Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 02 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-14-00378-CR,05-14-00378-CR |
| Parties | RONNIE DEAN DAVIS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5 Dallas County, Texas
Before Justices Lang, Stoddart, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Stoddart
A jury convicted Ronnie Dean Davis of possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine. In four issues, Davis argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, his sentence is void, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the law of parties, and the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury it must resolve any reasonable doubt in favor of a lesser-included offense. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The Dallas Police Department received a citizen's complaint about a house located at 6045 Wofford Drive in Dallas. They decided to perform a "knock-and-talk," which is a consensual encounter between the police and residents of a house during which the officers seek consent to search the home. On July 16, 2013, when the officers executed the knock-and-talk, a woman peeked through one of the glass windows in the door. They knocked again, announced"Dallas Police Department," and a woman answered the door. Officer Joshua Romero testified the woman, later identified as Monica Day, Romero introduced himself and explained the citizen's complaint about the house. Day said she lived at the house but was not the homeowner. After the police asked to speak to the homeowner, Day walked away from the door while the officers waited outside. Ronnie Davis then came to the door. Romero explained the police received a complaint about drugs at the house and asked for consent to enter and search the home. Davis denied consent.
While Romero was at the front of the house, two officers were positioned at the back. A woman, later identified as Laci Martinez, attempted to leave from the back of the house, and the officers detained her. She told the officers there were drugs in the house. Based on this information, Romero obtained a search warrant.
Romero entered the house and found In one bedroom, the officers found two bottles of testosterone and a baggie with methamphetamine residue. In Day's bedroom they found a mixing bowl with methamphetamine residue.
In a third bedroom, the officers found mail addressed to Davis at the Wofford Drive address, a wooden sign on the wall that said "Ronnie," and male clothing and shoes (the Bedroom). The Bedroom had a very large, carved headboard with a Harley-Davidson motif. Romero testified that inside the Bedroom, the officers found handcuffs, syringes, packaging materials for narcotics, scales, a BB gun under the mattress, and a shot of methamphetamine. In the closet, a large cardboard box He explained plastic baggies are used for packaging drugs, and a large quantity of baggies indicates a person is selling drugs.Further, he noted the baggies were different colors, which dealers use to differentiate the type and quantity of drugs being sold. Likewise, scales like the ones found in the Bedroom are used to measure drugs being put into the baggies. The officers also found methamphetamine residue near a torn plastic baggie in the Bedroom. A shard of methamphetamine was on the Harley-Davidson headboard; a laboratory tested the shard and determined the total weight was 2.75 grams, including adulterants and dilutants.
From the items collected in the house, Romero concluded the residents were using and distributing drugs. However, Romero testified the officers did not find any narcotics on Davis's person.
Laci Martinez testified she was present when the officers arrived on July 16, 2013, because she spent the preceding night at the house. When she saw the police at the door, she went to awaken Davis who was asleep in the Bedroom. When asked which bedroom belonged to Davis, she stated "There is a nice Harley-Davidson headboard, I guess that he made."
The State entered photos into evidence of Davis's tattoos and the door to the Bedroom. Davis's tattoos include multiple images of skulls. Likewise, the Bedroom door was painted and included skull images; no other door in the house was painted. Pictures of the Bedroom show a skeleton head on top of a metal box.
The State played portions of a few telephone calls made by Davis during his incarceration prior to trial. In one call, he stated: "I'm telling the truth; that room aint [sic] mine." In another call, Davis had the following conversation with a woman:
Davis: Take me a picture of that door too. I want a picture of that door.
Woman: Of what door?
Davis: My door. In my room.
Woman: You want me to print those out so you know what it looks like?
Davis: No, the door. I'm talking about . . . the side that's painted.
The defense presented testimony from a woman who stated she lived in the house at the time of Davis's arrest. She said the house belonged to Davis's cousin and the room with the Harley-Davidson headboard was the cousin's room; she testified Davis slept in a different room. Davis's ex-wife testified she would take their daughter to the house to visit Davis. Davis did not have a Harley-Davidson headboard in his room; the room with the Harley-Davidson headboard belonged to his roommate.
In his first issue, Davis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing he was either the primary actor or a party to the offense. Davis concedes he was present when the drugs were found and the drugs were in plain view, but argues the room where the methamphetamine was found was not his room, and there is no evidence linking the drugs to him.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of a criminal offense for which the State has the burden of proof under the single sufficiency standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Evidence issufficient if "the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict." Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis (1) exercised care, custody, control, or management over a controlled substance, (2) intended to deliver the controlled substance to another, and (3) knew the matter possessed was a controlled substance. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 48.102(6), 481.112(a). Whether direct or circumstantial, the evidence must establish that the accused's connection with the controlled substance was more than fortuitous. Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 594-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Mere presence at a location where drugs are found is insufficient, by itself, to establish possession. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Further, when the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406; see also Blackman, 350 S.W.3d at 594-95.
A nonexclusive list of factors that can be sufficient, either alone or in combination, to establish possession of contraband include: (1) presence when a search is conducted, (2) whether the contraband was in plain view, (3) proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband, (4) the accused being under the influence of narcotics when arrested, (5) possession of other contraband or narcotics when arrested, (6) incriminating statements made by the accused when arrested, (7) an attempt to flee, (8) furtive gestures, (9) an odor of contraband, (10) the presence of other contraband or drug paraphernalia, (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess theplace where the drugs were found, (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed, (13) possession of a large amount of cash, (14) conduct of the accused indicating a consciousness of guilt, (15) the quantity of the contraband, and (16) the accused's presence in a suspicious area under suspicious circumstances. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; Wright v. State, 401 S.W.3d 813, 818-19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd); Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). These are simply some factors which may circumstantially establish the sufficiency of the evidence to prove knowing possession....
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