Darlene C, In Interest of, 21882

• Decision Date: 16 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 21882,21882
• Citation: 278 S.C. 664,301 S.E.2d 136
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Interest of DARLENE C., a Child Under Seventeen Years of Age, Appellant.

Page 136

301 S.E.2d 136

278 S.C. 664

In the Interest of DARLENE C., a Child Under Seventeen Years of Age, Appellant.

No. 21882.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 16, 1983.

Asst. Appellate Defender William Isaac Diggs, of S.C. Com'n of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Retired Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Martha L. McElveen, Columbia, for respondent.

HARWELL, Justice:

This is an appeal from a juvenile proceeding in Family Court. Appellant alleges the court erred in adjudicating her delinquent and committing her to the Department of Youth Services for an indeterminate period not exceeding her twenty-first birthday. We remand for resentencing.

During oral argument appellant's counsel stated that appellant served several months in the detention center and is presently on probation. Normally, this would render the case moot, but we find the issue raised is "capable of repetition but evading review" and, therefore, take jurisdiction. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

On February 9, 1982, the family court found appellant, a sixteen year old, to be a runaway child. It ordered her to be placed in the North Augusta Girls' Home and to receive counseling from the Mental Health Center. Further, the order stated that if appellant failed to abide by its mandate, the court would find her in contempt. Two days later, appellant promptly ran away again. Consequently, the family court issued a Rule to Show Cause as to why appellant should not be held in contempt of court for violating the previous court order. Appellant appeared at the Rule to Show Cause hearing but offered no defense. Thereafter, the judge ruled her in contempt of his February 9 order. The judge acknowledged that appellant had appeared before him on several occasions as a truant and runaway, a status offender. A status offense is one which, if committed by an adult would not be a crime. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-30(6) (1981 Cum.Supp.). The legislature has mandated that a status offender not be placed in a detention facility. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-600 (1981 Cum.Supp.). Nevertheless, the court concluded that by violating the previous order, appellant elevated her status to one of a delinquent. The court sentenced her as a delinquent to commitment in a detention center for an indeterminate period not to exceed her twenty-first birthday.

The issue is whether a juvenile who commits criminal contempt by running away in violation of a court order may be given a disposition reserved for delinquents who have committed offenses which would be crimes if committed by an adult. We conclude that, under the most egregious circumstances as we have here, family courts may exercise their contempt power in such a manner that a status offender will be incarcerated in a secure facility.

Although we have held that juvenile offenders may be punished only as prescribed by the South Carolina Children's Code, Matter of Westbrooks, S.C., 288 S.E.2d 395 (1982), the Code specifically provides that it shall be interpreted in conjunction with all relevant laws and regulations. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-20 (1981 Cum.Supp.). Therefore, when dealing with juveniles, family courts may look to their inherent powers as well as to the Children's Code. All courts possess the inherent power to punish contemnors. That power is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the courts' judgments, orders and writs and consequently to the due administration of justice. Curlee v. Howle, S.C., 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982). We conclude the family court properly held appellant in contempt. In this case the record reflects that appellant had appeared in family court for the status offenses of running away and truancy. She appeared in court fourteen different times over a two and a half year span. In this particular instance, she ran away from the very home in which she asked to be placed.

We acknowledge the legislature's concern with the effects of commingling disobedient children with juveniles who have allegedly committed more serious crimes. However, the legislature has not dealt adequately with the problem of chronic runaways. By enacting ...