David Cabrera, Inc. v. Union de Choferes y Duenos
| Decision Date | 17 August 1966 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 207-66. |
| Citation | 256 F. Supp. 839 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | DAVID CABRERA, INC., a corporation and/or Superior Sand & Gravel, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff, v. UNIÓN de CHOFERES y DUEÑOS de CAMIONES HERMANADOS de PUERTO RICO, and/or its officers and/or its members and/or Jose N. Bonilla, Defendant. |
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Ernesto Maldonado Perez, San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.
Jose Perez Rodriguez, San Juan, P. R., for defendant.
This case has been brought before this Court on a complaint for "Injunction and Damages" filed by David Cabrera, Inc. against Unión de Choferes y Dueños de Camiones Hermanados de Puerto Rico (Union). Plaintiff Cabrera is in the business of furnishing sand, gravel and broken stone to the construction businesses in Puerto Rico. These products are obtained from the Puerto Rican shores of the North Coast of the Island and the beds of the rivers within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In turn, the sand, gravel and stone are transported by independent contractors who belong to Union. Some of these independent contractors own and drive their own trucks. Others employ drivers for their trucks. Both, contractors and their employees, are members of Union. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Union from any activity, peaceful (such as concerted refusal to work) or otherwise, that might interfere with his business.
Jurisdiction is alleged under 15 U.S. C.A. § 26 and 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that Union has interfered with interstate commerce by conspiring to control the construction industry in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, since the material processed by the plaintiffs are a basic ingredient of construction, together with other materials which move in interstate commerce.
In short, plaintiff alleges that the refusal of Union to carry his sand, stone and gravel interferes with interstate commerce since this is one of the ingredients of construction work, together with other ingredients which are imported into the Commonwealth. Hence, he claims, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
At the outset, we may point out that to suggest jurisdiction based on these grounds is somewhat strained. However, plaintiff advances two arguments on this point. These are his exact words:
Before briefly setting out plaintiff's argument on these points, it may be well to recall section 12 of Title 15 of the United States Code. It is there stated in its pertinent part, that:
"Commerce," as used herein, means trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State, Territory, or foreign nation, or between any insular possessions or other places under the jurisdiction of the United States, or between any such possession or place and any State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or any foreign nation, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided, That nothing in this Act contained shall apply to the Philippine Islands.
Plaintiff's argument regarding his first point, if we read it correctly, suggests, in a rather veiled fashion, two things:
In order to settle both of these points, it is completely unnecessary to delve into the question of the political status of Puerto Rico as a Commonwealth, as the plaintiff seems to suggest. It is obvious from 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 that Congress is not using the term "territory" in its broad meaning. Its use, together with the use within the same statute of the terms "State", "District of Columbia", "foreign nation", "insular possession" and "place under the jurisdiction of the United States", indicates the intent of Congress to be precise in the terminology used in this statute. The clear intent was to refer to territory in its political sense. We are governed by that intent in the interpretation thereof.
The second point is plainly erroneous. Whatever the political and juridical status of Puerto Rico may be, it is totally irrelevant to the case under consideration and we are not deciding this point in any manner. Public Law 81-600, 64 Stat. 319, was enacted as part of the progressive recognition by Congress of the right of the people of Puerto Rico to govern themselves. In so doing, Congress and Puerto Rico, in their compact, continued in effect section 9 of the Jones Organic Act, 39 Stat. 954, to the extent that "the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States * * *." 64 Stat. 319.
Thus, we are bound to view this particular law now under our consideration as having the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States, for we have not found, nor has it been shown to us, that it has otherwise been provided by the Congress and the People of Puerto Rico, through a compact or otherwise, nor that it is locally inapplicable.
The law as stated guides us in looking at the second point of argument. We do not assume that "Puerto Rico is now the equal of a State". We do not have to. Whatever the equality or the inequality of the Commonwealth to a State, the Federal Relations Act, 64 Stat. 319, at sec. 4, specifies that, in considering a statute such as the one here interposed, it "shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States."
Plaintiff's argument on this point is quite short and we transcribe it here almost in its entirety.
* * * the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that the construction industry depends in great measure upon interstate commerce. It can also take judicial notice of the fact that sand, gravel and stone are the very nerve centers of such industry. Indeed, it can be argued that without sand, gravel and stone there can be no construction industry and that as a consequence thereof many other industries, interstate in nature, would be adversely affected. Certainly more interstate commerce is affected in our situation that in the case of United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010, wherein the Supreme Court stated "(s)ection 1 of the (Sherman) Anti-Trust Act outlaws unreasonable restraints on interstate commerce regardless of the amount of commerce affected. Cfr. Mercer v. United States, (C.C.A., N.J., 1931), 61 F.2d 97 92; Page v. Work, (C.A. Cal., 1961), 290 F.2d 323.
The Commerce Clause granted to Congress a power which, without doubt, is one of the greatest possessed by that legislative body, as well as one of the most far reaching. Striking examples of this have recently been made clear in issues regarding civil rights. Cfr. Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, (1964), 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258.
Nevertheless, the Constitution did not wipe out the federal system in this matter, and we must still reckon with a distinction between what jurisdiction lies in the State and what lies in the Federal Government, on these matters. The case history of this distinction is very long and runs from Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824), 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23, to the present.
First we will consider the distinctions between intrastate and interstate commerce; then we will...
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