Daniel v. State, A16A0587
Decision Date | 07 June 2016 |
Docket Number | A16A0587 |
Citation | 338 Ga.App. 389,787 S.E.2d 281 |
Parties | Daniel v. The State. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Gerard Bradley Kleinrock, Decatur, for Appellant.
Paul L. Howard Jr., Dist. Atty., Atlanta, Marc A. Mallon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
After a jury trial, Desmond Daniel was convicted of burglary. He appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of a jury charge on trespass as a lesser offense, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. However, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, there was no evidence to authorize a jury charge on trespass as a lesser offense, and there has been no showing that trial counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm.
Newsome v. State , 324 Ga.App. 665, 751 S.E.2d 474 (2013). Byrd v. State , 325 Ga.App. 24, 752 S.E.2d 84 (2013).
So viewed, the evidence shows that at approximately 9:30 a.m., on November 25, 2009, Daniel opened a fence gate and entered the victims' property; went to the back door of their house and knocked on the door; upon no one answering the knock, Daniel broke in the back door and entered an enclosed porch; he then attempted to remove the hinges of a door leading into the interior of the house, where the victims had many valuable items, including a computer, television, video game consoles, and leather goods.
At the time of the attempted break-in, 11-year-old M.R. was inside the house alone, while both of his parents were at work. M.R. called 911 and reported the incident. A patrol officer responded to the call within two minutes, heard a loud metal-on-metal noise as Daniel was still trying to gain entry through the door, confronted Daniel with his weapon drawn, and ordered him to show his hands. Daniel came out from the porch with his hands up and said, “You got me.” As the officer handcuffed him, Daniel told the officer, “I can get you a murderer.”
Daniel was charged with burglary in violation of OCGA § 16–7–1 in that he unlawfully entered the victims' premises with the intent to commit a theft therein. He argues that the evidence was insufficient because it did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that he did not have the intent to commit theft and instead was simply seeking shelter from the cold. However, Daniel has pointed to no evidence in the record which would support an inference that he was merely seeking shelter. Conversely, “[t]he presence of valuables inside the premises can support an inference of intent to steal, particularly when no other motive is apparent.” Miller v. State , 208 Ga.App. 547, 547–548, 430 S.E.2d 873 (1993) (citations and punctuation omitted). In this case, evidence showing “[t]he presence of valuables, such as [the victims'] television [, computer and other goods], is sufficient to support an inference of [Daniel's] intent to steal.” Howard v. State , 227 Ga.App. 5, 8(6)(b), 488 S.E.2d 489 (1997) (citation omitted). “And the fact that [Daniel] may have failed in accomplishing his apparent purpose does not render a finding of burglary improper.” Bradshaw v. State , 172 Ga.App. 330, 332, 323 S.E.2d 253 (1984) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, “the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of burglary as alleged in the indictment.” Howard , supra.
Daniel contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary. Our review of this issue is only for plain error. Although Daniel filed a written request for such an instruction and objected at the charge conference when the court indicated that it would not give the charge, Daniel failed to object to the jury charge that the court eventually gave.
Because an objection voiced at the charge conference does not preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given, the failure to object to the charge as given precludes appellate review unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties. Despite the lack of objection below, the omission of the jury instruction [on criminal trespass] was raised on motion for new trial and enumerated as error and argued on appeal in this case. Consequently, we will review the failure to charge on [criminal trespass], but we review only for plain error, meaning an error that is obvious, that likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We find no plain error here.
Merritt v. State , 292 Ga. 327, 330–331, 737 S.E.2d 673 (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Hiley v. State , 245 Ga.App. 900, 539 S.E.2d 530 (2000) (citations and punctuation omitted).
However, in this case, Daniel did not testify at trial or present any other evidence negating any element of the crime of burglary.
Rather, as noted above and as properly found by the trial court, while the state presented evidence from which the jury could infer an intent to steal, there was no evidence that Daniel was merely seeking shelter when he tried to break into the area of the victims' house containing valuables. ...
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