Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 31 August 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 5D17-745
• Citation: 253 So.3d 1234
• Parties: Jahquell DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

253 So.3d 1234

Jahquell DAVIS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-745

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed August 31, 2018

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock Mcguigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

EDWARDS, J.

This case deals with the application of the Melton¹ elements to Appellant's claim that his transport to and lengthy detention at the sheriff's office constituted an "arrest" for purposes of Florida's speedy trial rule, which requires a person charged with a felony to be tried within 175 days of arrest. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (d).² Appellant, Jahquell Davis, argues that he was "arrested" on May 29, 2014, when he and several others were transported to the sheriff's office. Over a period of several hours, each was questioned in turn by a single detective as part of an investigation into a violent robbery that occurred earlier that day at a metal recycling facility.

When it was Appellant's turn to be interviewed he agreed to talk with the detective and voluntarily submitted to DNA and gunshot residue testing at the station. Following a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's speedy trial-based motion for discharge. Appellant was tried, found guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, and sentenced to forty years in the Department of Corrections. We agree with the trial court's factual findings and its legal conclusion that an investigatory detention took place on May 29, 2014, which did not constitute an arrest for speedy trial purposes. For the reasons set forth in more detail below, we affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for discharge.

A trial court's ruling on a speedy trial-based motion for discharge presents mixed questions of fact and law. See State v. Glatzmayer , 789 So.2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001). The trial court's factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent, substantial evidence, but its legal conclusions are subject to de novo review. Id.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On May 29, 2014, sheriff's deputies responded to a robbery and shooting at OU Metal Recycling. Video surveillance was used to identify the getaway vehicle involved in the robbery; it was later found outside a house. Using a loudspeaker, deputies ordered the occupants out of the house. When nobody responded to that command, the S.W.A.T. team was deployed to the scene. The stand-off ended approximately ninety minutes later, when Appellant, four other males, and two females exited the house. The males were instructed to stand along the curb near the house while a show-up was conducted, during which one victim recognized one of the men—not Appellant—as the driver of the getaway vehicle.

Deputies believed that it would be impractical to interview the five males at the house because it was in a high crime area, the S.W.A.T. team and news media surrounded the area, and the detective handling the investigation had multiple people to interview. Accordingly, the males were handcuffed, placed into individual squad cars, transported to the sheriff's department, and placed in separate rooms in a secured area of the building, where their handcuffs were removed. After being read their Miranda³ rights, they were sequentially interviewed by the same detective. All the males were eventually swabbed for gunshot residue and DNA.

The detective, who referred to Appellant's status as "investigative detention," began his interview of Appellant by apologizing for the delay in getting to him. Appellant testified at his evidentiary hearing that he agreed to speak to the detective and consented to the gunshot residue and DNA testing because he wanted to help and also wanted to clear his name. During this time, Appellant was not informed he was free to leave. Indeed, outside the door of his interview room was a uniformed deputy who would not have permitted him to leave. During the approximately four to six hours that Appellant was at the sheriff's department, he was never told he was under arrest, that he was suspected of committing the robbery, or that he was charged with any crime.

The detective ended his interview of Appellant by advising him that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. The detective offered Appellant transportation, which Appellant declined. At the time Appellant was released, there was no information connecting him to the robbery or shooting beyond his presence at the house where the getaway vehicle was found.

Appellant was not formally arrested until June 17, 2015, after the investigation was essentially completed and after two different witnesses identified Appellant as one of the robbers. The information charging Appellant was filed on June 19, 2015. Appellant moved for discharge, arguing that his prosecution was barred by Florida's speedy trial rule as far more than 175 days had passed since his May 29, 2014 detention.

Appellant preserved this speedy trial issue by making a pre-trial motion, seeking a writ of prohibition, renewing his motion during trial, and pursuing this timely appeal following his jury trial and conviction.

ANALYSIS

The only disputed legal issue is whether Appellant's detention on May 29, 2014, constituted an arrest for speedy trial purposes. If it was an arrest for speedy trial purposes, then he was entitled to a permanent discharge as requested because of the time that passed between detention and trial. However, as the trial court did below and as we do now, employing the four Melton elements to analyze Appellant's May 29, 2014 detention leads to the conclusion that the detention was not an arrest for speedy trial purposes.

Before we begin our analysis of whether this was an "arrest," it is important to recognize and acknowledge that a person may be "in custody" for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings, yet not have been "arrested" for purposes of the speedy trial rule. Williams v. State , 757 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Griffin v. State , 474 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1985) ). Likewise, police "seizure" of an individual may trigger Fourth Amendment protection and yet not constitute an arrest for purposes of speedy trial. Id. The rights listed in the Miranda warnings and the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure are triggered when a person is taken into custody or seized, regardless of whether any criminal charges are contemplated or levied.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a speedy trial to limit the duration of possible public scorn, adverse impact on employment, and other consequences brought about by arrest or indictment that can only be cleared by a verdict of not guilty or permanent dismissal of the charges. See Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). "This guarantee [of a speedy trial] is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." United States v. Ewell , 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966) ; see also State v. Lott , 286 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973) (quoting Ewell with approval ). Given that the speedy trial rule is designed to protect against the adverse impacts of arrest or indictment pursuant to criminal charges, it follows that the right to a speedy trial is triggered only "(1) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the crime charged or (2) when the person is served with a notice to appear in lieu of physical arrest." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d).

Appellant, the State, the trial court, and this court all agree that the seminal case on what constitutes an arrest under the speedy trial rule is Melton v. State . In that case, the Florida Supreme Court defined an arrest as follows:

It is uniformly held that an arrest, in the technical and restricted sense of the criminal law, is "the apprehension or taking into custody of an alleged offender, in order that he [or she] may be brought into the proper court to answer for a crime." When used in this sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him.

Melton , 75 So.2d at 294 (internal citations omitted).⁴ All four Melton elements must be present to conclude that an arrest has occurred. Brown v. State , 623 So.2d 800, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

The first Melton element is "[a] purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority." 75 So.2d at 294. Here, the detective testified that it was not his purpose or intent to arrest Appellant on May 29, 2014, because Appellant was not suspected of having committed any crime at that point. Thus, the trial court's pretrial factual finding that there was no purpose or intent to effect an arrest on May 29, 2014, is supported by competent, substantial evidence. The trial court received additional evidence as the case progressed which confirmed that there was initially no probable cause to support a legal arrest, and that Appellant was not a suspect on May 29, 2014. The DNA testing was inconclusive as to Appellant, and the deputy who performed the gunshot...