Dennis v. Dennis

• Decision Date: 03 August 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 2016–CA–00425–SCT,2016–CA–00425–SCT
• Citation: 234 So.3d 371
• Parties: Thomas M. DENNIS v. Shelia F. DENNIS
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

234 So.3d 371

Thomas M. DENNIS

v.Shelia F. DENNIS

NO. 2016–CA–00425–SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

August 3, 2017

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAVID C. OWEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: SHELIA F. DENNIS (PRO SE)

BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., KING AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.

CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Thomas Dennis appeals from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Lowndes County, arguing that the chancellor erred by denying a petition to terminate his child-support obligations with respect to his step-great-grandchild, J.R.H.¹ We affirm the decision of the chancellor.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On March 28, 1994, Thomas Dennis ("Dennis") and Sheila Sims Dennis ("Sims") were married to each other.² Prior to her relationship with Dennis, Sims had a daughter named Renee Wright. Renee then had a daughter named Courtney; thus, Courtney is Sims's granddaughter. Courtney married Josh Hartzell, and they are the natural parents of J.R.H. Therefore, Sims is J.R.H.'s great-grandmother and, by extension, Dennis was J.R.H.'s step-great-grandfather. J.R.H. and Dennis are not blood-related in any way.

¶ 3. In May 2005, the Mississippi Department of Human Services ("DHS") informed Sims that J.R.H.'s natural parents (the Hartzells) had gotten into legal trouble. According to Sims, DHS told her that she could either come get J.R.H. or that DHS would put the child "in the system." So, in October 2005, Dennis, Sims, and the Hartzells filed a Joint Petition for Child Custody in Lowndes County. All parties agreed that it would be in the best interest of J.R.H. to be placed in the custody of and reside with Dennis and Sims. In the petition, the Hartzells each agreed to pay $106 per month to Dennis and Sims for the care, maintenance, and support of J.R.H. The Hartzells also requested visitation rights for alternating weekends, holidays, and summers. On March 13, 2006, the Chancery Court of Lowndes County entered an order granting the parties' requests.

¶ 4. About six months later, on or around October 10, 2006, Dennis and Sims separated. Two years later, on June 11, 2008, Sims filed for divorce. A judgment granting an irreconcilable-differences divorce was entered one year later on June 23, 2009. Incorporated into the divorce decree was a Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement") which gave Sims sole legal custody of J.R.H. In the Agreement, Dennis agreed to pay $400 per month to Sims for child support, and he was granted visitation rights with J.R.H.³ According to Dennis, he exercised his visitation rights with J.R.H. until the child refused to see him anymore.

¶ 5. At some point after Dennis's and Sims's divorce, J.R.H. cut off any relationship with Dennis. According to Sims, Dennis told J.R.H. that he was happy that the child's grandmother (Sims's daughter Renee Wright) had died. Dennis denies making any such statement. Regardless of what was said, it is undisputed that J.R.H. currently refuses to see or speak to Dennis. Sims further stated that she will not make J.R.H. see Dennis and that the "relationship is terminated as long as [J.R.H.] wants it to be that way."

¶ 6. On November 20, 2015, Dennis filed an amended petition to consolidate the divorce matter and the child-custody matter and to modify the child-custody and support agreement. In his petition, Dennis argued that the chancellor should allow him to relinquish his custody of J.R.H. and to terminate any ongoing⁴ child-support obligations. According to the petition, Dennis "wrongfully believed that some sort of legal duty existed pursuant to applicable law for him to pay child support." Dennis claimed to have "never developed any real parental/familiar relationship with J.R.H." and that J.R.H. had terminated any relationship with him. He also claimed that J.R.H.'s "parents still have parental visitation rights and have the legal obligation to provide child support."

¶ 7. The chancellor held a hearing and ultimately denied Dennis's requested relief. The chancellor concluded that no material change in circumstances had arisen. The chancellor also rejected Dennis's argument that his child-support obligations should be terminated because of J.R.H.'s refusal to see or speak to him for two years. He reasoned that the child was only twelve years old and therefore "not old enough to appreciate that [the] failure to have a relationship with Mr. Dennis is legally significant." Dennis now appeals, raising nine issues. We restate and combine these issues into three arguments for clarity:

I. Whether there is a legal basis for child support or, alternatively, whether the collapse of the relationship justifies termination.

II. Whether the natural parents' ongoing parental obligations establish that Dennis should not be required to pay child support.

III. Whether Dennis should be permitted voluntarily to terminate his custodial obligations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. Our review of a chancellor's decision is limited. Dep't of Human Servs., State of Mississippi v. Marshall , 859 So.2d 387, 389 (Miss. 2003). "We will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless the court was manifestly wrong, abused its discretion or applied an erroneous legal standard." Id. Legal questions receive de novo review. Sanford v. Sanford , 124 So.3d 647, 652–53 (Miss. 2013).

DISCUSSION

¶ 9. We first note that Sims, who proceeded pro se below, failed to file an appellee's brief with this Court. Generally, the "[f]ailure of an appellee to file a brief is tantamount to confession of error and will be accepted as such unless the reviewing court can say with confidence, after considering the record and brief of appealing party, that there was no error." Sanders v. Chamblee , 819 So.2d 1275, 1277 (Miss. 2002) (quoting Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp. , 458 So.2d 714, 717 (Miss. 1984) ). "Where the appellant's brief makes out an apparent case of error ..., we do not regard it as our obligation to look to the record to find a way to avoid the force of the appellants' argument." Id.

¶ 10. This Court, however, may choose to review a case on the merits of the record without an appellee's brief when the case "involves an issue affecting the public interest[.]" Id. Because this case concerns issues regarding child custody and support modification, as well as who may be held accountable for child-support obligations, we choose to review this case on the merits. See Allred v. Allred , 735 So.2d 1064, 1067 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ("Because, to some extent, this proceeding touches on matters relating to the welfare of minor children, this Court has determined to reach the merits of the issues in this appeal, though we proceed unaided by a brief from the appellee.").

I. Whether there is a legal basis for child support or, alternatively, whether the collapse of the relationship justifies termination.

¶ 11. Dennis's primary argument is that he has no duty to provide support to J.R.H. because he is not the child's parent. Citing Mississippi Code Section 93–5–23,⁵ he argues that only the natural parents of a child or those standing in loco parentis have support obligations.

¶ 12. This Court has "defined a person acting in loco parentis as one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption." Logan v. Logan , 730 So.2d 1124, 1126 (Miss. 1998). "Any person who takes a child of another into his home and treats it as a member of his family, providing parental supervision, support and education, as if it were his own child is said to stand [in loco parentis ]." Griffith v. Pell , 881 So.2d 184, 186 n.1 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Logan , 730 So.2d at 1126 ). Here, Dennis argues that he is not in loco parentis and that he never sought to supplant J.R.H.'s relationship with the natural parents. To the contrary, he claims that he spent less than a year in the same home with J.R.H. before moving out and separating from Sims and never assumed the role of stepfather. Therefore, he argues that the chancellor erred by not allowing him voluntarily to terminate his obligations because no duty exists for him to pay child support.

¶ 13. From the outset, we restate that a third party who takes temporary custody of a child and who does not stand in loco parentis has no obligation to support the child once the custody has ended. In Williams v. Williams , this Court held that "in the absence of consanguinity, legal adoption, or a knowing and voluntary assumption of the obligation to provide support, the law will not compel one who has stood in the place of a parent to support the child after the relationship has ceased." Williams v. Williams , 843 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2003) (quoting NPA v. WBA , 8 Va.App. 246, 251, 380 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1989) ). Every day, family members, foster parents, and others take on responsibility to care and provide for children for various reasons, including situations like the case at hand where the natural parents apparently were unable to do so. Holding third parties accountable for child-support obligations after their custody has ended may cause people to be less likely to take custody of a child out of benevolence. Therefore, simply by agreeing to take custody of J.R.H. when DHS called, Dennis did not assume a legal obligation to provide for J.R.H. after his custody ended.

¶ 14. The analysis, however, does not end here under the facts of this case. Here, Dennis agreed to provide child support for J.R.H. in the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement incorporated into his irreconcilable-differences divorce decree. Therefore, the issue is not whether Dennis has a statutory duty to pay child support, but rather whether he has a quasicontractual obligation to do so. "We do not hold that a man who is not a child's biological father can be absolved of his support obligations in all cases. Those who have adopted the child or voluntarily and knowingly assumed the obligation of support will be required to continue doing so. " Id. at n.1 (citing NPA , 380 S.E.2d at 181 ) ...