Daly v. DelPonte

• Decision Date: 05 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 10372,10372
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Edward DALY v. Lawrence F. DelPONTE, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

Page 93

608 A.2d 93

27 Conn.App. 495

Edward DALY v. Lawrence F. DelPONTE, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

No. 10372.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 19, 1992.

Decided May 5, 1992.

Lawrence W. Berliner, with whom, on the brief, was Catherine Cushman, for appellant (plaintiff).

Cornelius F. Tuohy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before LAVERY, LANDAU and HEIMAN, JJ.

HEIMAN, Judge.

The plaintiff, Edward Daly, appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his appeal from the decision of the defendant, the commissioner of motor vehicles for the state of Connecticut, suspending his driver's license and requiring him to submit certain medical reports as a condition of reinstatement and retention of that license. He claims that the trial court (1) incorrectly determined that his substantial rights were not prejudiced by the defendant's decision, (2) incorrectly determined that the defendant's prejudgment decision summarily suspending his license comported with General Statutes § 4-182, (3) improperly failed to consider whether the defendant's actions violated the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution, (4) incorrectly determined that the defendant's action was not arbitrary, capricious, illegal or an abuse of discretion and (5) improperly failed to consider the effects of certain claimed ex parte communications made by the defendant. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The facts necessary to resolve this appeal may be summarized as follows. In 1986, the plaintiff, an inspector employed by the department of motor vehicles (DMV), was treated by Michael Krinsky, a neurologist, after experiencing a seizure. As a result of the seizure, the defendant required the plaintiff to submit a P-142N, a DMV neurological medical report form, periodically. In a P-142N dated January 19, 1989, Krinsky indicated that the plaintiff was taking his anticonvulsant medication as instructed.

On May 4, 1989, the plaintiff suffered another seizure while on his lunch break at Max's Pizza restaurant in Bloomfield and was taken to Mount Sinai Hospital for treatment. As a result of this incident, the plaintiff was relegated to office duties upon his return to work and was prohibited from driving a state vehicle until his condition could be evaluated further. The plaintiff was notified by letter dated March 23, 1989, that the defendant summarily had placed him on medical probation, a period during which he was required, under threat of having his driver's license suspended, to submit medical reports to the DMV. In a letter dated May 16, 1989, Krinsky confirmed that the plaintiff had suffered a seizure recently, that his anticonvulsant medication was increased as a result of the seizure and that he was approved to resume his regular duties at work.

The plaintiff submitted another P-142N signed by Krinsky on May 25, 1989. Upon receiving the May 25, 1989 P-142N, Gladys O. Johnson, the chief of the drivers services division of the DMV, wrote to John T. Hornblow, a neurologist and then chairman of DMV's medical advisory board, soliciting Hornblow's opinion regarding the plaintiff's fitness to drive. To aid Hornblow in his analysis, Johnson enclosed medical reports and a letter signed by Krinsky as well as a memo from Lieutenant Lee Telke of the DMV, an eyewitness to the May 4, 1989 seizure. In a letter dated June 12, 1989, Hornblow informed Johnson that although he had misgivings about the plaintiff's ability to drive safely, he had not yet consulted with Krinsky. In a letter dated June 26, 1989, Hornblow informed Johnson that, because he still had been unable to confer with Krinsky and therefore did not have the optimum data on which to base a recommendation, he felt that the plaintiff's license should be suspended until his medication requirements could be assessed.

Johnson notified the plaintiff by letter dated July 22, 1989, that the defendant had ordered his driver's license suspended effective August 5, 1989, on the basis of a finding that his continued operation of a motor vehicle would be dangerous to himself and to others. The letter further advised the plaintiff of his right to request a presuspension hearing.

On August 1, 1989, the plaintiff requested a presuspension hearing. Consequently, Johnson sent a memorandum to Michael Krochmalny, chief of the DMV's adjudications division, requesting that he schedule a hearing concerning whether the plaintiff's driver's license should be suspended. The defendant notified both the plaintiff and Krinsky that a hearing was scheduled for August 15, 1989.

On August 15, 1989, the parties negotiated a proposed stipulated settlement agreement that was tentatively accepted by Michael Ross, a DMV hearing officer, on the condition that the defendant approve it. The defendant notified the plaintiff's attorney that after reviewing the agreement and the plaintiff's file and consulting with Johnson and Hornblow, he was unable to approve the agreement. He further stated that he would request Krochmalny to schedule a full hearing on the matter.

A license suspension hearing was held on September 21, October 26, and December 6, 1989, before DMV hearing officer William Grady. On January 2, 1990, Grady issued his decision, finding that the plaintiff was "not a proper person to hold a Connecticut operator's license based on available medical evidence." As a result of Grady's findings, the defendant ordered that (1) the August 5, 1989 suspension remain in effect until May 4, 1990, (2) on May 4, 1990, the plaintiff become eligible for reinstatement of his driver's license, (3) in the event that the plaintiff's driver's license was reinstated, he submit P-142Ns to the DMV every three months, commencing with the date of reinstatement, for a period of three years, and (4) the plaintiff submit a P-142N to the DMV within seven days of any subsequent consciousness altering event or seizure.

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which rendered judgment dismissing the appeal on June 11, 1991. At some time before the trial court rendered its judgment the plaintiff's license suspension had expired and his license had been reinstated. This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the defendant did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion in placing him on medical probation. He specifically argues that the defendant was without the statutory or regulatory authority to place him on medical probation. We disagree.

The plaintiff attacks both the defendant's March, 1989 decision summarily placing him on medical probation and that portion of the defendant's January 2, 1990 decision requiring him to submit P-142N forms as a condition of reinstatement and retention of his suspended license.

The plaintiff's claim with respect to the March, 1989 decision summarily placing him on medical probation is moot. The defendant's license was suspended from August 5, 1989, to May 4, 1990, rendering this condition on his ability to retain his license during this period meaningless. Moreover, the postsuspension reporting requirements were not a continuation of the March, 1989 medical probation but were new requirements that became effective when the plaintiff's license was reinstated. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that although the term "medical probation" is used in the March, 1989 letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, it is not used in the defendant's January, 1990 order. Because the March, 1989 medical probation terminated on August 5, 1990, the plaintiff's challenge to it is moot. See Furstein v. Hill, 218 Conn. 610, 627, 590 A.2d 939 (1991); Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 166 Conn. 449, 453, 352 A.2d 291 (1974). As such, we will not consider this claim.

We turn next to the plaintiff's attack on the postreinstatement reporting requirements. The trial court found that the defendant's authority to require the plaintiff to file postreinstatement medical reports was derived from General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-36(e), which states in pertinent part: "If any applicant [for a Connecticut driver's license] suffers from any physical defect or from any disease which might affect the operation by him of a motor vehicle, the commissioner may require the applicant to demonstrate personally that, notwithstanding such defect or disease, he is a proper person to operate a motor vehicle, and he may further require a certificate of such applicant's condition.... A license, containing such limitation as the commissioner deems advisable, may be issued in any case...." The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly relied on this statute because he was not an applicant for a Connecticut driver's license. The trial court properly relied on this statute. The defendant's January, 1990 order states that the plaintiff's license was to remain suspended until May 4, 1990, when he would be "eligible" for reinstatement. The order clearly contemplates that the plaintiff would be applying for reinstatement of his license after that date. For the purposes of the postreinstatement reporting requirements, therefore, the plaintiff was an applicant as that term is used in the statute.

The plaintiff next claims that the statute, by its express terms, applies only to those applicants "who [have] not held a Connecticut motor vehicle operator's license during the preceding two years...." Although the plaintiff accurately quotes this statutory language, his reliance on it is misplaced. The quoted passage is taken from the first portion of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-36(e), which states in pertinent part: "Before granting a license to any applicant who has not held a Connecticut motor vehicle operator's license during the preceding two years, the commissioner shall require the applicant to demonstrate...