Davis v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 23 September 2021
• Docket Number: 2018-CT-01184-SCT
• Parties: STACEY DAVIS v. JAMES LESLIE HENDERSON
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

STACEY DAVIS v. JAMES LESLIE HENDERSON

No. 2018-CT-01184-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi

September 23, 2021

DATE OF JUDGMENT 06/04/2019

MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT HON. ROBERT GEORGE CLARK, III TRIAL JUDGE

TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS PAUL E. ROGERS CLAYTON HAROL GESTES JEFFREY GRAY BAKER HOUSTON DAVID RANDALL WADE MEDA BYRD LINDLEY MATTHEW CHARLES RAPHAEL, JR. TRACY A. BOWEN BRIDGET RENEA TODD DAVID BRIDGES

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT PAUL E. ROGERS MARY CATHERINE WILLIAMS

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE DAVID RANDALL WADE

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BEAM JUSTICE

¶1. This certiorari case considers the temporary termination of a father's child-support obligation. Because we find that the Court of Appeals did not apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applicable to the chancery court's decision, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. We reinstate and affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

FACTS

¶2. James "Jim" Henderson and Stacey Davis were divorced in April 2004. In May 2005, Stacey received sole legal and physical custody of the parties' two minor sons subject to Jim's visitation rights.^[1] Since then, the parties have been in numerous proceedings involving custody, visitation, and contempt. In 2018, Jim filed his sixth petition for citation of contempt against Stacey and a petition to terminate his financial obligations for one of the minor sons, C.R.H.

¶3. After the hearing,

The chancery court found that "the failure for visitation between the minors and Jim primarily lies with the minors' desire not to see their father." The chancery court ruled "that the actions of the minors are clear and extreme enough to warrant a temporary suspension of child support until such time as all parents and all children participate in co-parenting and reunification counseling." It further ruled that "Jim's obligation to pay child support . . . [was] temporarily suspended until such time as Jim, Stacey, L.S.H., and C.R.H . . . . participated in co-parenting and parental reunification counseling[.]"

A year later, the chancery court issued its final judgment and granted Jim's request to terminate his financial obligation to C.R.H. The court held that "C.R.H.'s hostility towards his father and his abandonment of the father-son relationship constitute[d] clear and extreme conduct, and warrant[ed] the termination of Jim's obligation to pay child support for C.R.H." It further held that "Jim's child support obligation for C.R.H. [was] terminated, until such time as C.R.H. [ ] resumed his regular visitation with [Jim] on a consistent basis and a viable father-son relationship exists between C.R.H. and Jim." The court found that L.S.H. had some relationship with his father and reinstated Jim's child-support obligation to him. Jim's child-support obligation for the children was reduced by half, to $1, 000 per month.

Davis v. Henderson, No. 2018-CA-001184-COA, 2020 WL 5793021, at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2020) (alterations in original).

¶4. The chancellor determined that the lack of visitation between C.R.H. and Jim has been an ongoing, long-term occurrence because of C.R.H.'s desire not to see his father. While the paramount reason for failure of visitation was the minors, Stacey's contempt also prevented this from taking place.

¶5. The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor's decision, disagreeing with the chancellor that C.R.H. and Stacey were responsible for the strained relationship. Id. at *7. The Court of Appeals found that Jim's conduct caused the lack of visitation. Id. at *6.

¶6. Jim filed a petition for writ of certiorari and argued that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with well-established law, which articulates the applicable standard of appellate review. We granted the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. "The standard of appellate review in domestic-relations matters is quite limited. A chancellor must be manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or apply an erroneous legal standard in order for this Court to reverse." Johnson v. Gray, 859 So.2d 1006, 1012 (Miss. 2003) (citing Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So.2d 815, 818 (Miss. 2003)). "[F]indings of fact made by a chancellor may not be set aside or disturbed upon appeal if they are supported by substantial, credible evidence." Marascalco v. Marascalco, 445 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Miss. 1984).

DISCUSSION

¶8. This Court in Caldwell v. Caldwell recognized that there might be instances when a child's actions could cause a forfeiture of child support. Caldwell v Caldwell, 579 So.2d 543, 548 (Miss. 1991). "Those actions would have to be clear and extreme[.]" Id.

¶9. Here, the chancellor found that C.R.H.'s hostility and abandonment of the father-son relationship were clear and extreme, warranting termination of Jim's child-support obligations.

¶10. C.R.H. testified that he has not seen his father since January 2015 and that he has no interest in having a relationship with his father. He testified that he does not respond to text messages or phone calls from his father and, in fact, he would rather go to jail than to visit his father. C.R.H. told the guardian ad litem he hated his father and did not need his father in his life.

¶11. Therefore, the chancellor determined that Jim's obligation was terminated "until such time as C.R.H. has resumed his regular visitation with his father on a consistent basis and a viable father-son relationship exists."

¶12. In Copeland v. Copeland, the chancellor terminated a father's child-support obligations when the children sent hateful emails and texts stating they wished he were dead. Copeland v. Copeland, 235 So.3d 91, 96 (Miss. 2017). The chancellor found that the children's conduct amounted to the extreme conduct permitting a termination of a father's child-support obligation but "left the door open for reconciliation and expressed his willingness to reconsider the resumption of child support." Id. at 94 (citing Caldwell, 579 So.2d at 548). This Court affirmed the ruling of the chancellor. Id.

When reviewing a chancellor's decision to terminate a parent's financial obligations to his or her child, we do not ask if the decision is the same one we would have made. Rather we are instructed to give the chancellor deference and ask whether the decision is one the chancellor could have made.

Id. at 97 (quoting Stasny v. Wages, 116 So.3d 195, 196 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)).

¶13. We find that the Court of Appeals did not adhere to this standard of review. In stark contrast to the chancellor's findings, the Court of Appeals found that "the proximate cause of the erosion of the relationship lies with Jim[, ]" Davis, 2020 WL 5793021, at *7, and while "C.R.H. and Jim are estranged because of C.R.H.'s refusal to see or speak to Jim[, ] . . . [t]he estrangement between father and son stems from Jim's abuse and neglect." Id. at *6. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that "C.R.H.'s conduct does not rise to the level of 'clear and extreme' actions." Id. at *7.

¶14. Similarly, Justice Kitchens's dissent concludes, after a lengthy recitation of the facts, that C.R.H.'s actions do not rise to the elevated standard in Caldwell.

¶15. But, without finding "the chancellor abused [his] discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied[, ] "we must affirm findings of fact by the chancellor. Borden v. Borden, 167 So.3d 238, 241 (Miss. 2014) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Robison v. Lanford, 841 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Miss. 2003)). As long as substantial evidence supports the chancellor's findings, an appellate court is without authority to disturb them, even if it would have found otherwise as an original matter. Joel v. Joel, 43 So.3d 424, 429 (Miss. 2010) (citing Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So.2d 876, 880-81 (Miss. 2005).

¶16. The dissent highlights cases in which termination of child-support obligations were not warranted under the Caldwell standard, but these cases are factually different. In Department of Human Services v. Marshall, this Court reversed the chancellor's findings that "[o]ne bad visit. . . does not rise to the level. . . envisioned by Caldwell." Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Marshall, 859 So.2d 387, 390 (Miss. 2003). Here, the chancellor did not find it was one bad visit. The chancellor found that the lack of visitation was an ongoing, long-term occurrence. In Dennis v. Dennis, this Court affirmed the chancellor who found that a twelve-year-old was "not old enough to appreciate that [the] failure to have a relationship. . . is legally significant." Dennis v. Dennis, 234 So.3d 371, 374 (Miss. 2017). Here, C.R.H. was nearing college age at the time of the hearing in 2019, and C.R.H. testified that he had not seen his father since 2015 and had no interest in having a relationship with him.

¶17. The dissent finds that we are reversing for the lack of evidence of abuse and neglect. While we do find that the Court of Appeals went beyond the chancellor's findings and found abuse and neglect, which are not supported by the record, the major flaw is the Court of Appeals' failing to the defer to the chancellor's findings.

¶18. The only allegation of abuse was an incident that happened in 2014. Jim made C.R.H. hold his hands against the wall for a period of time until he cried. L.S.H. testified that Jim slapped him on his neck. School workers noticed the marks and called the Mississippi Department of Human Services.

¶19. Stacey claims that DHS investigated and substantiated the charge, which the Court of Appeals accepted without any other evidence. Jim testified that Judge Goree reviewed these charges in prior proceedings and found nothing. The guardian ad litem concluded at the time that it was an isolated incident and that it did not warrant any change in the...