.R.APP.P. 74. This Court has jurisdiction over any appeal where the appellant files an instrument that was filed in a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex.1991) (per curiam) (quoting, in part, Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apartments, 776 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex.1989)). We have already concluded that the District's notice of appeal was sufficient to vest this Court with jurisdiction over this appeal. Indefiniteness in a brief is not a jurisdictional defect. We overrule A.R.C.'s re-urged motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over an appeal and subject matter jurisdiction, however, are two different concepts. Subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex.1986); see Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1993). We must inquire into our own jurisdiction, even if it is necessary to do so sua sponte. White v. Schiwetz, 793 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Appellate court jurisdiction of the merits of a case extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken. Pearson v. State, 159 Tex. 66, 315 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex.1958). If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, then an appellate court only has jurisdiction to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause. See State ex rel. Kelly v. Baker, 580 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1979, no writ); see also Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 356, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 (1961). Thus, on our own motion, we address the issue of jurisdiction.

Our standard for reviewing subject matter jurisdiction requires the pleader to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446. When reviewing subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, we must construe the petition in favor of the pleader, and if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports jurisdiction. See id.

A.R.C.'s main contention in this suit is that it should not be required to resubmit its applications. A.R.C.'s argument is based on the premise that its agent authorization forms are sufficient as a matter of law to grant it the authority to name itself as tax agent for the homeowners. The District disagreed with A.R.C.'s interpretation of its agent authorization forms, concluding that those authorizations were not "specific" enough as required by the comptroller's form.

There is no dispute about the comptroller's authority to require specificity of a tax agent's authority. See TEX.TAX CODE ANN. § 1.111(h). At oral argument, A.R.C. stated that the only issue before us is a question of law. "Specificity," however, is an issue where reasonable minds can differ. We cannot conclude, therefore, that "specificity" is a pure question of law; thus, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is applicable. Cf. Grounds, 707 S.W.2d at 892.

Choosing to ignore any administrative remedies it had, A.R.C. challenged the District's decision through this mandamus action. We now turn to consider whether the Code provides A.R.C. an administrative remedy.

The Code requires the chief appraiser to "accept and approve or deny"...